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CONTRIBUTIONS TO STRUCTURAL MODELING AND ESTIMATION
Wayne-Roy Gayle, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2006
The first chapter of my thesis develops and estimates a dynamic structural partial equilibrium
model of schooling and work decisions. The estimated model explicitly accounts for the simulta-
neous choice of enrolling in school and working. It also allows for endogenous leisure choices,
intertemporal nonseparabilities in preferences, aggregate skill specific productivity shocks, aggre-
gate consumption price effects, and individual heterogeneity. Times spent on schooling, working,
and leisure are treated as continuous choice variables. The estimated model is solved and two
counterfactual simulation exercises are performed. The first is the case where a subsidy is given to
individuals who enroll in school and do not participate in the labor market. The second is the case
where the demands of the school curriculum are increased so that a young man enrolled in school
necessarily spends more time studying. The conclusion is that the latter policy is more effective in
enhancing educational achievements and future wages.
The second chapter of my thesis develops a semiparametric estimator for a dynamic nonlinear
single index panel data model. Flexibility of the model is achieved by assuming that the index
function is unknown. Flexibility in individual heterogeneity is achieved by assuming that the
individual effect is an unknown function of some observable random variable. The paper proposes
an algorithm that estimates each of the finite and infinite dimensional parameters. In particular, the
full data generating process is estimated. This is important if the predicted outcomes are used as
plug-in estimators, as in the multistage estimation of dynamic structural models.
The final chapter of my thesis develops a powerful new algorithm to solve single object first
price auctions where bidders draw independent private values from heterogeneous distributions.
The algorithm allows for the scenario in which groups of symmetric and asymmetric bidders may
iv
collude, and for the auctioneer to set a reserve price. The paper also provides operational univariate
quadratures to evaluate the probabilities of winning as well as the expected revenues for the bidders
and the auctioneer. The expected revenue function is used to the compute optimal reserve under
asymmetric environments.
v
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This thesis simultaneously extends the literatures on econometric theory, applied microeconomics
and computational economics. These extensions are guided by the increasingly recognized, yet
still largely untapped complementarities between these three branches of economics. This com-
plementarity can be explained by a simple philosophy. Developing models to analyze and solve
interesting economic puzzles require understanding and appreciation of the available theoretical
tools. The level of realism achieved when estimating a model with available data is constrained
by the existing econometric technology and the computational feasibility of the solution. The abil-
ity to understand and compute existing estimators, and to develop new ones, therefore allows the
investigator greater flexibility in thinking about and characterizing economic puzzles.
Two key economic puzzles are addressed in this thesis. The first lies essentially in the educa-
tional attainment and returns to education literature. The second lies in the literature of asymmetric
first price auctions with applications to the sustainability of collusions.
The first chapter of this thesis investigates the effects of time allocation between the labor
market and the classroom on educational attainment and future wages. Over the last three decades
more young individuals are participating in the US labor market while actively remaining enrolled
in school. Young individuals are increasing both their incidence of work, as well as the amount of
hours worked while enrolled in school. This trend has generated growing interest in its possible
immediate and long run effects on young individuals.
It is not obvious how working while enrolled in school affects a young individual’s educational
attainment and future labor market opportunities. On one hand, there is valid concern that an inten-
sive amount of working while in school may hinder academic performance and increase drop-out
rates. This is known in the literature is the crowding-out hypothesis. On the other hand, working
while in school may improve a young individual’s organizational skills, sense of responsibility and
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self esteem. This is known as the congruence hypothesis.
Along with the congruence effect other positive effects of working while enrolled in school
include the human capital effect and the cash effect. The human capital effects states that working
while enrolled in school gives the student immediate working experience that is directly rewarded
in the labor market. The cash effect states that working while enrolled in school provides income
for the student that can be used to further finance education, leading to higher educational attain-
ment and thus increased future labor market success.
The objective of the first paper, therefore, is to disentangle these different avenues of effects of
working on educational attainment and future wages. I focus on separating these different effects
because their significance may vary over different groups of individuals.
The key issue then in the first paper is the optimal time allocation between time spent in the
labor market, time spent on school activities, and time spent on leisure. Previous work on the
effects of working on educational attainment has essentially ignored the important fact that in-
dividuals also choose the number of hours they spend on studying and other in school activities
(See Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999 for example). The difficulty with such an analysis is that an hour
increase in the number of time spent in the labor market is interpreted as an hour decrease in
leisure. In reality, the individual could choose to reduce the time spent on school activities instead
of leisure. Such analysis can therefore lead to imprecise or incorrect estimates of the effect of
working on educational attainment and future labor market success.
The abstraction away from time spent on schooling is largely due to insufficient information
on the time use of students. The dataset used in this study is taken from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY79), which is a comprehensive panel data set that follows individuals
who were 14 to 21 years of age as at January 1, 1979. This dataset also contains a single wave of
schooling time use data collected in 1981. This data is notorious for measurement error, and since it
is a single wave, investigators have typically abstracted away from employing this data. I show that
with a suitable method for controlling for measurement errors in study time and also controlling for
permanent individual unobserved heterogeneity, we can indeed get precise estimates of study time.
The estimation of study time is also augmented by including lagged enrollment and labor supply
decisions. This helps tremendously in improving the estimates. The estimated study time function
is then used to predict study time for all individuals in the sample over all applicable years. This
2
strategy however creates a difficult econometric problem.
In a dynamic modelling framework, current decisions depend on the expectation future out-
comes, including future study time. The estimation technique implemented is a modified version
of the Conditional Choice Probability (CCP) estimator of Hotz and Miller [1993] and extended by
Altug and Miller [1998]. In this technique, the expectation of future outcomes is captured in the
probability of future decisions conditioned on the realization of future states of the world. These
probabilities have to be estimated. Direct estimation as proposed by Altug and Miller [1998] would
inadvertently result in conditioning on functions of the same dependent variable that is being used
to estimate the probabilities. In the first paper I propose an alternative method of estimating these
probabilities that avoid this severe endogeneity problem.
Another technical contribution of the first paper is the estimation method and corrected stan-
dard errors. The estimation method combines an efficient iterated GMM (GMMI) with a variation
of the Nested Pseudo Likelihood Algorithm (NPL) proposed by Aguirregabiria and Mira [2002].
This method of estimation results is improved small sample properties of the estimator coming
from both steps. Hansen et al. [1996] shows that iterating over the optimal weighting matrix re-
sults in improved small sample properties of the estimates. Iterating over the CCP’s eliminates
the initial nonparametric estimates and hence also improves the small sample properties of the
estimator.
This process however results in nonstandard correct standard errors of the estimates. I propose
an alternative representation of the corrected standard errors to that of Altug and Miller [1998] by
employing a technique developed in Newey and McFadden [1994], and Newey [1994]. Further-
more, the structure of the state space implies that the law of iterated expectations can be used to
greatly simplify the form of the standard errors. In particular, no post estimation is required to
compute these standard errors. This greatly reduces the computation burden of the CCP estimator.
The estimated results indicate that crowding-out effect outweighs the positive effects for whites
while the congruence and human capital effect outweighs the crowding-out effect of blacks and
Hispanics. A related conclusion found in the same analysis is that modest increases in school
curriculum results in significant increases in the educational attainment and hourly wage rate of
whites and blacks, but only modest increases for Hispanics.
Another exercise performed with this model is to analyze the effects of equating the quality of
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schools of blacks and Hispanics to that of whites. The results indicate that policy would lead to
significant increases the educational attainment of both minority groups. This policy also leads to
significant increases in the hourly wage rate of blacks and more modest increases for Hispanics.
Although this policy leads to a significant narrowing of the race education gap, it does not eliminate
the gap.
The analysis of the effects of increasing the school curriculum is repeated under this new envi-
ronment. The result indicates even larger increases in the educational attainment and hourly wage
rate of blacks. Also in this environment we see the most significant increases in the educational
attainment and hourly wage rates of Hispanics. In other words, Hispanics become significantly
more responsive to policies that increases the time they spend on school activities if the quality of
the school they attend is improved to the quality of the schools whites attend.
In estimating the dynamic structural model, a multistage procedure was implemented. The
potential problem with the multistage procedure is that misspecification of the first stage estima-
tor typically introduces bias in the final stage estimator. Flexible specification of pre-estimators
therefore becomes an important goal. The second chapter of this thesis addresses this problem by
developing a new semiparametric estimator for a dynamic nonlinear single index panel data model
with small T.
In moving away from a fully parameterized nonlinear single index panel data model, there
are trade-offs between which assumptions can be relaxed. In general, relaxing the parametric
assumption on the unobserved heterogeneity requires maintained parametric assumptions about
the index function. Under the assumption that the individual-time specific shocks are independent
and if covariates are unbounded, the finite dimensional parameters can be estimated consistently
with the parametric convergence rate without specifying the distribution of the individual-specific
effects conditional on the covariates if and only if the distribution of the individual-time specific
shocks is logistic [Magnac, 2004]. On the other hand, Manski [1987] has shown that the finite
dimensional parameters can be consistently estimated with only a strict monotonicity assumption
on the index function. However, this estimator does not converge at the parametric rate.
The second chapter of this theses therefore adds to this literature by showing that under the
strict monotonicity assumption on the index function and a flexible assumption of the form of
the individual specific effect, one can still obtain estimates of the finite dimensional parameters
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that converge at the parametric rate. Also the estimator proposed also produces estimates of the
index function and the individual specific effects. In other words, the full data generating process
is recovered. This is important if the intention of the investigator is to perform counterfactual
simulations.
The assumption made on the individual specific effects is that it is an unknown function of
a known random variable. This restriction extends the suggestion of Newey [1994] and arises
naturally in the discrete choice framework. Our own interest however goes beyond the discrete
choice framework. We prove that the resulting estimator is not only
√
n consistent, but that it
achieves the semi-parametric efficiency bound. Thus under the same assumption no other estimator
can obtain a smaller asymptotic variance. The method used to compute the estimator is the back-
fitting algorithm proposed by Buja et al. [1989]. This algorithm has the advantage that it does
not depend on the type of smoother chosen to compute the estimate of the index function. The
investigator can therefore implement a sieve estimator of a kernel estimator.
A small simulation exercise shows that the proposed estimator performs very well in recovering
both the finite dimensional parameters and the index function. This is the case for even small
numbers of observations. The method is also implemented to estimate a wage regression. An
interesting result is that the function recovered resembles the exponential function, which suggests
that the error made by assuming a log-linear wage regression should be relatively small.
The final chapter of this thesis proposes a powerful numerical algorithm to solve independent
private values asymmetric first price auctions where the auctioneer sets a reserve price. Asym-
metry arises from the specification of ex-ante heterogeneous distributions of private values, as
well as from collusion among subsets of bidders. Our algorithm generalizes the seminal work
of Marshall et al. [1994] who consider the special case where n players draw their values from
uniform distributions on [0,1] and a subgroup of k1 < n bidders form a coalition.
We also derive operational univariate quadratures to compute the probability that the auctioneer
retains the item, the probabilities that a particular bidder wins the item as well as expected revenues
for bidders and auctioneer under asymmetric first and second price auctions. Embedding these
calculations within a simplex optimization algorithm enables us to compute an optimal reserve
price under either auction scheme.
These techniques provide us with a powerful tool to numerically investigate whether results
5
derived under symmetry extend to the asymmetric case as well as the (single auction) viability
of collusion among subsets of bidders. Illustrative examples are provided with and without the
assumption of stochastic dominance.
6
2.0 A DYNAMIC STRUCTURAL MODEL OF LABOR SUPPLY AND EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last three decades, there has been an increasing trend of young individuals participating
in the US labor market while actively enrolled in school. Young individuals are increasing their
incidence of labor market participation, and the amount of hours worked while enrolled in school.1
This trend has generated growing interest in the possible immediate and long run effects of working
while enrolled in school on educational attainment and future labor market opportunities. On
one hand, there is the concern that an intensive amount of working while in school may hinder
academic performance and increase drop-out rates, thus jeopardizing future opportunities.2 On the
other hand, working while in school may improve a young individual’s time organizational skills,
sense of responsibility and self esteem, which in turn are traits that may be rewarded in the labor
market in the future. Furthermore, working while in school produces immediate work experience
and cash that may be used to finance their studies.3 It is not obvious which of these two opposing
effects dominate. It may be that the net effect of these opposing forces varies over different groups
of young individuals.
This article develops and estimates a dynamic structural model of schooling and work deci-
sions to investigate the process by which a cohort of young males accumulate human capital over
their life cycle. The theoretical model provides a detailed treatment of the economic costs and ben-
1A recent documentation of this phenomena is found Bacolod and Hotz [2005].
2This apprehension is reflected in the article entitled “Long hours taking toll on youths, studies say,” by Paloma
McGregor, The Plain Dealer, March 5, 2001.
3This opinion was expressed in the article entitled “Teens Find Profit and Loss in Work: Part time jobs bring
experience and cash, but can hinder studies,” by Jacqueline Salmon, The Washington Post, March 28, 1998.
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efits associated with the schooling and labor supply alternatives faced by individuals. Specifically,
the estimated model explicitly accounts for the simultaneous choice of enrollment in school and la-
bor force participation, endogenous leisure choices, intertemporal nonseparabilities in preferences,
aggregate skill specific productivity shocks, aggregate consumption price effects, and individual
heterogeneity.
In addition to accounting for the simultaneous choice of work and schooling, the model treats
hours spent on schooling, working, and leisure as continuous choice variables.4 This approach
is in contrast to other models (see Keane and Wolpin, 1997, and Eckstein and Wolpin [1999] for
examples) that treat leisure time as exogenous to the individual, where an increase in labor supply
is equivalent to a decrease in time spent on schooling activities if the individual is enrolled in
school. In this framework, an individual may optimally choose to sacrifice leisure and increase
time spent on both schooling and labor market activities. In this sense the model is one of optimal
intra- and inter-temporal allocation of time among schooling, working and leisure. The model
also allows for flexible specification of preferences with respect to time allocation. The additional
flexibility comes from the specification of intertemporal nonseparabilities in leisure.
Recent studies of the life-cycle models of labor supply have stressed the importance of in-
tertemporally non-separable preferences.5 Hotz, Kydland, and Sedlacek [1988] found that the as-
sumption of intertemporally separable preferences for leisure is inconsistent with data for prime-
age males. Given that hours schooling activities and leisure are related by the time constraint of
the individual, such nonseparabilities are also likely to affect their enrollment and study patterns.
The estimation results indicate that leisure choices are intertemporal complements. Increases in
current hours of leisure increases the future demand of leisure. In other words, an increase in hours
of current schooling activities decreases the future marginal disutility of schooling. This evidence
of intertemporal complimentarity suggests habit formation by young men.
The primary data used in this study comes from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY79), which is a comprehensive panel data set that follows individuals who were 14 to
4While some studies model these alternatives as mutually exclusive [Keane and Wolpin, 1994,
Cameron and Heckman, 1999], the growing trend is to allow for interior solution to choices where individuals
simultaneously participate in the labor market and attend school (see D’Amico, 1984, Ruhm, 1997, Oettinger, 1999,
and Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999 for examples)
5See Hotz et al., 1988, Eichenbaum et al., 1988, Altug and Miller, 1998, Imai, 2000, and Gayle and Miller, 2003
for examples.
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21 years of age as at January 1, 1979. The estimation technique implemented is a modified
version of the Conditional Choice Probability (CCP) estimator of Hotz and Miller [1993] and
Altug and Miller [1998]. This estimation technique allows for unobserved individual-specific ef-
fects to be arbitrarily correlated with the observed characteristics in the model. The model employs
a fixed effects method of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Other models of education,
such as Eckstein and Wolpin [1999] control for individual-specific effects by way of a random-
effects, finite mixture specification. These techniques typically require that the investigator make
strong independence assumptions on the relationship between the unobserved covariates, and their
observed counterparts. The cost of the flexibility allowed by a fixed effects specification is the re-
sulting incidental parameters problem. We argue, using previous results [Altug and Miller, 1998,
Gayle and Miller, 2003] and evidence from the data used in this paper that these biases are likely
to be small.
The incidence of working, the number of hours worked, and the number of years that young
men spend working while enrolled in school varies across races. Bacolod and Hotz [2005] docu-
ments that the number of years working while in high school increased the most for young Hispanic
men, followed by young black men. Young black men experienced the largest increase in working
while in college. In estimating the parameters of the model, we pay special attention to racial dif-
ferences in outcomes that are not accounted for by the rich set of observed background variables
found in the NLSY79, nor by estimated individual specific effects. The theoretical model provides
a natural separation of these unexplained racial variations into preference differences and statistical
discrimination [Altonji and Blank, 1999].
The empirical results indicate that, conditional on enrolling, young black males are likely to
spend more time on school activities than white males. Young Hispanic males are likely to spend
less time on school activities white males. Furthermore, young black and Hispanic males are less
likely to be promoted from the grade level than young white males. These young minority males
either repeat the grade level or drop out of school during the school year. These racial differences
remain significant after the inclusion of the rich set of demographic variables and measures of
ability that are found in the NLSY79, as well as measures of unobserved individual specific char-
acteristics. The lower probability of grade promotion for blacks and Hispanics is interpreted as
capturing race specific differences in the school environment. Specifically, in the paper we argue
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that this grade promotion probability gap is a measure of the differences in the quality of schools
that blacks and Hispanics attend as against the quality of schools that whites attend.
Controlling for racial differences in wages, and the aforementioned racial differences in study
patterns and grade promotion propensities, the results indicate that there are no race specific dif-
ferences in the propensity of participate in the labor market, the propensity to enroll in school,
nor in the choice of leisure. These results are in contrast to many previous results in structural
estimation that find significant race indicators in their specified utility functions. The result is this
paper suggests that racial disparity in outcomes are due to the racial differences in the school and
work environment, and not to racial differences in tastes and preferences.
The model is solved and simulated in order to analyze the effects of various hypothetical poli-
cies. The first policy analyzed is one where the government subsidizes students who decide not to
participate in the labor market. The simulated results indicate that this policy does very little in
affecting the level of education, labor market experience, and wages on young men. The second
policy analyzed is one where the school administration adjusts the school curriculum so that young
men who enroll necessarily spend more time on school activities. Such a policy can be achieved
by increasing the number of hours in school, increasing the number or difficulty of assignments,
after school programs, or Saturday (Sunday) classes. The results indicate that such a policy has
significant positive effects on wages and education of whites and blacks, and more modest positive
effects on Hispanics.
The third simulation exercise analyzes a situation where school quality of blacks and Hispanics
are equated to those of whites. The results indicate that this policy has significant positive effects
on the level of education and wages of blacks. The effects of this policy on Hispanic are positive but
much more modest than that for blacks. The final simulation exercise evaluates the same policy of
increasing time spent on school activities of blacks and Hispanics after equating the school quality
of minorities to to those of whites. It is in this environment where we find significant increases in
wages and education for Hispanics. We find also significant increases in wages and education of
blacks. The results indicate therefore that policies that are aimed at increasing the time minorities
spend on school activities are significantly more effective if the school environment of minorities
are improved to match those of white.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the basic behav-
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ioral model. We then discuss the solution of the model in section (2.3) and describe the first order
necessary conditions for optimality that will be used in estimation. Section (2.4) discusses the con-
struction of the sample used in estimation, and Section (2.5) discusses the empirical methodology
implemented in estimation of the parameters of interest. Section (2.6) describes the estimation of
the consumption function and discusses the empirical findings. Section (2.7) discusses the esti-
mation of the wage equation and the empirical findings. Section (2.8) discusses the estimation of
the time spent on schooling activities and the transition probabilities. Section (2.9) presents the
methodology used to estimate the conditional choice probabilities and their corresponding deriva-
tives, which are needed to estimate the preference parameters. Section (2.10) presents the moment
conditions and corresponding sample analogs that are used in estimating the preference parameters
of the model, as well as discuss the empirical findings of the model. Section (2.11) presents the
method of solving the dynamic programming model and discusses the policy simulations. Section
(2.12) concludes.
2.2 THE THEORETICAL MODEL
This section develops the theoretical framework that is used to investigate how individuals allocate
time between human capital accumulation, labor market participation, and leisure.
2.2.1 Environment
The model is set in discrete time t ∈ {0,1, · · · ,T}. We assume that there exists a continuum of
individuals on the unit interval [0,1]. Associated with each individual is a K-dimensional vector
of exogenous covariates, denoted znt , which is assumed to be independently distributed over the
population with known cumulative distribution function Q0(znt+1|znt). In each period, individual
n ∈ [0,1] is endowed with a fixed amount of time normalized to one. He must choose how to
allocate this unit of time between leisure lnt , the time spent on labor market activities hnt , and the
time spent on school activities snt :
1 = lnt +hnt + snt . (2.2.1)
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Define dhnt ≡ 1{hnt>0} and dsnt ≡ 1{snt>0} where 1{·} is the indicator function equal to one if the
event in parentheses occurs and zero otherwise. There is a single composite consumption good in
the economy which is consumed and traded by all individuals. Let cnt denote this composite good.
We assume the model has a Markov structure, in which the individual does not need to remem-
ber the full history to solve this problem, but only a summary statistic xnt , belonging to a finite
vector space X . In particular, define (hnt−ρ, · · · ,hnt−1) as the ρ-dimensional vector of past labor
supply outcomes, (snt−ρ, · · · ,snt−1) as the ρ-dimensional vector of past time spent on schooling
activities, Snt as the highest grade completed by individual n as at the beginning of t, and Ent as the
total years of labor market experience accumulated by individual n as at the beginning of period t.
Define also (cnt−ρ, · · · ,cnt−1) to be the ρ-dimensional vector of past consumption. Then the typical
observed state vector for individual n at time t is given by the (3ρ+ k +1)-dimensional vector6
xnt ≡ (hnt−ρ, · · · ,hnt−1,snt−ρ, · · · ,snt−1,Snt−ρ+1, · · · ,Snt ,cnt−ρ, · · · ,cnt−1,Ent−ρ,z′nt)′.(2.2.2)
Given that individual n has chosen to enroll in school, he may or may not complete that grade
level. If he does complete the grade he is currently enrolled in, his level of education increases by
one grade. Otherwise, his level of education remains unchanged. The probability that an individual
advances a grade level given that he has enrolled in school at the beginning of period t is denoted
by F(xnt).
2.2.2 Technology
We assume that the individual has access to a sector specific production technology in each period
where, if he works in sector j = 1, · · · ,J, he produces a quantity of the output wnt jhnt . Here, wnt j
is marginal product of labor of individual n at time t with skill level j. It is assumed that wnt j
is composed of J exogenously determined time specific aggregate skill prices ωt j, an individual
specific, time invariant productivity effect, µn, and a skill specific function of his stock of human
capital, his socio-economic characteristics and other state vectors, γ j(xnt):
wnt j = ωt, jµnγ j(xnt), (2.2.3)
Thus µnγ j(xnt) is the number of efficiency units of labor supplied by the worker per unit of time in
sector j, while ωt, j is the time specific aggregate price of skill in sector j.
6To conserve on notation in what follows, we will use xnt to denote any subset of this vector.
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2.2.3 Choice Set
This model falls within the class of mixed continuous and discrete Markov decision processes.
The continuous choice variables in this model are cnt ,hnt ,and snt . If hnt = 0, individual n does
not work at time t. Otherwise, the individual works for the fraction of time hnt > 0. Likewise if
snt = 0, individual n does not attend school at time t. Otherwise, the individual studies for the
fraction of time snt > 0. Define the discrete choice variables for each individual n ∈ [0,1] at time
t ∈ {0,1, · · · ,T}:
dnt0 ≡
 1 if dhnt = 0 and dsnt = 00 otherwise , (2.2.4)
dnt1 ≡
 1 if dhnt = 1 and dsnt = 00 otherwise ,
dnt2 ≡
 1 if dhnt = 0 and dsnt = 10 otherwise ,
dnt3 ≡
 1 if dhnt = 1 and dsnt = 10 otherwise .
2.2.4 Preferences
Similar to models such as Heckman [1976] and Eckstein and Wolpin [1999], we assume that at-
tending school provides some consumption value to the individual. Learning may be directly val-
ued by the individual, and social interaction within the school environment may provide positive
consumption value. However, in this specification, this consumption value of attending school is
not confounded with the loss in leisure due to schooling activities since leisure is modelled directly.
We specify the contemporaneous utility of attending school as follows:
Unt1 = u1(dsnt ,xnt). (2.2.5)
Similarly, we assume that there is a utility associated with labor market participation. We specify
this contemporaneous utility of labor force participation as follows:
Unt2 = u2(dhnt ,xnt). (2.2.6)
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Preferences are assumed to be additive in consumption and leisure, but not separable with respect
to leisure over time. The contemporaneous utility of leisure is therefore given by:
Unt3 = u3(xnt , lnt). (2.2.7)
The utility of leisure is specified to be dependent on current leisure level and the level of leisure
consumed over the last ρ periods.7. We assume that u3 is increasing and concave in lnt . The utility
derived from the consumption good in time t is also assumed to be increasing and concave in cnt
and is denoted by
Unt4 = u4(cnt ,znt). (2.2.8)
We introduce a vector of choice specific utility shifters (εnt0, · · · ,εnt3)′, which are assumed to
be independent over (n, t) and drawn from a population with a distribution function
Q1(εnt0, · · · ,εnt3). They are interpreted to be choice specific, time-varying characteristics that
partially determine the utility associated with the corresponding alternatives and unobserved to
the econometrician. Let β ∈ (0,1) denote the common subjective discount factor, and E0 denote
expectation conditional on the information set at date 0. The expected discounted lifetime utility
of individual n is given by:
E0
{ T
∑
t=0
βt
[ 4
∑
k=1
dntk(Unt1 +Unt2 +Unt3 +Unt4 + εntk)
]}
. (2.2.9)
7The lags in leisure are not specified explicitly here since it is a subset of the state vector xnt by equation (2.2.1)
14
2.3 THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
The inclusion of an aggregate component in marginal product of labor (2.2.3), complicates esti-
mation. To make the model empirically tractable, we assume that markets are competitive and
complete. Agents are price takers and there are no distortions in the market for the consumption
good, labor supply and loans, a common interest rate facing borrowers and lenders, and that a rich
set of financial securities exists to hedge against uncertainty. This assumption incorporates uncer-
tainty in a sufficiently simple manner that leads to a tractable econometric model. Competitive and
complete capital market assumption was used by Ben-Porath [1967], Blinder and Weiss [1976],
Heckman [1976], and Shaw [1989] to analyze life cycle models of human capital accumulation.
This assumption was also recently used by Altug and Miller [1990], Altug and Miller [1998], and
Gayle and Miller [2003] to estimate life-cycle models of consumption, labor supply and fertility
decisions with aggregate shock.
One key restriction that the assumption of competitive and complete markets places on the
model is the lack of any binding borrowing constraint. Borrowing constraints are popular consid-
erations in the study of educational choice. It is a widespread postulation that borrowing constraints
critically restricts economically disadvantaged individuals from obtaining the level of formal edu-
cation that they would have attained otherwise. However, the empirical evidence does not support
this view. Cameron and Heckman [1999, 1998] conclude that it is the long-term influences of fam-
ily and environment that account for ethnic and racial disparities in school attendance, and not
short term liquidity constraints. Keane [2002] conclude that borrowing constraints have little ef-
fect on college attendance decisions. In the light of these and other evidences, we abstract from
any considerations of liquidity constraints and thus the assumption of competitive and complete
markets presents itself as an appealing approximation.
Under the assumptions of competitive and complete markets, we appeal to the fundamental
welfare theorems which allows us to recast the optimization problem as a social planner problem.
The objective function of the social planner is the weighted average of the expected discounted
utilities of each individual n given in (2.2.9). The social weight attached to an individual is given
by η−1n . The optimization problem of the social planner is subject to the time allocation constraint
for each individual (2.2.1), as well as the production technology available to each individual as
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reflected in (2.2.3). Define L to be the lebesgue measure that integrates over the population. The
aggregate feasibility condition is given by:
∫ 1
0
[cnt +ant +pint −wnt hnt ]dL(n)≤ 0, t ∈ {0,1, · · · ,T}. (2.3.1)
where ant is the individual savings at time t, or the value of claims to period t +1 consumption net
of the claims to time t consumption. pint is the direct schooling expenses incurred by the individual
if he chooses to enroll in period t.
The Pareto optimal allocations are found by maximizing
E0
{∫ 1
0
T
∑
t=0
βtη−1n
[ 4
∑
k=1
dntk(Unt1 +Unt2 +Unt3 +Unt4 + εntk)
]
dL(n)
}
, (2.3.2)
subject to (2.3.1) and (2.2.1) with respect to sequences for consumption, schooling, and labor
supply {cnt ,snt ,hnt}Tt=0 for all individuals n ∈ [0,1].
2.3.1 Optimal consumption
Define βtλt as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the aggregate feasibility constraint in equa-
tion (2.3.1). Given the assumption of an interior solution for consumption allocation, the set of
necessary conditions characterizing optimal consumption allocation are given by
∂u3(cnt ,xnt)
∂cnt
= ηnλt , (2.3.3)
for all n ∈ [0,1] and t ∈ {0, · · · ,T}. Under the assumption of contemporaneous separability of
consumption from education and labor supply choices, (2.3.3) can be used to solve for individuals’
Frisch demand functions which determines optimal consumption allocation in terms of the time-
varying characteristics xnt and the shadow value of consumption ηnλt . Assume that the utility
derived from consumption takes on the following augmented CRRA specification:
u3(cnt ,xnt) = g(xnt)
cαnt
α
. (2.3.4)
Then condition (2.3.3) takes the form
g(xnt)cα−1nt = ηnλt . (2.3.5)
16
Multiplying (2.3.5) by α−1cnt gives the following alternative representation of the indirect contem-
poraneous utility derived from consumption:
u3(cnt ,xnt) =
ηnλt
α
cnt . (2.3.6)
The empirical strategy comprises of estimating the parameters of the utility function u3 from (2.3.3)
and (2.3.4) to obtain estimates of the individual specific weights ηn as well as the Lagrange multi-
plier λt . These estimates are then substituted in (2.3.6), which is in turn substituted into the social
planner’s objective function (2.3.2).
Under the assumption that none of the consumption good is wasted at the optimal allocation,
the first order necessary condition with respect to the the lagrange multiplier βtλt gives the optimal
consumption allocation for each individual
cnt = wnthnt −ant −pint . (2.3.7)
2.3.2 Optimal schooling and labor supply
Characterizing the optimal labor supply, leisure and schooling decision is more complicated. The
optimal schooling and work allocations are confounded by the constraint imposed by (2.2.1). In
particular, in any period, increasing both schooling and labor supplied by individual n necessarily
leads to a decline in the level of leisure enjoyed by that individual. Consequently, the optimal
allocation of labor supply, education and leisure cannot be separately solved for as in the case
of optimal consumption allocation. Following Altug and Miller [1998], the conditional valuation
functions associated with the discrete choices on individual n in period t is defined as:
Vnt j + εnt j ≡ max
{snr ,hnr}Tr=t
Et
 ∑Tr=t βr−t[∑3k=0 dnrk(Unr0 +Unr1+α−1ηnλr(wnthnt −ant −pint)+ εnrk)|dnt j = 1]
 . (2.3.8)
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Let d0nt j be the socially optimal decision by individual n in period t. The term Vnt j +εnt j denotes the
social value from individual n choosing alternative j at time t. Accordingly, individual n’s choice
of alternative j at time t is optimal if
d0nt j =
 1, if Vnt j + εnt j >Vntk + εntk ∀ k 6= j0, otherwise . (2.3.9)
Let h0nt and s0nt be the optimal interior choice of labor supply and study time. Given that it is socially
optimal for individual n to work in time t, h0nt must satisfy
∂Vnt j
∂hnt
= 0, for j = 1,3. (2.3.10)
Likewise, given that it is socially optimal for individual n to enroll in time t, s0nt must satisfy
∂Vnt j
∂snt
= 0, for j = 2,3. (2.3.11)
In order to express the conditional valuation function recursively, define pnt j to be the probability
of individual n choosing option j in period t conditional on the information set available to him in
period t
pnt j ≡
∫
∞
−∞
∫ Vnt j−Vnt0+εnt j
−∞
· · ·
∫ Vnt j−Vnt3+εnt j
−∞
dQ1(εnt0, · · · ,εnt3). (2.3.12)
The information set available to individual n at period t is composed of the observed state vector
xnt , and the unobserved individual specific and aggregate shocks to productivity and consumption.
Define this state vector as Ψnt ≡ (x′nt ,µn,ηn,λt ,ωt1, · · · ,ωtJ)′. Define also A int to be the set of all
possible realizations of the state vector for individual n at i periods after t given the realization of
the state vector Ψnt at period t. Correspondingly, let Fj(Ψ(i)nt |Ψnt) is the probability that the state
vector of individual n in period t + i is Ψ(i)nt , given that his state vector in period t is Ψnt and he
chooses alternative j in period t. Then from equation (2.3.9), the conditional probability that alter-
native j is chosen by n in period t in equation (2.3.12) has the following alternative representation
pnt j ≡ p j(Ψnt)≡ E[d0nt j|Ψnt ], (2.3.13)
and Hotz and Miller [1993] prove the existence of a mapping ϕk : [0,1]→ℜ such that
ϕk(pk(Ψnt)) = E[εntk|Ψnt ,d0ntk = 1], k ∈ 0, · · · ,3. (2.3.14)
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Therefore, the conditional valuation function has the following recursive representation:
Vnt j = maxhnt>0
{
Unt0 +Unt1 +α−1ηnλt(wnthnt −ant −pint)
+β
[
∑Ψ(1)nt ∈A1nt
[
∑3k=0 pnt+1,k(Vnt+1,k +ϕk(pk(Ψ(1)nt )))
]
Fj(Ψ
(1)
nt |Ψnt)
]
|dnt j = 1
}
.
(2.3.15)
Finally, the optimality conditions for interior solution to labor supply h0nt (2.3.10) and study time
s0nt (2.3.11) are given by
∂Unt1
∂hnt +
ηnλt
α wnt = −β
{
∑Ψ(1)nt ∈A1nt
[
∑3k=0
[
pntk+1
∂(Vnt+1,k+ϕk(pk(Ψ(1)nt )))
∂hnt
+
∂pnt+1,k
∂hnt (Vnt+1,k +ϕk(pk(Ψ
(1)
nt )))
]
Fj(Ψ
(1)
nt |Ψnt)
+∑3k=0 pnt+1,k(Vnt+1,k +ϕk(pk(Ψ(1)nt )))∂Fj(Ψ
(1)
nt |Ψnt)
∂hnt
]
|dnt j = 1
}
, and,
(2.3.16)
∂Unt1
∂snt = −β
{
∑Ψ(1)nt ∈A1nt
[
∑3k=0
[
pntk+1
∂(Vnt+1,k+ϕk(pk(Ψ(1)nt )))
∂snt
+
∂pnt+1,k
∂snt (Vnt+1,k +ϕk(pk(Ψ
(1)
nt )))
]
Fj(Ψ
(1)
nt |Ψnt)
+∑3k=0 pnt+1,k(Vnt+1,k +ϕk(pk(Ψ(1)nt )))∂Fj(Ψ
(1)
nt |Ψnt)
∂snt
]
|dnt j = 1
}
,
(2.3.17)
for j = 1,3, and j = 2,3 respectively. The first condition in (2.3.16) says that the net current
benefit from an additional hour of work is equal to the present discounted value of future utility
costs of that additional hour. The current marginal utility from an additional hour of work is equal
to the net of the utility cost of leisure forgone, and the consumption value of the additional goods
and services produced. The future value of an additional hour of work is decomposed into three
main components. The first term on the RHS captures the direct effect of an increase in hours
worked on future productivity and future utitily. Future utility is directly affected because of the
assumption that current and future leisure are intertemporally nonseparable. Future productivity is
affected by the assumption that current labor force participation enhances human capital, which is
reflected in higher future marginal productivity of labor. The second term on the RHS captures the
indirect effect on future utility by current hours worked through its effect on future probability of
employment. The third term on the RHS accounts for the indirect effect of current hours worked
on future utility through its effect on the transition probability. The probability of being promoted
a grade level given that the individual is currently enrolled is assumed to be dependent on hours
worked.
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2.4 DATA
The data is taken from the 1979 youth cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Market
Experience (NLSY79), a comprehensive panel data set that follows individuals over the period
1979 to 2000, who were 14 to 21 years of age as of January 1, 1979. The data set initially consisted
of 12,686 individuals: a representative sample of 6,111 individuals, a supplemental sample of 5,295
Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks, and economically disadvantaged, non-black, non-Hispanics, and
a supplemental sample of 1,280 military youth. Interviews were conducted on an annual basis
though 1994, after which they adopted a biennial interview schedule. This study makes use of
the first 16 years of interviews, from 1979 to 1994.8 The data is restricted to include males and to
exclude respondents with missing observations on the highest grade level completed that cannot be
recovered with high confidence from other data information. A list and description of the variables
used in the model is presented in Table 1. Table 2 presents summary statistics of the sample used
in this study. Attrition accounts for a loss of approximately 22 percent of the individuals between
1979 and 1994. However, the largest loss occurred between 1990 and 1991, late in the sample
period.
2.5 ESTIMATION METHOD
The empirical analysis employs a multi-stage version of the conditional choice probability (CCP)
estimator developed in Hotz and Miller [1993] and extended by Altug and Miller [1998]. We out-
line the estimation strategy of each stage in turn. The parameters of the model can be estimated
from the optimality conditions derived in section (2.3). First, there is contemporaneous separability
between consumption and labor supply in the utility function. Given that consumption is measured
with error and that the measurement error is uncorrelated with the information set of the individual,
the consumption function can be estimated separately from the equations characterizing optimal
discrete choice to provide first stage estimates of the of the shadow price of consumption. Sim-
ilarly, assuming that observed wages are noisy measures of the marginal product of labor, where
8Appendix 1 provides a detailed discussion of the data construction and sample restrictions.
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the measurement error is assumed to be independent of the information set of the individual over
time, the parameters of the marginal product of labor can be estimated separately from the other
parameters of the model.
Examination of equations (2.3.15) and (2.3.10) in section (2.3) suggest that estimation of the
conditional choice probabilities pknt and their derivatives with respect to hours worked hnt and
study time snt are required. These quantities are estimated nonparametrically and substituted into
the necessary conditions for optimal choice and hours allocation. The technique employed here
also requires that the transition probabilities be estimated. The remaining parameters of the model
are estimated by nonlinear GMM, where the moment conditions are formed as sample analogs of
equations (2.3.9), (2.3.16) and (2.3.17). Since the first stage regressions are of interest in their own
right, we discuss them in separate sections.
2.6 CONSUMPTION
Estimation of the marginal utility of consumption requires further parametrization of the utility of
consumption given by equation (2.3.4). We assume that g(xnt) has the following parametrization:
g(znt) = exp(x′ntB1), (2.6.1)
The first order necessary conditions for optimal consumption allocation are then given by:
exp(x′ntB1)cα−1nt = ηnλt . (2.6.2)
The necessary conditions (2.6.2) and (2.3.7) provide the key equations for the estimation of the
shadow value of consumption λt and the individual specific effect ηn. Taking the natural log of
equation (2.6.2) and rearranging results in the following equation
ln(cnt) = (1−α)−1x′ntB1− (1−α)−1 ln(ηn)− (1−α)−1 ln(λt). (2.6.3)
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Assuming that observed consumption c˜nt is measured with error so that c˜nt = cnteνnt , where cnt is
the true level of consumption, and E[νnt |xnt ,ηn,λt] = 0. Let ∆ denote the first-difference operator.
Taking first difference of equation (2.6.3) and rearranging, we have that
∆νnt = ∆ ln(c˜nt)− (1−α)−1∆x′ntB1 +(1−α)−1∆ ln(λt). (2.6.4)
Equation (2.6.4) is estimated by the efficient GMM. The estimated results in Table 4 indicate that
consumption increases with the size of the family, average family income, and the average age of
the family. Consumption decreases with the level of unemployment local to the residence of the
individual. Table 4 also suggests that for a given level of education, consumption is increasing and
concave in the age of the individual. For a given age of the individual, consumption is decreasing
and convex in the level of education.
The first panel of Table 6 reports the estimated log change in aggregate prices with the cor-
responding standard errors. The graph along with the 95% confidence interval are also presented
in Figure 1. These figures show that the changes in aggregate prices are estimated precisely. The
figure also show that there are significant variation in the time effects. The simple F-test reject the
restriction that (1−α)−1 ln(λ2) = · · ·= (1−α)−1 ln(λT ) at the 99% confidence level.
2.7 WAGES
Assume that the time varying component of the individuals productivity function has the represen-
tation:
γ j(xnt)≡ exp(x′ntB2 j). (2.7.1)
Observed wages are assumed to be noisy measures of the marginal productivity of labor, where the
multiplicative error term is assumed to be conditionally independent over individuals, the covari-
ates in the wage equation, and the labor supply decision
w˜nt j = ωt jµn exp(x′ntB2 j)exp(εnt). (2.7.2)
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The individual specific effects captures absolute advantage of the individual in the labor market
[Willis, 1986]. Assume that human capital comes in two types, an unskilled type ( j = 1) and a
skilled type ( j = 2). The skilled group is defined as having at least 16 years of formal education.
All occupations in the economy are sorted across these groups according to the level of education
required to carry out the task. Workers are assumed to be perfect substitutes within, but not across
efficiency units. Since the model is in the panel data framework, we do not need to assume that
schooling and employment choices are independent of the individual’s ability as captured by the
individual specific effect. This is in contrast to the model proposed in Willis [1986]. The absence
of this restriction serves to eliminate the problem of sample selection caused by ability bias.
Another key consideration in the estimation of equation (2.7.2) is whether there is the need to
estimate separate models for the different racial groups. The results of Neal and Johnson [1996]
and Altonji and Blank [1999] indicate that the large majority of the wage gap between races in
the NLSY is due to differences in measures of abilities (AFQT scores) and family background
(parents education). Since these measures are time invariant, a suitable transformation of a single
wage equation provides accurate estimate in the pooled data.
Taking logs of both sides of equation (2.7.2) and taking first difference gives the following
equation:
∆εnt = ∆ ln(w˜nt j)−∆ ln(ωt j)−∆x′ntB2 j (2.7.3)
Define ent1 to be equal one if individual n is belongs to efficiency unit 1 in period t. Likewise,
define ent2 to be equal one if individual n is belongs to efficiency unit 2 in period t. Equation
(2.7.3) is estimated by the efficient GMM. The skill specific coefficients are obtained by interacting
the explanatory variables with these indicator variables for each skill group. The skill specific
aggregate effects are also obtained by interacting the time dummies with these indicator variables.
The estimated results for the wage equation are reported in Table 4. The positive coefficients
on lagged hours indicate that there are positive returns to on the job training. Also, the effect
of past hours worked on current wages decline with further lags. The declining magnitude and
significance of lagged hours worked is consistent with the conjecture of depreciation in human
capital. The returns to on the job training are higher for skilled workers than for unskilled workers.
At 2000 hours per year, the wage elasticity of the first lagged hours is 0.04 for low skilled workers
23
and 0.06 for high skilled workers. However, the wage elasticity of the second lagged hours is
0.01 and 0.02. These qualitative results are in line with those found in Miller and Sanders [1997],
Altug and Miller [1998] and Gayle and Miller [2003].
The coefficients on the education and experience variables are all estimated highly precisely,
with the exception of education squared for low skilled workers.9 The coefficient of squared edu-
cation is positive and significant at the 1% level for the high skilled group, indicating nonlinearity
in marginal returns to education. We find that the coefficient on the interaction term between edu-
cation and experience is positive for low skilled workers and negative for high skilled workers, both
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that in terms of the productivity of young males, formal
education and labor market experience are compliments in the low skilled sector, and substitutes
in the high skilled sector.
The flexibility of the specification of the wage equation also allows for some heterogeneity
in the returns to education. It allows for comparative advantage with respect to human capital in
the labor market to be manifested through differences in patterns of schooling and employment.
At first glance marginal return to education for both the skilled and unskilled sector seem very
low. Indeed, the calculation would produce a marginal rate of return of 0.024 for low skilled
workers and 0.069 for high skilled workers of age 30 in the sample. Table 5 of Card [1999] lists
the estimated marginal returns to education found in a number of studies. The marginal returns
to education found here are lower than these other estimates. However, these other studies do not
account for growth in skill specific aggregate wages. When the average growth in log aggregate
wages in included in the calculation, the estimated marginal return to log wages increases to 0.044
for low skilled workers and 0.217 for high skilled workers of age 30. The estimated marginal
returns to education in Table 5 of Card [1999] all fall within the range.
The last two panels of Table 6 report the estimated changes in unskilled and skilled piece
rates. These series are also plotted in Figures 2 and 3 along with their 95% confidence bands.
The changes in unskilled piece rates ar less precisely estimated than the changes in skilled piece
rates. Two separate hypothesis tests are performed. The first is an F-test of the restriction of
equality of all the aggregate effects ∆ ln(ω21) = · · ·= ∆ ln(ωT 1) = ∆ ln(ω22) = · · ·= ∆ ln(ωT 2). The
9Because most individuals in the sample have no breaks in schooling until they have completed their total level,
identification of level of schooling in a first difference model is fragile at best and is excluded from the specification.
We exclude the level of experience for the same reason.
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second is an F-test of the restriction of a single set of time varying aggregate effects ∆ ln(ω21) =
∆ ln(ω22), · · · ,∆ ln(ωT 1) = ∆ ln(ωT 2). Both restrictions are rejected at the 99% level.
2.7.1 Individual-specific Effects
To estimate preference parameters of the model we need to estimate the individual specific effects
ηn and µn. They are estimated from the residuals in the log-linear versions of consumption and
wage equations (2.6.3) and (2.7.3) respectively. These estimators are subject to small sample bias
when T is small. However, Hotz et al. [1988] provide Monte Carlo evidence that the small sample
bias caused by using such fixed-effects estimates in computing the remaining parameters of interest
are quite small for moderate to large sample sizes. Altug and Miller [1998] and Gayle and Miller
[2003] estimate the parameters of their structural model under two assumptions on the fixed ef-
fects. The first is the traditional definition. The second assumes that fixed effects can be written as
functionals of observed covariates. Under the second assumption, consistency of the other param-
eters of the model is achieved. In their studies, the resulting estimates of the structural parameters
were very similar, and lead to the same conclusions. This also indicates that the bias induced by
employing estimates of the traditional fixed effects is quite small in these models. The estimates of
µn and ηn are calculated from samples where T1 = 15 and T2 = 12 respectively. Hahn et al. [2001]
suggests that these sample sizes are actually large, implying that the bias of these estimates are
expected to be small.
The fixed effects estimators of ln(µn) and ln(ηn) are obtained as simple time averages of the
estimated residuals of the consumption and wage equations.
2.8 STUDY PATTERNS AND THE PROBABILITY OF GRADE PROMOTION.
2.8.1 Study Patterns
In 1981, the NLSY79 collected information on the patterns of school activities of the respondents
that are enrolled in school. In particular, the NLSY79 asked the respondent about the amount of
hours they spent in school during the week before the interview date. They also asked whether or
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not the time they reported is typical or not, and if no, to report the typical hours spent in school.
The respondents also reported the number of hours they spent studying outside of school during
the week before the interview date. These responses are used to construct yearly measures of the
time spent by individuals on school activities. We show that one can get reliable estimates of time
spent on schooling activities from this data. We call this time spent on schooling activities study
time. Clearly this includes not only the time the individual spends actually studying, but also time
the student allocates to activities related to school, both during regular hours of school and outside
of school.
Assume that the study time of an individual n in period t is an exponential function of ob-
served demographic characteristics and literacy indicators of the individual, as well as unobserved
individual-specific characteristics ,
snt ≡ exp(x′ntB3).
Assume further that observed study time is a noisy measure on the true study patterns of the
individual, where the measurement error is assumed to be independent of the regressors.
s˜nt ≡ exp(x′ntB3)exp(εnt). (2.8.1)
Under these assumptions, we can consistently estimate the study time of individuals enrolled in
school using OLS on the log-linearized version of equation (2.8.1).
To estimate the preference parameters of the model, we need a consistent estimate of study
time given that an individual has enrolled in school. Thus the issue of sample selection bias does
not affect the estimation of equation (2.8.1). Another consideration is the fact that individuals
were questioned about their study patterns for only one week prior to the interview period. If the
interview is taken at a time where there are generally academic deadlines such as exams, then
the reported time spent studying may be overstated. However, interviews were administered to
different individuals at different times of the year. This makes plausible the assumption that on
average, one does not expect to observe over nor under reporting of study time in the data.
Table 7 reports the regression of the time spent on school activities. The number of observa-
tions in estimation is 2253. All variables included in the specification are significant at the 5%
level. The F-statistic for the model is 20.47, and the Adjusted R2 is 11.24%. These statistics show
that the instruments do well, both individually and as a group, in capturing variation in log study
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time. In particular there is no problem of weak instruments in this estimation of study time. This
issue of weak instruments is important since the predicted values of study time serve as first stage
estimates in all the estimators that follow.
The results in Table 7 show that lagged enrollment decisions are positively associated with
study time, with further lags becoming less important. The size of the coefficients indicate also
that lagged enrollments decisions are also quite relevant in explaining current study time. Lagged
hours of work are negatively correlated with current study time, with diminishing impact for further
lags. The magnitude of these effects are also considerable. Individuals with higher AFQT scores
spend more time on school activities. Since the AFQT test was administered in 1980 and the
data on schooling activities were collected in 1981, there is no issue of feedback effects of current
study time on AFQT scores. The results also indicate that the time spent on schooling activities
is approximately 11% higher for blacks and 10% lower for hispanics compared to time spent by
whites. These differences are quite large, working out to be approximately 154 more hours per year
for blacks and 140 less hours per year for hispanics at an average of 1400 hours, approximately
what is in the sample.
2.8.2 The Probability of Grade Promotion
An individual who decides to enroll in a particular grade level may or may not be promoted from
the grade. This probability of promotion is of interest in it own right, and is also a key ingredient
in the final stage estimation. Assume that this probability takes the logit form:
F(xnt)≡ (1−dhnt)
exp(x′ntB41)
1+ exp(x′ntB41)
+dhnt
exp(x′ntB42)
1+ exp(x′ntB42)
. (2.8.2)
Similar to the study time regression. What is needed for consistent estimates of the prefer-
ence parameters of the model is a consistent estimate of the probability of grade promotion given
enrollment. Estimation of equation (2.8.2) provides us with this. In principle, if the enrollment
decision is correlated with the error term defining equation (2.8.2), then the coefficient estimates
obtained would be biased and inconsistent and not conducive to direct interpretation. However,
the inclusion of AFQT in the regression should at least mitigate the level of biased induced by
regressing only on the subset of individuals that choose to enroll.
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Another issue is the choice of separate regressions for the set of students who choose to work
while enrolled in school and the set who choose not to work while enrolled in school. This main
reason for this specification is to improve the flexibility of the resulting estimated transition prob-
abilities. However, if the decision to work is correlated with the error term that defines equation
(2.8.2), then the coefficient estimates are expected to be biased and inconsistent. The inclusion
of our measure of labor market ability, the estimated fixed effects from the wage regression are
included to reduce the bias of the estimated coefficients. At the very least however, the coefficients
in equation (2.8.2) can certainly be interpreted for the relevant groups of individuals.
A third issue involves the appropriateness of including current period decision variables in
equation (2.8.2). The theoretical model assumes that the individual makes his schooling and em-
ployment decisions (dsnt ,snt ,dhnt ,hnt) at the beginning of each period conditioned on the information
set available to him at that point in time. The grade promotion probability function is known by
the individual, and he has control over it in so far as he has control over the decision variables.
However, the uncertainty is not resolved until the beginning of the following year. The timing of
the model thus makes the period t decision variables predetermined in equation (2.8.2).
Table 7 reports the result of the logit regression of the probability of completing a grade and
Table 8.1 reports the corresponding average derivatives. The standard errors reported are cor-
rected for the inclusion of predicted study time. Computation of the corrected standard errors is
complicated by the nonlinear specification of the study time function and the probability of grade
transformation. The details are presented in Appendix 2 for completeness. The number of observa-
tions used in estimation for the two groups (dhnt = 0, and dhnt = 1) are 2216 and 5606, the Likelihood
ratio statistics are 400.65 and 1350.78, and the Pseudo R2’s are 15% and 17%. Furthermore, all
coefficients except for the constant term are significant at the 10% level, and slope parameters,
except for 2 are significant at the 5% level. Note that some variables are dropped from estimation
in either groups because of their low precision and statistical irrelevance.
The results in Table 8 indicate that lagged labor market participation decisions are positively
correlated with the probability of grade promotion. This provides evidence for the congruence
hypotheses. However, the effect is a lagged effect, and the interpretation varies slightly from that
proposed by D’Amico [1984]. The decision to participate in the labor market in either of the last
two periods increases the current probability of grade promotion by approximately 5%. The full
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model will have to simulated to see exactly how large this effect turns out to be on completed
education. However, at this stage it is clear that a 5% increase in the probability of completing a
grade level is a significant magnitude.
We find that blacks have a lower probability of being promoted a grade level than their white
counterparts. For the group that works, hispanics also have a lower probability of being promoted
than their white counterparts. This result is not simply the classical drop-out story of minorities.
The interpretation of these coefficients are that: given two males, one black and the other white,
with the same abilities (as measured by AFQT scores and the estimated fixed effects), the same
hours studied, the same hours worked, and in the same grade level, along with other conditioned
covariates, the black male has a significantly lower probability of being promoted from that grade
level. To understand what may be driving this result, one must also look at what in not included
in the regression, that is, what factors are not controlled for and may be correlated with race.
The primary excluded factor in the regression would be the quality of the schools attended. It
is well known that the quality of schools attended by blacks are on average lower than those
attended by their white counterparts. I argue therefore that the negative coefficient of blacks in the
grade advancement regression captures the lower schooling opportunities and qualities available
to these racial groups. The quality of schooling is typically measured by, among other factors,
the level of funding that school receives, class size, in particular the student-teacher ratio, and the
socio-economics conditions of the community surrounding the school. The available data does not
contain information on these measures of school quality. However, if one is only interested in the
difference in schooling opportunities across races, as this study is, and not to identify the sources
of these differences, then the estimated regression is sufficient.
The results in Table 8 also indicate that the probability of grade level promotion is increasing
in time spent on schooling activities for both groups, and concave for the group that works. Con-
versely, this probability is decreasing and convex in hours spent in the labor market. Students in
grades 11 and 12 have a larger probability of being promoted than college students.
29
2.9 CONDITIONAL CHOICE PROBABILITIES
Estimation of conditions characterizing labor supply and schooling decisions also requires that
estimates of the conditional choice probabilities defined in equation (2.3.12). Inclusion of the
individual-specific effect, and time-specific effects as explanatory variables allows us to treat the
sample as pooled cross-section and time series data that is independently distributed over individual
and time. This implies straightforward nonparametric estimation of (2.3.13).
To estimate the preference parameters, we also need to estimate the conditional choice proba-
bilities conditional on all the states that remain feasible. This is done by taking advantage of the
finite state dependence of the model. In particular, we need to estimate the probability that individ-
ual n chooses alternative j in period t + i conditional on observing state k in that period p j(Ψ(i)ntk).
We achieve this by estimating the probability that an observationally equivalent individual chooses
alternative j in the current period conditional on observing the state k in the current period. The va-
lidity of this method depend on the inclusion of the individual-specific effects and the time-specific
effects in these regressions. These auxiliary CCP’s are estimated using nonparametric techniques.
The technical details of these estimators are outlined in Appendix A.1.3.
Table 10 presents the means and standard deviations of these estimated probabilities and the
required derivatives. The sample average of the CCP’s are equal to the sample average of their
corresponding indicator functions with 4 decimal places. This indicates that the bias in these
estimates are small. The relative magnitudes of the conditional state probabilities are also plausible.
The probability that an individual chooses home production given that he enrolled in school last
period and did not get promoted the grade level is larger than the probability of choosing home
production if he was promoted.
The average derivatives of the conditional state probabilities are also empirically plausible.
An additional hour of work in the past reduces the probability that the individual will choose
home production in the current period. An additional hour of school activity in the past increases
the probability of choosing home production in the current period if the individual did not get
promoted the grade level. On the other hand, an additional hour of school activity in the past
decreases the probability of choosing home production in the current period if the individual was
promoted the grade level.
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2.10 SCHOOLING, PARTICIPATION, AND HOURS
2.10.1 The moment conditions.
Estimation of the remaining parameters of the model makes use of an alternative representation of
the conditional valuation function derived in Hotz and Miller [1993]. This requires that parametric
restrictions be placed on the utility functions. Let the components of the utility of schooling, labor
supply in equation (2.2.6), and utility of leisure in equation (2.2.7) take the form
u1(xnt ,dsnt) = dsntx′ntB5, (2.10.1)
u2(xnt ,dhnt) = dhntx′ntB6, (2.10.2)
u3(xnt ,gnt) = lntz′ntB7 +
ρ
∑
i=0
δilnt lnt−i. (2.10.3)
The utility of leisure is assumed to be quadratic. Economic theory suggests that the utility of leisure
is concave in leisure, δ0 < 0. The parameters δi, i = 1, · · · ,ρ capture intertemporal nonseparabilities
in the preference for leisure. For i > 0, δi < 0 implies that current leisure and leisure lagged i
periods are intertemporal substitutes. On the other hand, δi > 0 implies that current leisure and
leisure lagged i periods are intertemporal complements.
Define θ ≡ (B′5,B′6,B′7,δ0, · · · ,δρ,α)′, γ ≡ (B′1, · · · ,B′4)′, P ≡ (Pnt0, · · · ,Pnt3)′. Let F denote
the set of conditional state probabilities and their relevant derivatives and let Θ ≡ (θ′,γ′,P′,F ′)′.
Define also l(0)nt ≡ 1, l(1)nt ≡ 1− hnt , l(2)nt ≡ 1− snt , and l(3)nt ≡ 1− hnt − snt . By substituting these
functional forms for the utility functions into the Euler condition for hours (2.3.16), we derive the
following moment condition:
mnt1(Θ)≡ dnt1
[
α−1ηnλtwnt − z′ntB5−2δ0l(1)nt −∑ρi=1 δi(lnt−i +βi)
−∑ρi=1 βi p0(Ψ(i)nt1)−1 ∂p0(Ψ
(i)
nt1)
∂hnt
]
+dnt3
[
α−1ηnλtwnt − z′ntB5−2δ0l(3)nt −∑ρi=1 δi(lnt−i +βi)
−∑ρi=1 βi
[
p0(Ψ(i)nt4)−1
∂p0(Ψ(i)nt4)
∂hnt F(xnt)+ p0(Ψ
(i)
nt5)
−1 ∂p0(Ψ(i)nt5)
∂hnt (1−F(xnt))
+ ln
(
p0(Ψ
(i)
nt5)
p0(Ψ
(i)
nt4)
)
∂F(xnt)
∂hnt
]]
.
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Likewise, we substitute the utility functions in to the optimality condition for study time (2.3.17)
to obtain the following moment condition:
mnt2(Θ)≡ dnt2
[
−z′ntB5−2δ0l(2)nt −∑ρi=1 δi(lnt−i +βi)
−∑ρi=1 βi
[
p0(Ψ(i)nt2)−1
∂p0(Ψ(i)nt2)
∂snt F(xnt)+ p0(Ψ
(i)
nt3)
−1 ∂p0(Ψ(i)nt3)
∂snt (1−F(xnt))
+ ln
(
p0(Ψ
(i)
nt3)
p0(Ψ
(i)
nt2)
)
∂F(xnt)
∂snt
]]
+dnt3
[
−z′ntB5−2δ0l(3)nt −∑ρi=1 δi(lnt−i +βi)
−∑ρi=1 βi
[
p0(Ψ(i)nt4)−1
∂p0(Ψ(i)nt4)
∂snt F(xnt)+ p0(Ψ
(i)
nt5)
−1 ∂p0(Ψ(i)nt5)
∂snt (1−F(xnt))
+ ln
(
p0(Ψ
(i)
nt5)
p0(Ψ
(i)
nt4)
)
∂F(xnt)
∂snt
]]
.
Additional moment conditions are formed from the optimal discrete choice conditions in equation
(2.3.9). In particular, we obtain the following moment conditions from the optimality condition
for choosing alternatives 1,2, and 3:
mnt3(Θ)≡ dnt1
[
ln
(
pnt1
pnt0
)
− x′ntB6 + x′ntB7(l(0)nt − l(1)nt )+δ0(l(0)2nt − l(1)2nt )
+∑ρi=1 δi(l(0)nt − l(1)nt )(lnt−i +βi)− ηnλtα (wnthnt)−∑ρi=1 βi ln
(
p0(Ψ
(s)
nt0)
p0(Ψ
(s)
nt1)
)]
,
mnt4(Θ)≡ dnt2
[
ln
(
pnt2
pnt0
)
− x′ntB5 + x′ntB7(l(0)nt − l(2)nt )
+δ0(l(0)2nt − l(2)2nt )+∑ρi=1 δi(l(0)nt − l(2)nt )(lnt−i +βi)+ ηnλtα pint
−∑ρi=1 βi
[
ln p0(Ψ
(i)
nt0)− ln p0(Ψ(i)nt2)F(xnt)− ln p0(Ψ(i)nt3)(1−F(xnt))
]]
,
mnt5(Θ)≡ dnt3
[
ln
(
pnt3
pnt0
)
− x′ntB5− x′ntB6 + x′ntB7(l(0)nt − l(3)nt )
+δ0(l(0)2nt − l(3)2nt )+∑ρi=1 δi(l(0)nt − l(3)nt )(lnt−i +βi)− ηnλtα (wnthnt −pint)
−∑ρi=1 βi
[
ln p0(Ψ(i)nt0)− ln p0(Ψ(i)nt4)F(xnt)− ln p0(Ψ(i)nt5)(1−F(xnt))
]]
.
Define mnt(Θ)≡ (mnt1(Θ), · · · ,mnt5(Θ))′ and let T denote the set of periods for which the working
and schooling hours, enrollment and participation conditions are valid. Let mn ≡ (m′n1, · · · ,m′nT
denote the vector of empirical moments for a given individual over time. We further define the
weighting matrix Ω ≡ E[mn,m′n] and note that this matrix is block diagonal since Et [mntmns] = 0
for s < t.
In order to increase the finite sample precision of the estimates of the remaining parameters
of the model, we implement a iterated GMM (GMMI) variation of the Nested Pseudo Likelihood
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Algorithm (NPL) proposed by Aguirregabiria and Mira [2002]. This algorithm consists of two
steps. The first step is where GMMI is implemented to obtain estimates of the preference param-
eters, give an initial estimated of the CCP’s. The second step is where the CCP’s are updated
using the estimates of the preference parameters. To be precise, define Θk1 ≡ (θ′, γˆ′,(Pk)′, ˆF ′)′, and
Θk2 ≡ ((θk)′, γˆ′,P′, ˆF ′)′. At iteration K ≥ 1 of the outer algorithm, we apply the following steps
Step 1: Obtain new estimates of θ, θK , from the following iteration in j ≥ 1:
θK j = argmax
θ∈Θ
N
∑
n=1
[
mn(ΘK−11 )
]′
(Ω j−1)−1
[
mn(ΘK−11 )
]
, (2.10.4)
where Ω j−1 is the weighting matrix evaluated at ΘK−11 , in which θ = θK, j−1. This iteration is
repeated until convergence in θ is achieved, which is denoted θK
Step 2: Update P using the estimates θK as follows:
PKj = exp
(
Vj(ΘK2 )−V0(ΘK2 )
)
PK−10
= exp
(
m j+2(ΘK2 )
)
PK−10 , j ≥ 1,
PK0 = 1−∑Jj=1 PKj .
(2.10.5)
Iterate in K until convergence in P and θ is reached.
The convergence of the CCP’s is stated in Proposition 1 of Aguirregabiria and Mira [2002], while
the convergence of the GMMI is discussed in Hansen et al. [1996]. From our experience, it seems
that the iteration in step 1 of the algorithm improves greatly the stability of the overall algorithm.
The nature of the iteration in the CCP’s along with the inclusion of the pre-estimates (γˆ, ˆF)′
make the correct standard errors of the estimates of θ nonstandard. To derive the correct standard
errors, we implement the technique proposed in Newey and McFadden [1994] and Newey [1994].
Interestingly, because of the structure of the state space in the model, repeated use of the law of
iterated expectations results in significant simplification of the asymptotic variance. In particular,
no post estimation is required to correct the standard errors. This greatly reduces the computational
burden of the CCP estimator. The key effect of the iteration in the CCP’s is an alternative specific
re-weighting of the influence functions of the pre-estimators. This re-weighting is such that a larger
weight is assigned to alternatives with a higher probability of occurring. The asymptotic properties
of this estimator are discussed in appendix A.1.5.
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2.10.2 Consumption Value of School Attendance
Table 11 reports the estimated psychic value of enrollment. The results indicate that the consump-
tion value of schooling is increasing and concave in the level of education. For a given age, the
consumption value is decreasing in level of education. These signs capture the decreasing rate of
enrollment in school for higher levels of education and older individuals.
The coefficients on BLACK and HISPANIC in the consumption value of schooling are positive
by not significantly different from zero. This result holds with and without the inclusion of AFQT.
This implies that after controlling for racial differences in wages, hours worked, time spent of
schooling, and school quality, black and Hispanic males are no more likely to enroll in school than
their white counterparts.
2.10.3 Fixed Utility of Participation
Table 12 presents the estimate fixed utility of participating in the labor market. We find that the
consumption value of labor force participation is increasing and concave in the level of labor
market experience. However, these coefficients are imprecisely estimate. We find also that for a
given age, the consumption value of labor force participation is decreasing in the level of labor
market experience. The coefficients on BLACK and HISPANIC in the consumption value of labor
force participation are negative, but imprecisely estimated. This results the racial disparity in
the employment rates is not explained by differences in the propensity of participate in the labor
market.
2.10.4 Utility of Leisure
The estimates of the utility of leisure are reported in Table 13. The results indicate that the utility
of leisure is (weakly) decreasing and convex in age. This results is also found in Altug and Miller
[1998] and Gayle and Miller [2003]. The results also indicate that the utility of leisure in increasing
and concave in leisure. However, the parameter capturing the concavity is imprecisely estimated.
We find also that the coefficients on the black and Hispanic indictors are not statistically different
from zero. In other words we find no evidence of racial differences in the utility of leisure. In other
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words, the observed racial differences in hours worked and study time are not explained by racial
differences in the preferences for leisure.
2.10.5 Intertemporal Nonseparabilities in Leisure
The results in table 14 indicate that preferences are intertemporally nonseparable in leisure. The
positive coefficients on the interaction between current and lagged leisure in the utility of leisure
indicate that for males in the sample, current and future leisure are complements in intertemporal
preferences. This indicates a habit formation pattern where increases in current hours worked
decreases the future marginal disutility of work. Likewise, increases in current hours spent on
school activities decreases the future marginal disutility of studying.
Intertemporal nonseparabilities in leisure is estimated in, among others, Eckstein and Wolpin
[1989], Miller and Sanders [1997], Altug and Miller [1998], and Gayle and Miller [2003]. The
results concerning the intertemporal substitutability of complimentarity of leisure varies across
these studies. Altug and Miller [1998] conjecture that employing data sampled over shorter time
intervals result in the finding of complementarity between current and past leisure choices, while
data sampled over longer (yearly) intervals result in the finding of substitutability between current
and past leisure. However, the results in table 11 run in contrast to this conjecture, since in this
study, hours are measured annually.
2.11 SOLUTION AND SIMULATION EXERCISES
2.11.1 Solving the model
Given the estimated parameters, the model is solved by means of backward induction from age 65
to age 15. Ideally, we would like to treat hours worked and studied completely symmetrical, as
done in the estimation. However, solving for both hours worked and studied on a fine enough grid
is infeasible. To bypass this problem, we use the estimated function for study time to approximate
optimal study time in the solution. This approximation makes solution of the model tractable.
However, this function is valid only for males that choose to enroll. While this was not a problem
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for estimating the model, it may cause biases in the simulation results.
With the use of the study time function, optimal hours can then be solved for on a fine grid.
The problem of interpolating off this grid then arises. Interpolation is carried out by a third order
polynomial regression of the value at each point of the grid on the corresponding state space.
The parametric regression is preferred over nonparametric kernel techniques because it allows for
a finer grid on hours and avoids the corresponding curse of dimensionality that nonparametric
techniques face. In solving the baseline model, the smallest R2 at age 40 is 0.994, indicating that
the third order polynomial approximation is expected to provide very precise approximations of
the value functions off the grid of hours. We also assume in the solution that nobody enrolls in
school after the age of 36. This is justified as in the data only a very small fraction of the sample
enrolls in school past the age of 36.
The baseline model is solved assuming that the economy is in equilibrium where aggregate
components grow at an equilibrium rate of the average in the sample period. These aggregate
components are the shadow price of consumption, the skill specific piece rates, and tuition costs.
The assumption of zero growth rate in aggregate skill prices would result in unrealistic predictions
of wages over the life cycle. The baseline model is solved for 10,000 replications separately for
whites, blacks, and Hispanics. Table 14 reports the baseline simulation by age along with the
corresponding sample averages from the data. The baseline model under-predicts the level of labor
market experience and the average hourly wage rate. It may be possible to improve the fit of the
model to the data by adding dummies to capture the large drop-off in enrollment and increase in
working of 18 and 19 year old males that is found in the data. However, there is no economic
intuition for such dummies, and they are not necessary for the analysis to come. Furthermore,
given that we we do not have the full profile of the growth in the aggregate variables, the simulation
results are not expected to closely fit the sample averages at any rate. Not withstanding this, the
model predicts remarkably well the general patterns within each race group. Moreover, the model
also gets exactly the relative patterns in the reported outcomes across races.
The first two counterfactual simulations performed evaluate policies that are aimed at affecting
working while enrolled in school. First the government subsidizes individuals who choose to
enroll in school and not participate in the labor market. Second the government increases the
school curriculum so that individuals who enroll in school necessarily spend more time on school
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activities. The Third set of counterfactual simulations addresses the issue of equating the quality
of schooling across races. The final set addresses the issue an increase in time spent on school
activities when school quality is held constant across races.
2.11.2 Cash Subsidy
For the first counterfactual simulation exercise, we consider a subsidy of 1000 dollars, which grows
yearly at the same rate as the aggregate component of the marginal utility of consumption (which
is the same as the growth rate in tuition). The results from this simulation exercise are reported
in table 15 under the column labeled “Pol. 1”. The baseline simulation results are included for
comparison under the column labeled “Base”.
The results indicate that this policy does very little in affecting the outcomes of young men.
We see very modest increases in education, and reductions in experience. There are also modest
overall increases in wages due to this policy. The effect of the policy is the same for all races.
2.11.3 Increased time spent on school activities
In practice, the second policy can be achieved by increasing the number of hours school is in ses-
sion for, summer classes, or Saturday (or Sunday) classes. This can also be achieved my increasing
the number of, or level of difficulty of homework assignments and projects. In the simulation ex-
ercise, this policy is achieved by increasing the study time function. The amount by which the
constant is increased is chosen to make the magnitudes of this policy and the subsidy policy above
comparable. In particular, if at age 16, the individual was to work for $1000 at $4 hourly wage
rate, he would work for 250 hours. The study time function is therefore increased by 250. Since
the average wage at age 16 in the baseline simulations is approximately $3.50, the results from this
simulation are considered to be lower bound comparisons to the above simulation exercise. The
findings are reported in table 16 under the columns labeled “Pol 2”.
The findings indicate that this policy significantly increases education and wages for white and
black men, with moderate increases for Hispanics. By the age 35, the completed level of education
increases by 15% for whites and 12.3% for blacks, but only by 1% for Hispanics. Also we find
that the level of labor market experience for whites and black decreases as a result of the policy,
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while it increases for Hispanics.
Analysis of the change in the choices young men make due to the policy shows that Hispanics
are the least responsive. Further more, while the fraction of the population that enroll in school
and not work increase significantly for whites and black (21.8% and 16.4%), it increases only
modestly for Hispanics (1%). Another difference in the patterns of choices is that while the faction
of the white population that works and attends school decreases (by 5%), it increases for blacks
(0.5%) and Hispanics (1.8%). Furthermore, Hispanics are the only group in which the decline in
young men where the percentage increase in those working and attending school outweighs the
percentage decline in those who choose to exclusively participate in the labor market.
The conclusion therefore is that the crowding-out hypothesis holds most significantly for
whites, followed by blacks and Hispanics. This conclusion comes from the fact that a manda-
tory increase in the time spent on school activities has the most significant negative effect on the
employment rate of whites, and the most significant positive effect on completed education and
future wages of whites. This result is also empirically bolstered by the fact that in the data a larger
fraction of whites enroll in school and work at the same time. Hence intuitively, one would expect
that they may be most subject to the crowding out effect of working while attending school. Hence
policies that are aimed at increasing the time students spend on school activities has significant
positive effects on whites and blacks, but less so on Hispanics.
2.11.4 Equating school quality
The next policy experiment equalizes the quality of schools across races. Technically, this is done
by setting the coefficients of BLACK and HISPANIC in the grade transition probability equation
to zero. The results from this exercise are presented in table 15 under the columns labeled “Pol 3”.
We also present the results from the baseline simulation under the columns labeled “Base”.
The results in table 17 indicate that the policy has significant impacts on both blacks and
Hispanics. For blacks, by the age of 35, the completed level of education increases by 11%, the
years of labor market experience increase by 1%, and the hourly wage rate increases by 15%. For
Hispanics, by the age of 35, the completed level of education increases by 7%, the years of labor
market experience increase by 3%, and the hourly wage rate increases by 4%.
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For both blacks and Hispanics, the policy has the effect of increasing enrollment rates. How-
ever, the pattern of enrollment is quite different for both groups. For blacks, the policy has an
effect of increasing the fraction of those who enroll exclusively in school by 12%, and 13% for
those who enroll and work. For Hispanics however, the policy only increases the fraction of those
who enroll exclusively in school by 2%, but by 14% for those who enroll and work. Since the
chances of completing a grade level is smaller if the student is also working, this results in a more
modest increase in completed education, and thus a more modest increase in hourly wage rate.
We conclude therefore that policies aimed at improving the quality of schools for minorities
results in significantly increased education for both groups, but a more modest increase in hourly
wage rates for Hispanics.
2.11.5 Equating school quality and increasing time spent on school activities
Given that equating school quality results in a significant increase in the education level of His-
panics, it is interesting to know if the magnitude of the effect of an increase in study time changes
in magnitude under this new environment. Therefore we simulate this environment and the results
are reported in table 18 under the columns labeled “Pol 4”. Again, the baseline simulation results
are presented for comparison under the columns labeled “Base”.
The results under the new environment, the choices and outcomes for Hispanics are far more
responsive to the exogenous increase in study time. The simulated completed level of education
increases by 23% and the hourly wage rate increases by 29% for Hispanics by age 35. Furthermore,
the fraction of the Hispanic population that exclusively enroll in school increase by 23% and the
fraction that enroll and work increase by 18%. Thus under the environment where the quality of
schools are equated across race, the responsiveness of Hispanics to an exogenous increase in study
time increases significantly.
For blacks in this new environment, the exogenous increase in study time increases the com-
pleted level of education by 28% and the hourly wage rate by 79% by age 35. The fraction on
blacks that enroll in school exclusively increases by 38%, and the fraction that enrolls and work
increases by 8%.
These results indicate that policies aimed that increasing the time spent on school activities has
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a positive effect on minority students; magnitudes that are comparable to their white counterparts.
2.12 CONCLUSIONS
The paper has developed and estimated a dynamic structural model of educational attainment and
labor supply. The main focus of the analysis has been to study the allocation of time between
labor supply, formal schooling activities and leisure, both within a year and over the life cycle.
The model allows for skill specific productivity and piece rates, as well as intertemporal nonsepa-
rabilities in the utility of leisure. It also allows for racial variation in wages, consumption, school
quality, study patterns, the fixed cost of labor market participation, the fixed utility of schooling,
and the utility of leisure. The estimated results indicate that current and future leisure choices
are intertemporal complements. The results also indicate that the observed racial differences in
outcomes come from a variety of sources that interact in a highly nonlinear fashion, but not from
racial differences in tastes.
The estimated model is used to evaluate two policies that are aimed at affecting the allocation
of time between schooling and working. The first policy subsidizes young students that do not
participate in the labor market. The results indicate that this subsidy does little in changing the
patterns of enrollment and labor supply on either the extensive or the intensive side. The second
policy increases the school curriculum so that young men who choose to enroll in school neces-
sarily spend more time on schooling activities. The results indicate that this policy would have
significant positive effects on white and blacks, but more modest effects on Hispanics.
A third exercise was performed to evaluate the effects of equating school qualities of blacks
and Hispanics to that of whites. The results indicate that such a policy would have a large positive
effect on education and wages for blacks, but a smaller positive effect on Hispanics. We also show
that under this environment, Hispanics become significantly more responsive to policies aimed at
increasing the school curriculum.
This study was motivated by the increasing number of students that decide to also participate
in the labor market. The results indicate that the effect of this trend varies across races. Policy
focused on changing this trend to improve the level of education and labor market outcomes may
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have only modest effects on some racial groups. As a matter of policy, the results indicate that
equating school quality across races may be a more productive first step for improving the out-
comes of minorities. Of course, our measure of school quality is agnostic about exactly what are
the parameters in the school system that needs to be addressed. This would require an understand-
ing of the key variables that affect students’ grade promotion probabilities.
One of the main limitations of the model presented in this paper is that it is set in a partial
equilibrium framework. In a general equilibrium framework, one would expect that the aggregate
skill specific wages will also be affected by a policy that changes the distribution of the labor force
over these groups. A policy that increases the level of education will result in more labor supplied
to the high skilled sector and less to the low skilled sector. In a general equilibrium framework,
this will drive down the price of high skilled labor and push up the price of low skilled labor,
thus reducing the incentive to acquire higher education. Since this general equilibrium effect is
not accounted for in the model presented in this paper, the effects of policies that increase the
level of education may be overstated. How far the partial equilibrium effects are from the general
equilibrium effects is an important issue for future research.
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Table 1: List and Description of Variables Used
dsnt Indicator variable equal to 1 if individual n enrolls in year t
dsnt Indicator variable equal to 1 if individual n works in year t
snt Fraction of time spent on school activities in year t
hnt Fraction of time spent working in year t
Snt Completed level of education
Ent Level of experience
AGEnt Age at year t
WHIT E Indicator variable equal to 1 if White and 0 otherwise
BLACK Indicator variable equal to 1 if Black and 0 otherwise
HISPANIC Indicator variable equal to 1 if Hispanic and 0 otherwise
FAM INCnt level of family income at year t
FAM SIZEnt size of n’s household at year t
FAM AGEnt average age of n’s household at year t
SIBLINGS number of siblings of n as at age 14
US BORN indicator variable equal to 1 if n was born in the US
AFQT The Armed Force Qualification Test score for individual n
ASSETS Level of asset holdings by the household of n in year t
UNEMP Level of the unemployment rate local to n in year t
RURAL Indicator variable equal to 1 if n lives in a rural area in year t
TUITION Level of college tuition that individual n is subject to in year t
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Observations 3749 3512 3595 3575 3594 3549 3504 3413
d0 0.0205 0.0529 0.1115 0.1325 0.1719 0.1541 0.1435 0.1300
d1 0.0381 0.1452 0.2842 0.4215 0.5158 0.6198 0.6889 0.7380
d2 0.5644 0.3809 0.2439 0.1367 0.0951 0.0617 0.0345 0.0240
d3 0.3769 0.4208 0.3602 0.3090 0.2170 0.1642 0.1329 0.1078
ds 0.9413 0.8018 0.6041 0.4458 0.3121 0.2259 0.1675 0.1318
s 1436.5 1354.6 1276.0 1203.3 1149.7 1139.3 1114.6 1077.3
S 9.7967 10.730 11.335 11.842 12.198 12.416 12.578 12.708
dh 0.4150 0.5660 0.6445 0.7306 0.7328 0.7841 0.8219 0.8458
h 710.90 972.82 1080.5 1159.8 1310.0 1477.6 1577.7 1694.5
E 1.2107 1.6136 2.1655 2.8036 3.5166 4.2310 4.9877 5.8025
w1 4.3872 4.1601 4.3383 4.6541 4.8560 5.1220 5.5749 6.0788
AGE 16.743 17.653 18.695 19.697 20.706 21.699 22.690 23.688
WHIT E 0.5727 0.5769 0.5713 0.5757 0.5759 0.5711 0.5736 0.5722
BLACK 0.2625 0.2640 0.2651 0.2626 0.2613 0.2646 0.2606 0.2625
HISPANIC 0.2648 0.1592 0.1635 0.1617 0.1627 0.1643 0.1658 0.1653
FAM INC1 17647 19086 20011 21168 21398 21785 23577 25319
FAM SIZE 4.8434 4.5948 4.3171 3.9625 3.7045 3.3722 3.1726 2.9856
FAM AGE 26.225 26.823 26.978 26.665 26.699 26.653 26.538 26.175
SIBLINGS 3.6220 3.5899 3.6069 3.6204 3.6165 3.6238 3.6204 3.6024
US BORN 0.9306 0.9328 0.9310 0.9311 0.9315 0.9323 0.9326 0.9326
AFQT 42.024 43.186 42.793 42.835 42.774 42.606 42.545 42.565
ASSETS1 4141.2 4278.8 4998.8
UNEMP 2.5646 2.8476 3.1652 3.7848 4.1978 3.4356 3.2919 3.1693
RURAL 0.2125 0.20871 0.1997 0.1932 0.1830 0.1718 0.1680 0.1614
TUITION1 813.19 793.04 809.79 865.54 916.18 960.77 1029.0 1087.4
1In 1981 dollars
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Table 3: Summary Statistics (Contd.)
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Observations 3338 3357 3389 3328 2931 2936 2937 2896
d0 0.1207 0.0965 0.0994 0.0943 0.1044 0.1226 0.1113 0.1142
d1 0.8001 0.8394 0.8574 0.8647 0.8614 0.8474 0.8593 0.8649
d2 0.0155 0.0071 0.0023 0.0006 0 0 0 0
d3 0.0635 0.0568 0.0407 0.0402 0.0341 0.0299 0.0292 0.0207
ds 0.0790 0.0640 0.0430 0.0408 0.0341 0.0299 0.0292 0.0207
s 1043.2 977.74 970.54 962.93 976.60 1006.7 1118.6 1128.3
S 12.833 12.890 12.917 12.962 13.050 13.049 13.073 13.08
dh 0.8636 0.8963 0.8982 0.9050 0.8955 0.8773 0.8886 0.8857
h 1836.4 2016.8 2078.7 2025.0 2072.1 2126.6 2076.2 2111.7
E 6.6363 7.4566 8.2912 9.1908 10.022 10.853 11.676 12.548
w1 7.0968 7.6098 7.6038 8.0964 7.7159 7.8402 8.2973 8.4466
AGE 24.680 25.684 26.686 27.687 28.624 29.620 30.621 31.611
WHITE 0.5733 0.5737 0.5716 0.5736 0.5165 0.5150 0.5138 0.5162
BLACK 0.2657 0.2654 0.2653 0.2644 0.2972 0.2973 0.3006 0.2987
HISPANIC 0.1609 0.1609 0.1632 0.1620 0.1863 0.1877 0.1856 0.1851
FAM INC1 26572 29047 46666 34705 36938 59830 41624 43778
FAM SIZE 2.8406 2.7768 2.7722 2.7641 2.8161 2.8692 2.9240 2.9229
FAM AGE 26.154 25.624 25.707 25.814 26.108 26.231 24.292 24.610
SIBLINGS 3.6096 3.6136 3.6208 3.6283 3.6349 3.6294 3.6275 3.6339
US BORN 0.9340 0.9368 0.9350 0.9353 0.9344 0.9335 0.9342 0.9350
AFQT 42.789 42.565 42.270 42.422 42.089 41.905 41.869 41.965
ASSETS1 7107.8 7132.9 20246 10064 11688 13922 13488 12195
UNEMP 2.9331 2.6094 2.3865 2.4002 2.9512 3.1757 3 2.9499
RURAL 0.1791 0.1805 0.1844 0.1850 0.1641 0.1665 0.1722 0.1833
TUITION1 1153.1 1170.5 1181.5 1234.6 1351.1 1404.9 1490.2 1504.5
1In 1981 dollars
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Table 4: The Consumption Equation.
Variable Parameter Estimate Std. Err.
Demographic Variables
∆FAM SIZEnt B1,1 0.1466 0.0022
∆FAM INCnt B1,2 8.00E-06 0.08E-06
∆FAM AGEnt B1,3 4.00E-06 2.00E-06
∆UNEMPnt B1,4 -0.0010 0.0005
∆Snt B1,5 -0.0091 0.0008
∆(AGE×Snt) B1,6 0.0089 0.0008
∆AGE2nt B1,7 -0.0008 0.0004
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Table 5: The Wage Equation.
Low Skill High Skill
Variable Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
Lags of Enrollment
∆dsnt−1 B2,1,1 -0.0309 B2,2,1 -0.0701
(0.0382) (0.0266)
∆dsnt−2 B2,1,2 -0.0198 B2,2,2 -0.01239
(0.0421) (0.02707)
Lags of Participation
∆dhnt−1 B2,1,3 0.0198 B2,2,3 -0.1513
(0.0431) (0.0175)
∆dhnt−2 B2,1,4 0.0319 B2,2,4 -0.1272
(0.0460) (0.0193)
Lags of Hours Worked
∆hnt−1 B2,1,5 0.20E-04 B2,2,5 0.28E-04
(0.02E-04) (0.01E-04)
∆hnt−2 B2,1,6 0.07E-04 B2,2,6 0.10E-04
(0.02E-04) (0.01E-04)
Socio-Economic Variables
∆S2nt B2,1,8 -0.29E-04 B2,2,8 0.0040
(1.37E-04) (0.0001)
∆E2nt−2 B2,1,7 -0.0010 B2,2,7 -0.0011
(0.0003) (0.0002)
∆(Snt ×Ent−2) B2,1,9 0.0027 B2,2,9 -0.0072
(0.0003) (0.0002)
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Table 6: Estimated changes in aggregate prices and wages1
Aggregate Prices Aggregate Wages
Year (1−α)−1∆ ln(λt) Unskilled (∆ lnωt,1) Skilled (∆ lnωt,2)
1984 0.0345 0.0287 0.1127
(0.0199) (0.0393) (0.0162)
1985 -0.0423 0.0449 0.2320
(0.0200) (0.0381) (0.0177)
1986 0.0288 0.0526 0.2303
(0.0206) (0.0402) (0.0204)
1987 0.0713 0.0584 0.2831
(0.0218) (0.0384) (0.0212)
1988 -0.0102 0.0556 0.1421
(0.0226) (0.0363) (0.0210)
1989 0.1111 -0.0228 0.1781
(0.0228) (0.0375) (0.0221)
1990 -0.0186 0.0133 0.1652
(0.0232) (0.0366) (0.0219)
1991 0.0230 -0.0360 0.1610
(0.0237) (0.0368) (0.0219)
1992 0.2044 -0.0101 0.1713
(0.0246) (0.0392) (0.0237)
1993 -0.0260 0.0290 0.1770
(0.0250) (0.0411) (0.0252)
1994 -0.0056 0.0120 0.1587
(0.0251) (0.0351) (0.0218)
1 Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 7: Estimate of time spent on school activities.
Variable Parameter Estimate Std.Err
Constant B3,0 7.2383 0.1829
Lags of Enrollment
dsnt−1 B3,1 0.2602 0.0463
dsnt−2 B3,2 0.2037 0.0789
Lags of Hours Worked
hnt−1 B3,3 -0.77E-04 0.17E-04
hnt−2 B3,4 -0.50E-04 0.26E-04
Socio-Economic Variables
BLACK B3,5 0.1063 0.0265
HISPANIC B3,6 -0.0996 0.0304
AGEnt ×Snt B3,7 -0.0045 0.0013
(AGEnt ×Snt )2 B3,8 0.76E-05 0.26E-05
US BORN B3,10 -0.1261 0.0417
FAM SIZEnt B3,11 0.0135 0.0050
RURAL B3,12 0.0647 0.0250
UNEMPnt B3,13 -0.0244 0.0100
AFQT B3,15 0.0037 0.0004
ln(µ) B3,17 -0.1435 0.0273
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Table 8: Probability of Grade Promotion.
dhnt = 0 dhnt = 1
Variable Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
Constant B4,1,0 0.0307 B4,2,0 0.0482
(0.7734) (0.5499)
Time Use Variables
snt B4,1,1 0.0025 B4,2,1 0.0036
(0.0003) (0.0008)
s2nt B4,2,2 -0.15E-05
(0.03E-05)
hnt B4,2,3 -0.0006
(0.0001)
h2nt B4,2,4 0.10E-06
(0.03E-06)
Participation Variables
dhnt−1 B4,2,8 0.2185
(0.0873)
dhnt−2 B4,1,4 0.2771
(0.1203)
Socio-Economic Variables
BLACK B4,1,5 -0.2296 B4,2,9 -0.3751
(0.1305) (0.0925)
HISPANIC B4,2,10 -0.4627
(0.0928)
AGEnt B4,1,6 -0.1468 B4,2,11 -0.0824
(0.0268) (0.0147)
AFQT B4,1,7 0.0058 B4,2,13 0.0100
(0.0027) (0.0017)
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Table 9: Marginal Effects Probability of Grade Promotion.
dhnt = 0 dhnt = 1
Variable Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
Time Use Variables
snt B4,1,1 0.0005 B4,2,1 0.0008
s2nt B4,2,2 -0.26E-06
hnt B4,2,3 -0.0001
h2nt B4,2,4 0.02E-06
Enrollment Variables
dsnt−1 B4,2,5 0.0915
GRADE 11 B4,1,2 0.1136 B4,2,6 0.0717
GRADE 12 B4,1,3 0.1109 B4,2,7 0.2235
Participation Variables
dhnt−1 B4,2,8 0.0487
dhnt−2 B4,1,4 0.0542
Socio-Economic Variables
BLACK B4,1,5 -0.0449 B4,2,9 -0.0837
HISPANIC B4,2,10 -0.1032
AGEnt B4,1,6 -0.0365 B4,2,11 -0.0184
Snt B4,2,12 -0.0232
AFQT B4,1,7 0.0011 B4,2,13 0.0022
ln(η) B4,1,8 -0.1247 B4,2,14 -0.0985
ln(µ) B4,1,9 -0.0508 B4,2,15 -0.1216
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Table 10: Sample Averages of Nonparametric Estimates
Variable Sample Sample Variable Sample Sample
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
pnt0 0.1197 0.2145
∂p0(Ψ(1)nt1)
∂hnt -0.1988 2.0533
pnt1 0.7076 0.3427
∂p0(Ψ(2)nt1)
∂hnt -0.3520 5.2983
pnt2 0.0489 0.1303
∂p0(Ψ(1)nt4)
∂hnt -0.6092 4.5189
pnt3 0.1232 0.2307
∂p0(Ψ(1)nt5)
∂hnt -0.5044 5.2893
p0(Ψ
(1)
nt0) 0.3870 0.2398
∂p0(Ψ(1)nt2)
∂snt -0.0391 4.1811
p0(Ψ
(2)
nt0) 0.5709 0.1835
∂p0(Ψ(1)nt3)
∂snt 0.4081 6.9457
p0(Ψ(1)nt1) 0.0995 0.1503
∂p0(Ψ(1)nt4)
∂snt 0.8412 5.5360
p0(Ψ
(2)
nt1) 0.3659 0.2446
∂p0(Ψ(1)nt5)
∂snt -0.5360 6.3767
p0(Ψ(1)nt2) 0.0283 0.1095
p0(Ψ
(1)
nt3) 0.2616 0.3736
p0(Ψ
(1)
nt4) 0.0370 0.1504
p0(Ψ(1)nt5) 0.1436 0.3166
Table 11: Psychic Value of School Attendance.
Variable Parameter Estimate Std.Err.
Constant B50 -20.8502 10.0810
Snt B51 3.6935 1.6900
S2nt B52 -0.0654 0.0619
AGEnt ×Snt B53 -0.0635 0.0093
BLACK B54 1.4361 1.3736
HISPANIC B55 0.0667 1.8812
AFQT B56 0.0165 0.0343
51
Table 12: Fixed Utility of Labor Force Participation.
Variable Parameter Estimate Std.Err.
Constant B60 -0.8174 2.3807
Ent B61 1.2834 1.2741
E2nt B62 -0.0270 0.2294
AGEnt ×Ent B63 -0.0645 0.0176
BLACK B64 -0.4961 1.4026
HISPANIC B65 -0.0351 2.4603
Table 13: Utility of Leisure and the CRRA parameter.
Variable Parameter Estimate Std.Err.
lnt B70 0.0043 0.0114
AGEnt × lnt B71 -0.0009 0.0010
AGE2nt × lnt B72 0.27E-04 0.24E-04
BLACK× lnt B73 0.0009 0.0008
HISPANIC× lnt B74 0.0003 0.0021
l2nt δ0 -0.58E-07 0.68E-07
lnt lnt−1 δ1 2.87E-07 1.15E-07
lnt lnt−2 δ2 3.86E-07 0.11E-07
CRRA parameter α 0.1067 0.0060
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Table 14: Results from baseline simulation by race.
Age Education Experience Hours Wages
Actual Sim. Actual Sim. Actual Sim. Actual Sim.
White
20 11.96 10.37 3.32 2.90 1257 1708 4.89 3.77
25 13.16 12.21 6.96 5.19 1957 1812 9.37 6.71
30 13.52 13.43 10.70 7.50 2198 2092 13.77 11.57
35 14.37 9.93 2338 15.85
Black
20 11.71 9.69 2.67 2.65 1129 1521 4.35 3.35
25 12.36 10.90 5.90 4.61 1830 1711 7.38 5.73
30 12.53 11.58 9.62 6.52 1963 2023 10.36 8.84
35 11.91 8.60 2275 11.67
Hispanic
20 11.33 9.69 3.04 2.84 1320 1773 5.00 3.82
25 11.99 10.89 6.71 5.03 1817 1960 9.15 6.57
30 12.28 11.56 10.57 7.20 2107 2219 12.26 10.03
35 11.90 9.61 2403 13.20
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Table 15: Effect of cash subsidy to students who do not work.
Age Education Experience Hours Wages
Base Pol 1 Base Pol 1 Base Pol 1 Base Pol 1
White
20 10.37 10.38 2.90 2.88 1708 1709 3.77 3.77
25 12.21 12.24 5.19 5.14 1812 1810 6.71 6.71
30 13.43 13.48 7.50 7.41 2092 2094 11.57 11.68
35 14.37 14.44 9.93 9.78 2338 2336 15.85 16.08
Black
20 9.69 9.71 2.65 2.63 1521 1522 3.35 3.35
25 10.90 10.95 4.61 4.55 1711 1708 5.73 5.72
30 11.58 11.63 6.52 6.41 2023 2020 8.84 8.85
35 11.91 11.98 8.60 8.41 2275 2274 11.67 11.78
Hispanic
20 9.69 9.71 2.84 2.83 1773 1771 3.82 3.81
25 10.89 10.92 5.03 4.99 1960 1958 6.57 6.56
30 11.56 11.61 7.20 7.10 2219 2222 10.03 10.02
35 11.90 11.96 9.61 9.44 2403 2402 13.20 13.21
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Table 16: Effects of mandatory increases in time spent on school activities.
Age Education Experience Hours Wages
Base Pol 2 Base Pol 2 Base Pol 2 Base Pol 2
White
20 10.37 10.66 2.90 2.89 1708 1722 3.77 3.78
25 12.21 12.95 5.19 5.09 1812 1827 6.71 7.05
30 13.43 14.78 7.50 7.23 2092 2185 11.57 14.99
35 14.37 16.52 9.93 9.38 2338 2412 15.85 23.28
Black
20 9.69 9.96 2.65 2.64 1521 1528 3.35 3.35
25 10.90 11.62 4.61 4.52 1711 1704 5.73 5.84
30 11.58 12.68 6.52 6.35 2023 2070 8.84 10.50
35 11.91 13.38 8.60 8.39 2275 2325 11.67 15.15
Hispanic
20 9.69 9.76 2.84 2.84 1773 1771 3.82 3.81
25 10.89 10.98 5.03 5.04 1960 1958 6.57 6.58
30 11.56 11.66 7.20 7.23 2219 2222 10.03 10.07
35 11.90 12.00 9.61 9.67 2403 2402 13.20 13.24
55
Table 17: Equating school quality.
Age Education Experience Hours Wages
Base Pol 3 Base Pol 3 Base Pol 3 Base Pol 3
Black
20 9.69 10.03 2.65 2.65 1521 1501 3.35 3.34
25 10.90 11.62 4.61 4.60 1711 1654 5.73 5.82
30 11.58 12.60 6.52 6.65 2023 2000 8.84 9.80
35 11.91 13.20 8.60 8.71 2275 2297 11.67 13.47
Hispanic
20 9.69 9.97 2.84 2.86 1773 1771 3.82 3.82
25 10.89 11.39 5.03 5.11 1960 1958 6.57 6.63
30 11.56 12.21 7.20 7.40 2219 2222 10.03 10.35
35 11.90 12.68 9.61 9.94 2403 2402 13.20 13.67
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Table 18: Effects of mandatory increases in time spent on school activities after equating school
quality.
Age Education Experience Hours Wages
Base Pol 4 Base Pol 4 Base Pol 4 Base Pol 4
Black
20 9.69 10.28 2.65 2.63 1521 1509 3.35 3.34
25 10.90 12.38 4.61 4.49 1711 1648 5.73 6.06
30 11.58 13.96 6.52 6.26 2023 2118 8.84 13.50
35 11.91 15.26 8.60 8.31 2275 2393 11.67 20.91
Hispanic
20 9.69 10.35 2.84 2.84 1773 1737 3.82 3.81
25 10.89 12.29 5.03 5.04 1960 1884 6.57 6.82
30 11.56 13.58 7.20 7.25 2219 2215 10.03 12.45
35 11.90 14.56 9.61 9.70 2403 2432 13.20 17.05
57
Figure 1: Changes in Shadow Price of Consumption ∆((1−α)−1 lnλt)
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Figure 2: Changes in Unskilled Aggregate Wage ∆(lnωt1)
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Figure 3: Changes in Skilled Aggregate Wage ∆(lnωt2)
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3.0 SEMIPARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF A NONLINEAR PANEL DATA MODEL
WITH PREDETERMINED VARIABLES AND SEMIPARAMETRIC INDIVIDUAL
EFFECTS
(WITH SOILIOU NAMORO)
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Panel data models are important in econometrics, primarily because of their capacity to capture
facets of agent behavior in ways that cannot be accounted for in cross-sectional and time-series
data models. Furthermore, detailed and relatively reliable panel data sets have become increasingly
available. As a consequence, there is a growing demand for more sophisticated panel data models
by applied researchers.
A major advantage of the linear panel data model is its ability to jointly account for perma-
nent unobservable individual effects, time specific aggregate effects, and (structural) dynamics
in agent behavior.1 Though at a slower rate, progress has been made by econometricians in de-
veloping nonlinear panel data model that allow for individual specific effects, aggregate time ef-
fects, and dynamics in behavior. Indeed, the most significant development in nonlinear panel data
models has been spurred by the limited dependent variables framework (see Honore´, 1992 and
Honore´ and Kyriazidou, 2000 for examples). Typically however, the estimation of these nonlinear
models rely heavily on the logit specification of the index function. The model we consider in this
paper is complementary to these nonlinear index models in that we impose a stronger restriction
on the form of the unobserved individual specific effect, but we relax the assumption that the index
function is known.
1For comprehensive summary of the advances in linear panel data models and estimation techniques, see
Chamberlain [1984] and Arellano and Honore´ [2001].
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This paper considers semiparametric estimation of a nonlinear single index panel data model
of the following form:
yit = Φ(αyit−1 + x′itβ+ f (zi)+λt)+ εit (3.1.1)
where xit is a K×1 vector of strictly exogenous and/or predetermined variables, zi is an L×1 vector
of exogenous individual specific time invariant random variables,2 β is a K×1 vector of unknown
parameters, Φ(·) is a real valued unknown function, f (·) is an unknown real valued function, λt
is an unobservable time-specific effect, and εit is an unobservable error term assumed to have a
conditional mean of zero. The purpose of this paper is to find an estimator of β with the usual
parametric convergence rate n−1/2 without assuming that Φ and f belong to some parametric class
of functions. We are particularly interested in constructing estimators for Φ and f because the goal
is to be able to simulate and predict the dependent variable yit .
This restriction on the individual-specific effects extends the suggestion of Newey [1994], pp.
1354-1355. In the binary choice framework, the model presented in equation (3.1.1) arises natu-
rally under the assumption that the individual specific effect is of the form µi = f (zi)−ui. Papers
that provide estimators of the finite dimensional parameter in these binary choice models include
Chen [1998] and Gayle and Miller [2003]. The former paper suggests implementing a series esti-
mator of the index function and estimating by OLS, where the latter suggests estimating by GMM.
Our own interest goes beyond the discrete choice framework, and our estimator is an efficient
semi-parametric least squares estimator that can be implemented using either series expansions or
the investigators favorite Kernel estimator. Furthermore, the index function is easily recoverable
in our estimation framework. This is important since we are specifically interest in estimating the
full data-generating process for the purpose of prediction and simulation.
A variety of models used in empirical studies fall within this class of single index models. The
model proposed here is in some sense an extension of the single index models proposed in Ichimura
[1993] and Klein and Spady [1993] to panel data and pre-determined variables. The cost of this
extension relative to these models is that we assume that the index function is strictly increasing
over its support. In many cases, the assumption of strict monotonicity of the index function may
2Note that zi could be made of the vector of strictly exogenous random variable (xi1, · · · ,xiT )′, in which case this
is a generalization of the Mundlak specification.
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be informed by economic theory. One such example is in cases where the index function is a
cumulative distribution function (cdf) as in the case of probability models. Indeed, discrete choice
models also falls within the class of models specified in equation (3.1.1).
In the sub-class of discrete choice models, the literature has developed by taking two dominant
paths: the case where the index function Φ is assumed to belong to a parametric class of cdf’s,
and the case where the nonparametric assumption in placed on the cdf. In the former case, most
progress have been made under the assumption that the index function Φ is the cdf of the logistic
distribution. Rasch [1960], Anderson [1970], and Chamberlain [1980] show that these models
can be estimated by conditional maximum likelihood for T ≥ 2. Chamberlain [1985] and Magnac
[1997] show that this model can be estimated with both individual-specific effects and lagged
dependent variables, but without any other explanatory variables. Honore´ and Kyriazidou [2000]
expand the estimation of these models to include explanatory variables.
Despite these rapid advancements, the method of identification used in these studies relies
crucially on the logit assumption. Indeed, under the assumption that the individual-time spe-
cific shocks are independent and if covariates are unbounded, the finite dimensional parameters
can be estimated consistently with a
√
n convergence rate without specifying the distribution of
the individual-specific effects conditional on the covariates if and only if the distribution of the
individual-time specific shocks is logistic (Magnac, 2004). However, the logit assumption raises
the question of robustness of these estimators to violation of that crucial assumption. This leads us
then to find other methods of estimating these dynamic panel data models that allow for sufficiently
general individual heterogeneity.
Another class of estimators for discrete choice models are those that do not make paramet-
ric assumptions on index function. Manski [1987] derives a maximum score estimator for the
single-index model with exogenous regressors, and individual-specific effects based on that, un-
der weak regularity conditions, the sign of difference in the first conditional probabilities is equal
to the sign of the first difference in the index. Horowitz [1992] extends this model by maximiz-
ing a smoothed version of Manski’s score function. This modification results in Horowitz being
able to prove asymptotic normality coefficient β, a property that Manski’s model does not enjoy.
Honore´ and Kyriazidou [2000] further extends this estimation technique to include lagged depen-
dent variables. They show that this estimator is consistent, but did not derive the asymptotic dis-
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tribution for this estimator. These estimators typically converge at a rate slower than n−1/2. More
importantly, since the index function is not estimated in these models, the full data generating
process is not estimated and thus these models are incapable of performing predictions.
The proposed method to estimate the nonlinear panel data model presented in this paper es-
sentially mimics that of the linear case. It starts with the inversion of the unknown function that
links the conditional expectations (or the predicted outcome) to the explanatory variables. In fact
this alternative representation (3.1.1) can be viewed as a generalized linear model (GLM) with the
link function given by the index function Φ−1 (see for example Chen, 1995). In this literature, the
link function is typically assumed to be known. In this respect the proposed model can be seen as
a extension of the GLM.
The inversion is then followed by a differentiation, which suppresses the fixed effects from
the regressors. The predicted outcomes are themselves estimated nonparametrically, prior to the
computation of the estimator. The method proceeds with an iterative back fitting algorithm, which
yields the estimates of the slopes as well the unknown index function. Estimates of the fixed effects
are readily obtained from the first estimates.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: the following section describes the class of models
considered in this paper. Section (3) discusses identification while section (4) presents the estima-
tor. Section (5) presents the algorithm used to compute the estimate, and section (6) discusses the
large sample properties of the estimator. Section (7) is devoted to the monte carlo simulations and
section (8) concludes. All the proofs, as well as the lemmas on which these proofs are based, are
to be found in the appendix of the paper.
3.2 THE MODEL
The underlying data is a vector valued cross-section
(yi,xi,zi) ∈M(T ×1)×M(T ×K)×M(L×1) =: X ,
where M(a×b) denotes the set of real-entry matrices of a rows and b columns. More precisely, we
have yi := (yi1, . . . ,yiT )′, xi := (xi1, . . . ,xiT )′, where x′it := (xit,1, . . . ,xit,K) and zi is an L dimensional
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vector of time invariant regressors. Since we consider panel data with predetermined variables,
we have T ≥ 3. The basic assumption regarding the data is that the sequence (xi,yi,zi) is an
independent and identically distributed X -valued random process, where X is endowed with its
Borel sigma-field B . We shall denote the probability law of the vector (yi,xi,zi) by Q. We assume
that at least one column of xi contains a random variable that is strictly exogenous. Notice that
for notational convenience, we have suppressed the explicit representation of the lagged dependent
variable and the aggregate shock. Since we allow for xit to include predetermined variables and
discrete variables, we can assume that these lagged dependent variable and the aggregate shocks
are indeed included in the vector x. We define the conditioning vector wit as
w′it := (x
′
it ,z
′
i).
The model considered in this paper is given by:
yit = Φ(x′itβ0 + f0(zi))+ εit. (3.2.1)
The following assumption will be maintained through the paper:
Assumption 3.2.1. Φ : ℜ−→ℜ is a strictly increasing function.
This assumption arises naturally in discrete choice models where Φ is a cdf. For purposes of
estimating the finite dimensional parameter, this assumption can be weakened to the assumption
that Φ is strictly increasing on an interval of its index, and that the number of observations within
that interval of the support increases with the sample size.
By taking the conditional expectation of yit we obtain:3
Pit0 := E(yit | wi) = Φ(x′itβ0 + f0(zi)), i = 1, · · · ,N, t = 1, · · ·T. (3.2.2)
Assumption 3.3 allows us to express the relation (3.2.2) as
Φ−1(Pit0) = x′itβ0 + f0(zi), i = 1, · · · ,N, t = 1, · · ·T, (3.2.3)
3We shall assume that the unconditional and conditional expectations that we write are all defined and we shall
most of the time omit to add the label “almost surely” to relations involving conditional expectations, unless we want
to stress the underlying probability.
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which in turn implies
∆[Φ−1(Pit0)] := Φ−1(Pit0)−Φ−1(Pit−1,0) = ∆x′itβ0 := (x′itβ0− x′it−1β0) (3.2.4)
Relation (3.2.4) will be the starting point in the definition of our semiparametric (SP) estimators.
In particular, defining ϕ0 := Φ−1 and ϕ(Pi) := [ϕ(Pi1), · · · ,ϕ(PiT )], relation (3.2.4) can be written
as
∆x′iβ0−∆[ϕ0(Pi0)] = 0. (3.2.5)
Our estimation technique is to find the couple (β,ϕ) that minimizes the mean squared deviation
between ∆x′itβ and ∆[ϕ(Pit0)]. This, of course, relies on β0 and ϕ0 being the unique solution to
equation (3.2.5). Therefore, we first impose identification restrictions and state the identification
theorem.
3.3 IDENTIFICATION
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 3.3.1. 1. ‖β0‖= 1.
2. The random vector xi contains at least one continuous regressor that is not contained in zi.
3. E[∆xit∆x′it ] is invertible.
4. The unconditional mean of the nonparametric individual effect is zero: E[ f0(zi)] = 0
Assumption (3.3.1.1) is frequent in single index models (see Manski, 1987 for example). An
alternative normalization (see Horowitz, 1992 and Ichimura, 1993) is to assume that the fist compo-
nent of x′it has a probability distribution conditional on the remaining components that is absolutely
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, and then assume that |β1|= 1. In our case, un-
der the assumption that the index function is strictly increasing, assumption (3.3.1.1) allows us to
determine the signs of all the coefficients as in linear regression models. Assumption (3.3.1.3) is
the traditional full rank condition on the regressors. Of course this condition can be relaxed by
considering pseudo-inverses. Assumption (3.3.1.4) is a limit version of the traditional zero aver-
age assumption in fixed effects models. This assumption is what gives location identification of
66
the nonparametric functions in our model. This assumption is appealing in applications, but is
not necessary for the theoretical model because in most nonlinear and limited dependent variables
theoretical models, identification up to location is usually sufficient.
The model (3.2.3) introduced in section 3.2 is specified by the triplet pi0 = (β0,ϕ0, f0(zi)).
Consider another model pi1 = (β1,ϕ1, f1(zi)). We say that the models pi0 and pi1 are observationally
equivalent if pi1 also satisfies:
ϕ1(Pit0) = x′itβ1 + f1(zi), i = 1, · · · ,N, t = 1, · · ·T. (3.3.1)
Then under assumptions (3.3.1.1)-(3.3.1.4) we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3.2. (Identification) If
i. pi0 and pi1 are observationally equivalent,
ii. pi1 satisfies assumptions (3.3.1.1) - (3.3.1.3), and
iii. ϕ1 is strictly increasing,
then
β0 = β1 (3.3.2)
ϕ0 = ϕ1 + c (3.3.3)
f0(zi) = f1(zi)+ c (3.3.4)
for some constant c. Furthermore, if assumption (3.3.1.4) also holds, then c = 0.
3.4 THE ESTIMATOR
In this section, we define the estimator and describe the algorithm. For ease of exposition we first
define the unfeasible estimator and discuss the properties of such an estimator. Then we discuss
the feasible estimator. The following estimator is unfeasible because of the fact that the predicted
outcome, P0 is not observed.
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Definition 3.4.1. The unfeasible estimator (β∗,ϕ∗) of (β0,Φ−1) is the solution to the minimization
problem
inf
(β,ϕ)∈{β | ‖β‖=1}×S
1
N
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=2
(
∆x′itβ−∆[ϕ(Pit0)]
)2
, (3.4.1)
s.t.
1
NT
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
(ϕ(Pit0)− x′itβ) = 0, (3.4.2)
where S is the set of strictly increasing real-valued functions.
The constraint in (3.4.2) fixes the location of the estimate of ϕ0. It imposes that the unfeasible
estimator of the fixed effect is of mean zero. This is similar to the restriction imposed in linear
models (see Baltagi, 2001).
Typically, the predicted outcomes Pit0 = E[yit |wit ] is unknown and must be estimated. Non-
parametric procedures can be used to estimate these quantities. Since this is a conditional expec-
tation, the density of the data, that is found in the denominator, must be bounded away from zero.
We therefore impose a fixed trimming condition by defining a closed and bounded subset W of
the support of the density and assume that the density only affects the estimator through its values
on this set. Define the function, Jδ(wnt) := δ−DwJ(δ−1wnt), where Dw is the dimension of w, and
J is a Kernel which integrates to 1 over W . The scalar δ ∈ R+ is the band-width associated with
the kernel estimator. Then the kernel estimator for the predicted outcomes is given by:
ˆPnt =
∑Nm=1,m 6=n ∑Tr=1,r 6=t ymrJδ (wmr−wnt)
∑Nm=1,m 6=n ∑Tr=1,r 6=t Jδ (wmr−wnt)
(3.4.3)
Substituting ˆPit for Pit0 in equations (3.4.1), the feasible estimator is obtained as follows:
Definition 3.4.2. The feasible estimator ( ˆβ, ϕˆ) of (β0,Φ−1) is the solution to the minimization
problem
inf
(β,ϕ)∈{β | ‖β‖=1}×S
1
N
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=2
(
∆x′itβ−∆[ϕ( ˆPit)]
)2
, (3.4.4)
s.t.
1
NT
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
(ϕ( ˆPit)− x′itβ) = 0, (3.4.5)
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Once the problem (3.4.4) is solved, and denoting the solution by ( ˆβ, ϕˆ), an estimator f̂ (zi) for the
individual-specific effects f (zi) is given by the following definition:
Definition 3.4.3. The estimator f̂ (zi) for the individual-specific effects f (zi) is given by
f̂ (zi) = ∑
T
t=2[ϕˆ( ˆPit)− x′it ˆβ]
T
(3.4.6)
However, these estimates are not useful if the goal is to perform simulation exercises or to simply
make out of sample predictions. A straightforward solution to this problem is a simple kernel
estimator of the projection of f̂ (zi) on zi as in the estimation of ˆPit . This then gives a smooth
estimator ˆf (zi) of the function f (zi).
3.5 COMPUTATION OF THE SP ESTIMATORS
3.5.1 The Algorithm
An analytic solution of the problem (3.4.4) hardly exists, due to the presence of a functional compo-
nent ϕ. The computation of the SP estimator requires, therefore, the use of a numerical algorithm.
Several such algorithms are conceivable. The one that we present here is a back fitting algorithm
(Buja, Hastie, and Tibshirani, 1989). It starts with an arbitrarily chosen function ϕ, and computes
and estimate of β, say ˆβ. The algorithm proceeds by setting the value of β to ˆβ and then updating
the previous estimate of ϕ, and so on, in a cyclical way until convergence. The SP estimator is
chosen to be any couple ( ˆβ, ϕˆ) that corresponds to the asymptotic fixed point.
The algorithm involves two additional complications above what is discussed in Buja et al.
[1989]. The first is that the estimate of β is in fact a constrained estimate. The second is that the
estimate of ϕ involves an (inner) contraction mapping. Define
ϕ(P) := (ϕ(P12), · · · ,ϕ(PNT ))′
ϕ(P)t := (ϕ(P13), · · · ,ϕ(PNT ))′
ϕ(P)t−1 := (ϕ(P12), · · · ,ϕ(PNT−1))′.
∆[ϕ(P)] := ϕ(P)t −ϕ(P)t−1
The following back fitting algorithm can therefore be used:
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1. Initialization. The parameters to be initialized are below.
a. ϕ1: An initial value of ϕ can be arbitrarily chosen. For example, one may choose the
mapping ϕ1(x) = x3.
b. ˆPit : As stated above, the algorithm requires that estimates of Pit be obtained before hand.
These empirical quantities can readily be obtained from equation (3.5.4).
c. (ε1,ε2): Two small positive numbers to be used in the evaluation of our convergence
criteria.
2. Numerical Evaluation. Given ϕs at iteration s of the algorithm, approximate values for the
pairs (βs+1,ϕs+1) are computed recursively as follows:
a. Compute the constrained regression of ∆[ϕs( ˆP)] on ∆x to obtain the approximate value
βs+1.
To perform this estimation, we present a general technique which is probably standard, but
we describe it in detail here since we are unable to find a reference for it. So to the best
of our knowledge, this constrained estimation technique is novel. Consider the standard
problem of estimating the (K×1) dimensional parameter β in the model:
yi = x′iβ+ εi, E[εi|xi] = 0 (3.5.1)
under the constraint that ||β||= 1. The solution to this problem can be written as follows:
ˆβ = arg min
{β:||β||=1}(−y+ xβ)
′(−y+ xβ). (3.5.2)
To solve this problem, we propose solving the auxiliary problem for estimates of the (K +
1)×1 dimensional parameter parameters δ = (δ1,δ′2)′:
ˆδ = arg min
{δ:‖δ‖=1}
(−yδ1 + xδ2)′(−yδ1 + xδ2)
⇔ δ̂‖δ‖ = argminδ
‖δ‖
δ
‖δ‖
′
B
δ
‖δ‖ (3.5.3)
where δ1 > 0, the (K +1) dimensional square matrix B is given by B = C′C and we define
C := (−y,x). Then it is well known that the solution to this problem is the (normalized)
eigenvector corresponding to the smallest eigenvalue of B. There are numerous efficient
softwares available for computing these eigenvectors. We adopt the subroutine “jacobi”
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from Press et al. [1996] for our purposes. This algorithm computes the solution in milli-
seconds. Once we have the solution δ||δ|| =(˜δ1, ˜δ′2)′ our solution for the original problem is
easily recovered by the equality ˆβ = (1− ˜δ21)−1/2 ˜δ2. This process is very fast on standard
computers, even for quite large values of K. Indeed, there is no observable difference in
the time this process takes to estimate β and the time that would be taken by OLS. This
makes this constrained estimation technique quite appealing.
b. Perform the regression of the vector ∆x′itβs+1 +ϕs( ˆP)t−1 on ˆP to obtain the approximate
value ϕs+1.
Recall that we assume that the index function ϕ is strictly increasing. This assumption is
not necessary for the algorithm to converge. Indeed it is sufficient that the index function
be in the class of functions of bounded variation. Furthermore, the current technology
in isotonic regression when the data set is large is unsatisfactory, because of the com-
putational time required to implement any of these techniques. As such, we relax the
strict monotonicity assumption on ϕ in the algorithm. Besides the ease of computation,
dropping this constraint allows one to test the assumption of monotonicity of the index
function.
The regression of ∆x′itβs+1 +ϕs( ˆP)t−1 on ˆP is itself a fixed point algorithm. The algorithm
accommodates either kernel or series estimators, but we present the kernel estimator here.
The procedure goes as follows. Given ϕs = ϕs j, we Construct ∆x′itβs+1 +ϕs j( ˆPit−1). Then,
adopting the notation of the kernel estimator given in section (3.4), for any value ˆPnt the
kernel estimator for ϕs j+1( ˆPnt) is given by:
ϕs j+1( ˆPnt) =
∑Nm=1,m 6=n ∑Tr=3,r 6=t Jδ
(
ˆPmr− ˆPnt
)(
∆x′mrβs+1 +ϕs j( ˆPmr−1)
)
∑Nm=1,m 6=n ∑Tr=3,r 6=t Jδ
(
ˆPmr− ˆPnt
) . (3.5.4)
This process is repeated (in j) until convergence. The proof that equation (3.5.4) defines
a contraction mapping is presented in Appendix A.2.6. The convergence criterion for this
inner contraction mapping is provided by the following inequality:
1
NT
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=2
(
ϕs( ˆPit)−ϕs−1( ˆPit)
)2 ≤ ε21. (3.5.5)
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If (3.5.5) holds at iteration J then we take ϕsJ to be our projection estimate ϕs+1 for
iteration s + 1 of the outer contraction. Our experience is that this part of the algorithm
converges within 6 iterations and is extremely stable.
3. Outer Convergence. Step 2. is repeated until the process converges. The convergence criterion
is provided by the following inequality:
‖βs−βs−1‖2K ≤ ε22 (3.5.6)
If (3.5.5) and (3.5.6) hold, then the corresponding values (βs,ϕs) constitute our numerical
solution ( ˆβ, ϕˆ). Otherwise, step 2. is repeated until the conditions (3.5.5) and (3.5.6) are
simultaneously satisfied.
The corresponding estimates of the individual-specific effects is then computed from equation
(3.4.6).
An important point to note is that if the investigator is willing to assume the form of the index
function Φ, for example, a logit or probit specification, then the computation of the estimator ˆβ
is simply to Regress Φ−1( ˆP) on ∆x. The asymptotic properties of this estimator will typically be
the same as that of the more general estimator which assumes that the index function is unknown.
This property illustrates the power of the estimator presented in this paper.
3.6 ASYMPTOTIC PROPERTIES OF THE SP ESTIMATOR
In order to derive the asymptotic properties of the SP estimator, some regularity conditions must be
imposed. We turn first to the nuisance parameter, the first stage kernel estimator of Pit0 = E[yit |wit].
Following Newey and McFadden [1994] we impose conditions that ensures uniform convergence
of the nonparametric estimate ˆPit0. Following the notation of Newey and McFadden [1994], define
γ := (γ1,γ2) where γ1 := f (wit) and γ2 := f (wit)E[yit|wit ]. Clearly Pit = γ2/γ1. Define also qit :=
(1,yit)′. Then the numerator and denominator of the first stage kernel estimator can be conveniently
written as ˆγ(w) = ∑Ni=1 ∑Tt=3 qitJδ(w−wit). We make the following assumptions
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Assumption 3.6.1. 1. J(u) is differentiable of order d, the derivatives d are bounded, J(u) is zero
outside a bounded set,
∫
J(u)du = 1, there is a positive integer m such that for all j < m,∫
J(u)[⊗ jℓ=1]du = 0
2. There is a version of γo(w) that is continuously differentiable to order d with bounded deriva-
tives on an open set containing S , a set contained in the support of w.
3. There is r ≥ 4 such that E[‖q‖r] < ∞ and E[‖q‖r|w] f0(w) is bounded.
4. The bandwidth δ = δ(N) satisfies
N1−(2/r)δk/ lnN −→ ∞, √Nδ2m −→ 0, and √N lnN/(Nδr+2d)−→ 0
Under these assumptions, Newey and McFadden [1994] shows that
√
N‖γˆ− γ0‖ p−→ 0, (3.6.1)
where the norm here is the Sobolev norm.
We now impose conditions for consistency of our estimates of the the pair (β0,ϕ0). First, the
fixed trimming condition along with assumptions 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 imply that there is a compact set
K in which all the P’s lie. We therefore define the restriction of the set S to K as SK . Define also
the distance d on the cartesian product BK[0,1]× SK (where BK is the close unit ball in ℜK) as
follows:
d[(β,φ),(α,ψ)] := ‖β−α‖K + sup
P
|φ(P)−ψ(P)|
where ‖.‖K is the Euclidean norm on ℜK . In what follows we assume that the conditions on the
kernel in assumption are also satisfied by the kernel used to estimate ϕ.
Assumption 3.6.2. 1. ‖∆Xi‖T2 ≤ R0 > 0 ∀i≥ 1 Q-almost surely.
2. Each element of S is differentiable.
3. There exist (unknown) γ such that for every ϕ ∈ SK , and for any x ∈ K ◦, where K ◦ denotes
the interior of K , ϕ′(x)≤ γ < ∞.
4. There is a (unknown) function η in S such that for all x ∈ℜ
sup
S
|ϕ(x)|= |η(x)|
Assumption 3.6.2.1 is weaker than assuming that the covariates are uniformly bounded almost
surely. We now state the consistency and asymptotic normality theorems.
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Theorem 3.6.3. Let the assumptions 3.3.1, 3.6.1, and 3.6.2 be satisfied. Then
ˆβ p−→ β0
sup
P∈K
|ϕˆ(P)−ϕ0(P)| p−→ 0
Theorem 3.6.4. If the assumptions 3.3.1, 3.6.1, and 3.6.2 are satisfied, then
√
N( ˆβ−β0) d−→ N(0,V ),
where V = E[∆x′∆x]−1E[∆x′R]ΩE[R′∆x]E[∆x′∆x]−1, Ω = Var(ε), and
Ri =

−ϕ′0(Pi1) ϕ′0(Pi2) 0 · · · 0 0
0 −ϕ′0(Pi2) ϕ′0(Pi3) · · · 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 0 · · · −ϕ′0(PiT−1) ϕ′0(PiT )
 .
3.6.1 Semiparametric Efficiency Bound
We now tackle the question of whether the proposed estimator of the finite dimensional parameter
β is efficient. The model for which we compute the efficiency bound is the implied model given in
equation (3.2.5), and not the conditional independence model of equation (3.1.1). In general these
bounds are different, and in many cases that of equation (3.1.1) may not be sharp, in that there may
be no estimator that can attain the bound. The variance bound that we compute for equation (3.2.5)
is the one that would be attained within an GMM framework. Thus our estimation framework is
as efficient as any competing extremum estimator for the condition given in (3.2.5), but retains
the property that it is independent of the choice of smoother, and that a consistent estimator of
the infinite dimensional nuisance parameters are computed immediately, and ready for simulations
and predictions. We state the following theorem:
Theorem 3.6.5. The estimator of the finite dimensional parameter β developed in section 3.4 is
semiparametric efficient with variance bound given in theorem 3.6.4.
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3.7 MONTE CARLO RESULTS
In this section we examine the small sample properties of the proposed estimator via a Monte Carlo
experiment. Consider the following data generating process:
yit = Φ(αyit−1 +βxit + f (zi))+ vit, i = 1, · · · ,n, t = 1,2,3.
In this model the index function is chosen to be asymmetric about 0 with range between 0 and 10.
Specifically the index function is given by:
Φ(x) =
10
1+ e−λ(x)x
,
λ(x) = 0.5− 0.35
1− e−5x . (3.7.1)
The individual specific effect is given by:
f (zi) = 4
(
e−zi
1+ e−zi
− 1
N
N
∑
i=1
e−zi
1+ e−zi
)
(3.7.2)
This specification results in the the function f to be of mean zero and ranges between -2 and 2.
The strictly exogenous random variable xit is distributed N(1,7), and zi is distributed N(0,3). The
error term vit is distributed N(0,0.5). The initial values yi0 are distributed N(0,6). Finally, (α,β) =
(0.6,0.8). We perform 50 Monte carlo replications of the model for four sample sizes n: 200, 500,
1000, and 1500. The mean bias and the root mean squared error (RMSE) are calculated for each
sample size.
The computation was done on a 3GHz Pentium 4 laptop computer. The algorithm take 30
seconds of CPU time to compute the estimates for a sample size of 1500. Table reft181 reports the
results from the Monte Carlo study. The results indicate that the estimator performs remarkably
well, even so for the index function Φ.
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Table 19: Small sample properties of estimator. Monte Carlo simulation of 50 trials.
α β Φ
Sample Size Mean Bias RMSEa Mean Bias RMSEa RMSEa
200 0.0235 0.0355 -0.0189 0.0283 0.2735
500 0.0133 0.0201 -0.0104 0.0157 0.1721
1000 0.0153 0.0185 -0.0118 0.0143 0.1435
1500 0.0128 0.0159 -0.0098 0.0123 0.1165
a Root mean square error.
Figures 4 to 8 presents plots of the estimated and true index function Φ for sample the four
sample sizes 200, 500, 1000, and 1500. The estimated index function tracks very well the true one
even for the sample size of 200. For the sample size of 1500, the two plots are largely indistin-
guishable. This again shows that the proposed cyclical projection algorithm performs remarkably
well.
3.8 EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we implement the algorithm developed in the paper to estimate a wage equation.4
The wage equation has the following specification
wit = Φ(x′itβ+ f (zi))+ εit, (3.8.1)
where the assumptions on the data are as in section 3.4. The vector xit is composed of the first two
lags of hours worked (hit−1,hit−2) and labor force participation (dit−1,dit−2), highest grade level
completed (Snt), and squared age (AGE2). As is well established in the literature on returns to
education, this equation is subject to selectivity bias which is typically called ability bias. The idea
4The executables panel.exe for WINDOWS and panel.out for UNIX used for estimation of these models is available
upon request from the authors.
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is that both wage and level of education are partially determined by the ability of the individual,
which is unobserved, creating a correlation with the explanatory variable Sit and the error term.
In this exercise however, we control for ability bias by including AFQT scores as a time invariant
explanatory variable in zi. The other time invariant covariates included in zi are the indicators
BLACK and HISPANIC.
The data is taken from the 1979 youth cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Labor
Market Experience (NLSY79), a comprehensive panel data set that follows individuals over the
period 1979 to 2000, who were 14 to 21 years of age as of January 1, 1979. The data set initially
consisted of 12,686 individuals: a representative sample of 6,111 individuals, a supplemental sam-
ple of 5,295 Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks, and economically disadvantaged, non-black, non-
Hispanics, and a supplemental sample of 1,280 military youth. This study makes use of 9 years of
interviews, from 1982 to 1990. The data is restricted to include males.
The estimates are presented in Table 1. The signs and relative magnitude of lagged hours
worked are consistent with the hypothesis of returns to on the job training, and depreciation in
human capital. Furthermore, the coefficient on Sit is positive and significant at the 5 percent level.
The only coefficient that does not conform to a-priori expectation is the coefficient of AGE2, which
is positive and significant. However, considering that the maximum age in the sample is 37, it is
unlikely that the declining effect on wages would be captured in this estimation, since this typically
begins in early to mid forties.
The isotonic estimate of the index function ˆΦ is presented in figure 5. It is interesting to note
that the shape of the index function roughly resembles that of the exponential function. This is
notable since it is common practice to express the wage equation in log linear form.
3.9 CONCLUSION
Over recent years, the specifications of econometric models have undergone a rapid increase in
complexity. An important stimulus for this transformation is that applied economists have become
more sensitive to the issue of specification bias and robustness of the estimation techniques used
in practice. The relaxation of parametric assumptions however comes at the cost of less tractable
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estimators, increased computational time, and limited ability to perform post-estimation analysis
such as out of sample predictions and Monte-Carlo studies. Hence, there is a need for the develop-
ment of estimators that allow for flexible specification, but at the same time estimates the full data
generating process at cheap computational cost.
This paper attempts to contribute to the semi-parametric single index panel data framework by
presenting an estimator and algorithm to achieve the above goals. In particular, we develop an ef-
ficient semiparametric method for estimating nonlinear panel data index models with small-T. The
estimation technique allows for the inclusion of predetermined variables, in particular lagged de-
pendent variables, aggregate time-specific unobserved effects, and a semiparametric specification
of the individual-specific effects. The paper provides a root-N consistent, asymptotically normal
and efficient estimator for the slope parameter, a consistent nonparametric estimator of the index
function as well as its convergence rate, and an estimator of the individual specific effects. Thus
with our estimator, one can predict and simulate the dependent variable. The algorithm presented
is straightforward and is found to be quite stable in practice. It immediately provides an estimate of
the index function, and the the investigator may implement it his favorite series or kernel smoother
in estimation. To the best of our knowledge, this property is novel in this framework. Further-
more, the algorithm can estimate an extension of the generalized linear model (GLM) where the
link function is unspecified and not assumed to be monotone. Therefore our implied model (i.e.
assuming that the ananlysis begins with equation (3.2.4)) can be used to test the assumption of
monotonicity, linearity, or simply that the index function belongs to a specific parametric family
such as the logistic. Excellent references for testing of monotonicity in nonparametric regression
include Bowman et al. [1996], van der Vaart et al. [1998], and Gibjels [2003].
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Table 20: The Semiparametric Wage Equation
Variable Estimate
Lags of Hours Worked
∆hit−1 0.000282
(0.0000006)
∆hit−2 0.000163
(0.0000001)
Lags of employment
∆dit−1 -0.8528
(0.0017)
∆dit−2 -0.4451
(0.0010)
Education
∆Sit 0.2732
(0.0015)
Demographic Variable
∆AGE2it 0.0035
(0.00004)
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Figure 4: True and estimated index function for sample size of 200
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Figure 5: True and estimated index function for sample size of 500
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Figure 6: True and estimated index function for sample size of 1000
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Figure 7: True and estimated index function for sample size of 1500
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Figure 8: Estimate of index function from wage regression
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4.0 NUMERICAL SOLUTIONS OF ASYMMETRIC FIRST PRICE INDEPENDENT
PRIVATE VALUES AUCTIONS
(WITH JEAN-FRANCOIS RICHARD)
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we propose a powerful numerical algorithm to solve first price single object auctions
where bidders draw Independent and Private Values (hereafter IPV) from heterogeneous distri-
butions, allowing for subsets of bidders to collude and for a set reserve price. We also provide
operational univariate quadratures to evaluate probabilities of winning as well as expected rev-
enues for the bidders and the auctioneer. The latter is used to compute optimal reserves under
asymmetric environments. This also enables us to provide insights as to whether collusion among
subsets of bidders are sustainable.
We first review some of the relevant literature. Much of the earlier auction literature as-
sumed that bidders draw their signals from a common underlying distribution. Pioneering con-
tributions include Riley and Samuelson [1981], Milgrom and Weber [1982] , Mathews [1983] and
Maskin and Riley [1984]. Important theoretical results such as revenue equivalence theorems ob-
tain under symmetry. However, the assumption of symmetry is often far too restrictive for many
empirical applications.
Relaxing the symmetry assumption prevents analytical derivation of (first price) bid functions
and, therefore, considerably complicates revenue comparisons. Nevertheless, important results
have been derived under asymmetry. For example, existence and unicity results under asymmetry
can be found in Lebrun [1996, 1999, 2005] or Maskin and Riley [2000a,b]. Furthermore, un-
der stochastic dominance Maskin and Riley [2000a] show that the high bid auction dominates
the open bid auction in terms of seller revenue and that the strong bidder (with the stochasti-
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cally dominant distribution) shades his bid more than the weak bidder. They also provide ex-
amples of situations where the seller revenue is higher in open auctions than in high auctions.
From a numerical viewpoint, a pioneering contribution which lead to the present paper is found
in Marshall et al. [1994] (hereafter MMRS) who proposed a numerical algorithm to compute first
price equilibrium bid functions in a two (subgroups of) players asymmetric environment under
uniform distributions. Actually, MMRS framework also implicitly assumes stochastic dominance.
Marshall and Schulenberg [1998] modified MMRS to accommodate reserve prices set by the auc-
tioneer.
In the present paper we generalize MMRS algorithm to a much broader class of first price
asymmetric IPV auction and procurement problems allowing for arbitrary numbers of (subgroups
of) players independently drawing their valuations from arbitrary distributions. Common distribu-
tions (Exponential, Weibull, Beta, Normal, Lognormal,...) are offered as options in the program.
Additional distributions can easily be added by users in the form of a subroutine. Our program
takes care of constructing Taylor Series Expansions for these distributions. The only (standard)
restriction is that these distributions have common support. Stochastic dominance is not required.
This will enable us to investigate whether existing results generalize when stochastic dominance no
longer holds. As in MMRS we are actually computing numerical solutions to a system of Ordinary
Differential Equations (ODEs) characterizing the first order conditions for a Nash equilibrium. The
solution belongs to a class of two-points boundary value problems and is evaluated by recursive
application of (low order) Taylor series expansions. Singularity of the system at the origin requires
backward extrapolation from an iterated end-point.
For ease of implementation our algorithm currently relies upon equal spacing subdivisions
of the support of the component distributions. While this has proved to be numerically stable for
most distributions, occasional pathologies (specifically excessive local curvature or densities which
are not bounded away from zero on their supports) would require smarter adaptative selection of
step size. Such robustification goes beyond the objective of the present paper and are currently
addressed by increasing the number of points in the grid as much as needed.
The key advantage offered by our algorithm relative to MMRS lies in its capability to accom-
modate a wide range of arbitrary distributions, providing us with a powerful tool to investigate
whether classic results (revenue equivalence, a.s.o.) extend to situations where symmetry and/or
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stochastic dominance are no longer assumed. This feature also provides broad flexibility for the
analysis of (sub)coalitions.
The paper is organized as follows. The baseline model and the solution algorithm are described
in Section 2; Expected revenue calculations are provided in Section 3 for first price auctions and
in Section 4 for second price auctions; Numerical examples are presented in Section 5 and Section
6 concludes.
4.2 THE ALGORITHM
4.2.1 Baseline Model
We are considering here a single object IPV first price auction. Risk neutral bidders submit sealed
bids. The highest bidder wins and pays his bid. There are N potential bidders. Only those with
private valuations above the reserve price R set by the auctioneer submit competitive bids. Bidders
are ex-ante heterogeneous. Each bidder belongs to one of n types. Each type is characterized by a
distribution function Fi on a common support [v, v]. There are ki bidders in group i for a total of
N = ∑ni=1 ki (potential) bidders.
Bid functions are denoted by the Greek ϕi, i = 1, · · ·n. Bidders are assumed to be risk neutral
with utility from winning the auction with a bid b given a type v defined as Ui(v−b) = v−b. The
generalization to constant risk aversion is fairly trivial and will not be discussed here. Clearly,
utility from winning the auction is increasing in the individual’s signal. Under these assumptions,
Proposition 5 of Maskin and Riley [2000b] establishes the existence of a monotonic pure-strategy
equilibrium in the standard first price auction. Indeed, Lebrun [1996] has shown that these bid
functions are strictly monotone and increasing, therefore, invertible. Inverse bid functions are
denoted by the Greek letter λi, i = 1, · · · ,n. Uniqueness of such equilibrium is well established in
the case with two types [Lebrun, 1996]. However in the general N player game, equilibrium may
not be unique in that we may end up with “non-essential” equilibria [Briesmer and Shubik, 1967].
Here we assume further that Fi is twice continuously differentiable with a density fi bounded
away from zero on [v,v]. Under these assumptions, Lebrun [1999] proves in the general N bidder
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case that the equilibrium is unique, and that the inverse bid functions have a common support
[R, t∗], where t∗ is the bid associated with the valuation v¯, and R is the reserve price set by the
auctioneer. We show in this paper that this equilibrium is amenable to numerical analysis, and
presents itself as a natural extension to the methods proposed in MMRS. As such the (numerical)
determination of t∗ is a critical component of the problem to be solved.
4.2.2 The differential equations
Let t = ϕi(v) denote the equilibrium bid submitted by bidder i with private signal v ∈ [v,v]. For
the ease of notation, bidders with signals lower than the reserve R are assumed to bid their signal,
whence ϕi(v) = v for v≤ R. Let v = λi(t) denote inverse bid functions. Following Lebrun [1999],
the λi’s share a common support [v, t∗]. For the ease of presentation, we momentarily assume that
t∗ is known. Bidder i with signal v ∈ [R,v] submits a bid t which is solution of the optimization
problem
t = arg max
u∈(R,v)
(v−u) · [Fi(λi(u))]ki−1Π j 6=i [Fj(λ j(u))]k j. (1)
The Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs) associated by the First Order Conditions (FOCs) are
given by
Πns=1Fs(λs(t)) = (λi(t)− t) · [
n
∑
j=1
k∗i, j f j(λ j(t))λ j(t)Πs6= jFsλs(t))], (2)
where k∗i,i = ki−1 and k∗i, j = k j for j 6= i, i : 1 → n. Let ℓi(t) = Fi(λi(t)). Equation (2) is rewritten
as
1 = [F−1i (ℓi(t))− t] ·
[
n
∑
j=1
k∗i, j
ℓ′j(t)
ℓ j(t)
]
, i = 1→ n (3)
The boundary conditions for λi and ℓi are given by
λi(R) = R, λi(t∗) = v, i : 1→ n (4)
ℓi(R) = Fi(R), ℓi(t∗) = 1, i : 1→ n (5)
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respectively. As noted earlier by MMRS under uniform Fis, the system (3) of ODEs is ill behaved
at the lower boundary. If, for example, R = v then a recursive application of l’Hospital rule for
t → v+ produces the result that the right derivative of ℓi at v is given by
ℓ◦i = fi(v) ·
N
N−1 , i : 1→ n (6)
and, most importantly, that all higher order right derivatives at v are zero. If instead R > v, then
lim
t→R+
ℓ′i(t) = +∞, i : 1→ n (7)
as in Marshall and Schulenberg [1998]. Whence, following MMRS, we shall solve the ODEs (3)
backward starting from the right boundary ℓi(t∗) = 1, assuming momentarily that t∗ is known.
4.2.3 The baseline algorithm
Our algorithm amounts to constructing piecewise polynomial approximations to the ℓis from which
(as discussed in Section 2.4 below) approximations for the λis and ϕis immediately follow. Assum-
ing we just computed xi,0 = ℓi(t0) where t0 ∈ (R, t∗), we describe next how to construct Taylor series
expansions for the ℓis at t0 which are then used to compute xi,1 = ℓi(t1) at the next point t1 = t0−∆t
where ∆t denotes the selected step size. The relevant expansions are denoted as follows:
ℓi(t) =
∞
∑
j=0
ai, j · (t− t0) j, (8)
ℓ′i(t)/ℓi(t) =
∞
∑
j=0
bi, j · (t− t0) j, (9)
F−1i (ℓi(t))− t =
∞
∑
j=0
pi, j(t− t0) j, (10)
F−1i (x) =
∞
∑
j=0
di, j(x− x0) j. (11)
Our baseline algorithm relies upon three recursive relationships among the above expansions to
construct the ai, js from the di, js. The relationships between these coefficients and those of other
functions of interest such as the Fi’s (input) and the ϕi’s (output) are discussed in Section 2.4 below.
Let JM denote the selected order of approximations. Step J(J : 0→ JM) consists of three parts:
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• The computation of ai,J given {(ai, j,bi, j); j < J}. The corresponding recurrence relationship
obtains from the identities ℓ′i(t) = ℓi(t). ℓ′i(t)/ℓi(t) which together with formulae (8) and (9)
imply the identities
∞
∑
j=1
jai, j(t− t0) j−1 =
[
∞
∑
r=0
ai,r(t− t0)r
]
·
[
∞
∑
s=0
bi,s(t− t0)s
]
. (12)
Equating the coefficients of order J−1 produces the following relationship
ai,J =
1
J
J−1
∑
r=0
ai,rbi,J−r−1, (i : 1→ n;J : 1→ JM) (13)
with initial conditions
ai,0 = ℓi(t0), bi,0 = ℓ′i(t0)/ℓi(t0), i : 1→ n. (14)
• The computation of pi,J given {(ai, jdi, j); j ≤ J}. The corresponding relationship obtains by
application of Lemma 1 in Appendix A to the composition of F−1i (input) and ℓi (output from
(13)), accounting for the additional factor t = [t0 +(t− t0)]. Whence we have
pi,J =
J
∑
r=1
di,rθi,r,J− zJ, (i : 1→ n;J : 1→ JM) (15)
θi,r,J =
J−r+1
∑
s=1
ai,sθi,r−1,J−s, (r : 1→ J) (16)
with z0 = z1 = 1,zJ = 0 for J > 1, and initial conditions
pi,0 = F−1i (xi,0), θi,0,0 = 1 (i : 1→ n) (17)
90
• The computation of bi, j given {pi, j; j ≤ J);(bi, j; j < J)}. The corresponding relationships
originate from the ODEs themselves. Substituting expansions (9) and (10) into equation (3)
produces the identities
1 =
[
∞
∑
r=0
pi,r(t− t0)r
][
n
∑
ℓ=1
k∗i,ℓ
∞
∑
s=0
bℓ,s(t− t0)s
]
, (18)
for i : 1→ n and ℓ : 1→ n Equation (18) can be rewritten as
1 =
∞
∑
j=0
[
n
∑
ℓ=1
k∗i,ℓ
( j
∑
r=0
pi,rbℓ, j−r
)]
(t− t0) j. (19)
Equating the coefficients of (t− t0)J to 0 for J > 1 and rearranging the corresponding identities
into matrix form produces the following vectorial recurrence relationship
P0(In− ink′)bJ = cJ, (20)
where P0 = diag(p1,0, · · · , pn,0), In is the identity matrix of order n, i′n = (1 · · ·1),
k′ = (k1, · · ·kn),b′J = (b1,J, · · · ,bn,J),c0 =−in and
cJ =

.
.
.
∑nℓ=1 k∗i,ℓ
(
∑Jr=1 bℓ,J−r
)
.
.
.
 ,J > 0 (21)
Standard formulae for partitioned matrices produce the following expressions for the determi-
nant and inverse of (In− ink′):
|In− ink′|= 1−N (In− ink′)−1 = In− ink
′
N−1 . (22)
Formulae (12) to (22) for J : 0 → JM define our baseline recurrences algorithm for the evalu-
ation of Taylor Series expansions at an arbitrary base point t0 ∈ (R, t∗), from which function
values at a new point t1 = t0−∆t are approximated.
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4.2.4 Additional details
A number of additional details need be addressed next to complete an operational implementation
of our baseline algorithm.
4.2.4.1 Numerical Search for t∗ With very few exceptions, one of which is found in Appendix
A of MMRS, t∗ cannot be found analytically. Instead, we shall rely upon the unicity result in
Lebrun [1999] together with the initial conditions (5) to define t∗ as
t∗ = arg min
t f∈(R,v)
n
∑
i=0
[
ℓi(R|t f )−Fi(R)
]2
(23)
where ℓi(·|t f ) denotes the solutions to the ODEs in (3) under a tentative terminal condition ℓi(t f ) =
1. Note that since
lim
t→R+
[F−1i (ℓi(t))− t] = 0 (24)
the coefficients (pi,0; i : 1→ n) should be zero for t0 = R. This prevents us from solving the system
(20) at t0 = R but we do not need to do so. Instead we compute ℓi(R|·) from the Taylor series
expansions at t0 = R + ∆t. Substituting these approximate values in the objective function (23)
suffices to produce very accurate estimates of t∗ for ∆t small enough. Alternatively, once we have
an estimate of xi,0 = ℓi(t0), we can also compute pi,0 = F−1i (xi,0) and use as objective function
∑ni=1 p2i,0. As for the actual minimization, we rely upon the simplex subroutine AMOEBA which
is numerically very efficient for our problem.
4.2.4.2 Additional Taylor Series Expansions As described in Section 2.4.4 below, our algo-
rithm constructs Taylor Series expansions of F−1i to compute those of ℓi, i : 1→ n. Very little work
is required to reformulate it in terms of the primitives of the problem, the distribution Fi and the
bid functions ϕi. First, note that the inverse bid functions λi are given by
λi(t) = t +
∞
∑
j=0
pi, j(t− t0) j (25)
Next, we can rely upon Lemma 2 in Appendix A to transform Taylor Series expansions of Fi and
λi into those of F−1i and ϕi, respectively.
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4.2.4.3 Support Conditions As expected from the formulation of equation (3), our algorithm
can become numerically unstable if the ℓis get too close to zero. This can occur on regions of
very low probability. Our current program implementation requires that tail areas of (very) low
probability be truncated away. Note that such truncations are commonly imposed in empirical
applications since most estimation techniques for auction models critically rely upon the invert-
ibility of bid functions and lack robustness relative to tail area behavior of the latter. See e.g.,
Donald and Paarsch [1996], Laffont et al. [1995] or Florens et al. [2004]. See also Marshall et al.
[2005] for an empirical application where truncation of an assumed Weibull distribution had to be
imposed for estimation purposes. Note, however, that distributions of interest for the tractability of
their order statistics (e.g. exponential, Weibull or extreme value distribution) have unbounded sup-
port. In practice any such distribution Fi with unbounded support will be replaced by a truncated
vesion thereof
F∗i (v) =
Fi(v)−Fi(v)
Fi(v)−Fi(v) , v < v < v (26)
Transforming the Taylor Series expansion of F−1i into that of F
∗−1
i follows by application of
Lemma 1 in Appendix to the following composite function
F∗−1i (u) = F
−1
i (Fi(v)+u[Fi(v)−Fi(v)]), 0≤ u≤ 1 (27)
Such transformations are automated in our computer programs.
4.2.4.4 Automated Taylor Series Expansions Analytical Taylor Series expansions for inverse
cdf’s are available for a number of standard distributions such as the extreme value distributions
which are commonly assumed in empirical applications. However, there are situations where this
is not the case. One such important situation is discussed in Section 2.4.5 below where we analyze
non-inclusive coalitions. Other important examples would be applications where empirical and/or
non-parametric cdf’s have been numerically evaluated.
In order to accommodate such situations our program includes a fully automated numerical
procedure for the computation of (piecewise) Taylor Series expansions for the inverses of arbitrary
cdf’s. This procedure incorporates the following steps:
1. We construct an equally spaced grid {u j; j : 1→ J} for the interval [0,1];
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2. Using a standard root finder we compute the corresponding (unequally spaced) grid for the
inverse cdf F−1,{v j;v j = F−1(u j); j : 1→ J};
3. Next, we construct a B-spline interpolator for F−1. Specifically, we invoke the IMSL subrou-
tines DBSNAK (to construct a knot sequence) and DBSINT (to compute B-spline coefficients),
see e.g., de Boor (1978) for numerical details.
4. Finally, we invoke the IMSL subroutine BSCPP to convert the B-spline interpolator into a
piecewise polynomial approximation, which provides the Taylor Series expansion needed for
our algorithm.
4.2.4.5 Non-inclusive Coalitions The object of our paper is not that of providing a theoretical
investigation of the stability of non-inclusive coalitions within a first price asymmetric framework
(which in many cases would likely required repeated games concepts). Nevertheless, we can use
our algorithm to numerically investigate whether such non-inclusive coalitions could potentially be
incentive compatible and also whether a strategic auctioneer could reduce the profitability of collu-
sions. Pioneering examples of such computations under (ex-ante symmetric) uniform distributions
can be found in MMRS and Marshall and Schulenberg [1998]. See also Marshall and Marx [2005]
for an in-depth discussion of incentive compatible mechanisms for non-inclusive cartels as well as
an extensive list of related references.
Short of such theoretical analysis our algorithm can be used to numerically evaluate bid func-
tions and expected revenues in the presence of non-inclusive cartels, as long as one treats such a
cartel as a single representative bidder. At minimum, such computations can provide useful insight
on potential incentives to defect and on the auctioneer’s capability to reduce cartels’ profitability.
For example, MMRS had already illustrated the fact that within an ex-ante uniform symmetric
framework outsiders benefit more than insiders (on a per capita basis) from the presence of a non-
inclusive cartel. One would not expect such findings to generalize to asymmetric scenarios. In
particular, there exist numerous real-life illustrations of the viability of non-inclusive cartels con-
sisting, for example, of better informed players. One such situation was recently highlighted by
the conviction of seven leading stamp dealers and auctioneers who, for several years, had agreed
not to compete against one another at estate auctions of stamp collections.
Specifically, in the context of our program, an arbitrary cartel consisting of u = ∑ni=1 ui players,
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were ui denotes the number of players of type i is treated as a single player drawing her signal from
the corresponding highest order statistics cdf.
F∗(v) = Πnj=1
[
Fj(v)−Fj(v)
Fj(v)−Fj(v)
]u j
(28)
Taylor Series expansions for the inverse of F∗ are automatically produced by application of the
numerical procedure described in Section 2.4.4 above. It is also trivial to verify that all probability
and expected revenue calculations described below remain valid under such scenarios with the
only modification that the revenue computed represents the cartel’s total expected revenue. As
discussed above, we do not discuss allocation rules among cartel’s members and only provide per
capita comparisons between insiders and outsiders.
4.3 PROBABILITIES OF WINNING, EXPECTED REVENUES AND OPTIMAL
RESERVE PRICE
In this section we demonstrate that expected revenues and probabilities of winning when the auc-
tioneer sets a reserve price R can all be expressed as simple univariate integrals (quadratures) of
products of the functions evaluated by our algorithm over the interval (R, t∗), where t∗ itself is an
implicit function of R.
The following conditions have to be met for a bidder from group i to win
R < vi < v and v j < λ j(λ−1i (vi)) for j 6= i (29)
Whence the probability that group i wins is given by
Pi(R) = ki
∫ v
R
fi(v)Πnj=1[Fj(λ j(λ−1i (v)))]k
∗
i, jdv (30)
where k∗i,i = ki−1 and k∗i, j = k j for j 6= i, as in Section 2 above. Introducing the change of variable
t = λ−1i (v) and rearranging terms yields the following operational expression
Pi(R) = ki
∫ t∗
R
ℓ′i(t)
ℓi(t)
·Πnj=1 [ℓ j(t)]k jdt (31)
95
Note that
n
∑
i=1
Pi(R) =
∫ t∗
i=1
kiℓ′i(t)Πnj=1[ℓ j(t)]k
∗i, j
=
∫ t∗
R
[
Πnj=1
[
ℓ j(t)
]k j]′dt = 1−Πnj=1 [Fj(R)]k j (32)
confirming the obvious result that the probability that the auctioneer retains the item is given by
P0(R) = Πnj=1
[
Fj(R)
]k j (33)
Group i’s expected revenue is given by
Vi(R) = ki
∫ v
R
[v−ϕi(v)] · fi(v) ·Πnj=1
[
Fj(λ j(λ−1i (v)))
]k∗i, j dv (34)
which can be rewritten as
Vi(R) = ki
∫ t∗
R
[
F−1i (ℓi(t))− t
]
· ℓ
′
i(t)
ℓi(t)
·Πnj=1
[
ℓ j(t)
]k j (35)
Per capita expected revenue within group i’s accounting for subcoalitions (ui ≥ 1) is then given
by Vi(R)/(ki · ui). Finally, assuming that the auctioneer receives a fixed percentage of all winning
bids, her revenue is proportional to
Va(R) =
n
∑
i=1
ki
∫ v
R
ϕi(v) fi(v)Πnj=1
[
Fj(λ j(λ−1i (v)))
]k∗i, j dv (36)
=
∫ t∗
R
t ·
[
Πnj=1
[
ℓ j(t)
]k j]′ dt (37)
Integration by parts produces the following expression
Va(R) = t∗−RΠnj=1
[
Fj(R)
]k j −∫ t∗
R
Πnj=1
[
ℓ j(t)
]k j dt (38)
Note that formulae (31), (35) and (38) all depend upon univariate integrals of products of the func-
tions which are being evaluated by our algorithm over a fine grid of values of t in (R, t∗). Therefore,
these integrals can be evaluated by univariate quadrature as immediate byproducts of our algorithm.
As we typically use grids with anywhere from N = 500 to N = 10,000 equally spaced points,
we can rely upon the extended Simpson’s rule - see Press et al. [1986] or Abramowitz and Segun
[1968][formula 2.5,4.5] (formula 4.1.13) - with remainder proportional to N−4 to compute numer-
ically highly accurate estimates of all relevant probabilities and expected revenues.
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Moreover, the use of a fixed number of equally spaced grid points implies that these numerical
integrals will be continuous functions of a R. Whence numerical simplex maximization of Va(R)
w.r.t R will itself be numerically very accurate. Note that t∗ in formulae (31) to (38) is an implicit
function of R so that our algorithm has to be rerun for each value of R selected by AMOEBA.
4.4 ASYMMETRIC SECOND PRICE AUCTIONS
One of the immediate intended use of our new algorithm is that of running comparisons between
first and second price auctions under a variety of asymmetric environments. In order to do so we
need to derive operational expressions for expected revenues under second price auctions. While
Vickrey’s logic still applies whereby bidders bid their private values, expected revenue calculations
are more complex than under first price due to a wider range of scenarios for the price paid by the
winner.
Several pricing scenarios need to be considered. Focusing our attention on group i, let v1 > v2
denote the two highest order statistics in group i (implicitly assuming that ki > 1, but one verifies
that the formulae derived below also apply for ki = 1) and let w j denote the highest order statistic
in group j ( j 6= i). The following pricing scenarios are relevant:
Ei,R : price is R; i.e., v1 > R, v2 < R, w j < R, for j 6= i
Ei,i : price is v2; i.e., v2 > R, v2 > w j, for j 6= i
Ei, j : price is w j; i.e., w j > R, w j > v2, w j > wℓ, for ℓ 6= j, i.
Probabilities and expected revenues are indexed conformally. The relevant densities are
ki(v1,v2) = ki(ki−1) fi(v1) fi(v2) [Fi(v2)]ki−2 ,v1 > v2 (39)
k j(w) = k j f j(w)
[
Fj(w)
]k j−1 (40)
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Note that by relying upon the k∗i, j notation introduced in formula (2), a common treatment applies
to scenario Ei,i and Ei, j( j 6= i). The probability that group i wins and pays either v2 or w j is given
by
n
∑
j=1
Pi, j(R) = ki
{
n
∑
j=1
k∗i, j
∫ v
R
fi(v1) ·
{∫ v1
R
f j(v) ·
[
Fj(v)
]k∗i, j−1
Πℓ6= j[Fℓ(v)]k
∗
i,ℓdv
}
dv1
}
(41)
where v denotes v2 for j = i and w j for j 6= i. As in Section 3 above, we first apply integration by
parts to the outer integral and regroup terms obtaining the following expression
n
∑
j=1
Pi, j(R) = ki ·
∫ v
R
[1−Fi(v)] ·
[
Πnj=1[Fj(v)]
k∗i, j
]′
dv (42)
A second integration by part produces the result
n
∑
j=1
Pi, j(R) = ki
∫ v
R
fi(v)Πnj=1
[
Fj(v)
]k∗i, j dv
−ki [1−Fi(R)]Πnj=1
[
Fj(R)
]k∗i, j (43)
Note that the second term in the right hand side of formula (43) represents Pi,R(R). Whence the
probability that group i wins is given by
Pi(R) = Pi,R(R)+
n
∑
j=1
Pi, j(R) = ki
∫ v
R
fi(v)Πnj=1
[
Fj(v)
]k∗i, j dv (44)
Note that
n
∑
i=1
Pi(R) =
∫ v
R
(
Πnj=1
[
Fj(v)
]k j)′ dv = 1−Πnj=1 [Fj(R)]k j = 1−P0(R) (45)
Next, we derive the auctioneer expected revenue which is given by
Va(R) =
n
∑
i=1
{
Pi,R(R)+ ki
{
n
∑
j=1
k∗i, j
∫ v
R
fi(v)1
[∫ v1
R
v f j(v)
[
Fj(v)
]k∗i, j−1 Πℓ6= j [Fℓ(v)]k∗i,ℓ dv]dv1}} (46)
The same integration by parts sequence as for the probability produces the following expression
paralleling formula (44)
Va(R) =−
n
∑
i=1
ki
∫ v
R
(v[1−Fi(v)])′Πnj=1[Fj(v)]k
∗
i, jdv (47)
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=∫ v
R
v
(
Πnj=1
[
Fj(v)
]k j)′dv− n∑
i=1
ki
∫ v
R
[1−Fi(v)]Πnj=1
[
Fj(v)
]k∗i, j dv (48)
or, equivalently after a third integration by parts
Va(R) = v−RP0(R)−
∫ v
R
Πnj=1
[
Fj(v)
]k j dv
−
n
∑
i=1
ki
∫ v
R
[1−Fi(v)]Πnj=1
[
Fj(v)
]k∗i, j dv (49)
The expected revenue for group i is derived in the same way. We first have
Vi(R) = ki
{[∫ v
R
(v−R) fi(v)dv
]
Πnj=1
[
Fj(R)
]k∗i, j
+
n
∑
j=1
k∗i, j
∫ v
R
fi(v1)
[∫ v1
R
(v1− v) f j(v)
[
Fj(v)
]k∗i, j−1 Πℓ6= j [Fℓ(v)]k∗i,ℓ dv]dv1
}
(50)
Integration by parts of the first integral in v and of the outer integral in v1 produces the simpler
expression
Vi(R) = ki
{[
(v−R)−
∫ v
R
Fi(v)dv
]
Πnj=1
[
Fj(R)
]k∗i, j}
+
∫ v
R
(v− v)
(
Πnj=1
[
Fj(v)
]k∗i, j)′ dv+∫ v
R
Fi(v)
[
Πnj [Fj(v)]
k∗i, j −Πnj [Fj(R)]k
∗
i, j
]
dv
}
(51)
Integration by parts of the second factor in the right hand side of formula (51) and cancellations
produce the following operational expression for Vi
Vi(R) = ki
∫ v
R
[1−Fi(v)]Πnj=1[Fj(v)]k
∗
i, jdv (52)
As above, per capita expected revenue in group i is given by Vi(R)/(ki ·ui).
As was the case for the first price auction, formulae (44), (49) and (52) are numerically evalu-
ated by quadrature. All probabilities and expected revenues calculations for first price and second
price auctions have been incorporated in our algorithm allowing for automated comparisons be-
tween first and second price auctions under a wide variety of asymmetric scenarios. Examples are
provided below.
99
4.5 EXAMPLES
In this section we present three numerical illustrations of the capabilities of our program. The
parameters and, in particular, the truncation range (v,v) were selected to produce graphically well
separated bid functions. For the first two examples, all type distributions are truncated Weibull of
the form given in formula (27) together with
Fi(v) = 1− exp
[
−(v/a)bi
]
(53)
4.5.1 Example 1 (3 individual bidders)
We first consider 3 individual bidders (low, high, median types) and compute their first price asym-
metric bid functions without reserve as well as with optimal reserve. We also compute bidder’s
expected revenues (per capita), bidder’s probabilities of winning, auctioneer’s expected surplus
and probability of retaining the item (under a reserve). The same statistics are also computed for
second price auctions. Graphs of the first price asymmetric bid functions with and without reserve
are provided in Figure 1. Relevant statistics are regrouped in Table 21. We note that the reserve
price impacts the bidders differently, the larger impact being obviously felt by the high-type bidder.
We also note that in the absence of reserve first price is more profitable for the auctioneer (by about
5%) but that the ordering is reversed under optimal reserve. The high-type bidder always prefers
second price, especially obviously in the absence of a reserve.
4.5.2 Example 2 (2 individiual bidders)
This example illustrates the fact that asymmetric bid functions can cross one another once stochas-
tic dominance no longer applies. Hazard functions are monotone for Weibull distributions. Our
choice of shape parameters for this example implies that the hazard function of bidder 1 is increas-
ing (b1 = 1.5) and that of bidder 2 is decreasing (b2 = 0.5). With means close to one another
it implies that the distribution functions cross one another at v = 1.45. It also implies that as il-
lustrated by Figure 2, the two bid functions cross one another at v = 1.7. Expected revenues and
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surpluses together with probabilities of winning with and without reserve prices are regrouped
in Table 22. We note that first and second price auctions are virtually revenue equivalent even
though, in the absence of reserve, second price favors bidder 1. A systematic numerical investiga-
tion of whether revenue equivalence holds under particular asymmetric scenario goes beyond the
objectives of the present paper but belongs to our research agenda.
4.5.3 Example 3 (non inclusive cartels)
MMRS offer a numerical investigation of incentive compatibility within subcoalitions when indi-
vidual bidders all draw their valuations from a common uniform distribution. Within this (single
object) framework they find that bidders outside the coalitions benefit more than those inside. Here
we consider instead an asymmetric scenario where high type bidders collude together in order to
protect their informational advantage over low type bidders.
This example is inspired by a recent court case where a group of prominent stamp auctioneers
and dealers were found guilty of collusion at estate auctions. While their cartel operated for several
years, our example illustrates the fact that such noninclusive cartels could be incentive compatible
even within a single object framework (ignoring, however, proxy defections as analyzed by ?.
We consider two bidders of high type (H) against four (non collusive) bidders of low type (L).
Signals are lognormally distributed with a common standard deviation 0.35 and means 1.35 and
0.75, respectively. The common support for signals is the interval [1.5, 6.0]. Results for the non
collusive benchmark scenario are reported in Table 23. Graphs of the corresponding bid functions
with and without optimal reserves are provided in figure 3. Results for subcoalitions {H,H} and
{H,H,L} are reported in Table 24, and figures 4 and 5.
The impact of the collusion among high types is greatest under second price auction. Under
first price, low types also benefit from the presence of the cartel (even more than high types per-
centage wise). Reserve is most effective under second price (and would be even more effective
if items kept by the auctioneer had a resale value). In the future, we plan to investigate whether
the effectiveness of optimal reserve requires precise knowledge of the cartel composition by the
auctioneer.
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4.6 NUMERICAL ACCURACY AND COMPUTATIONAL TIME
Accuracy of the numerical approximation of the equilibrium bid functions depend primarily on two
variables. The first is how fine a grid is chosen on which to evaluate the component distributions.
A finer grid leads to higher accuracy of the numerical approximations. The second variable is
the order of the Taylor Series approximations chosen approximate these distributions. A higher
order Taylor series expansion does not necessarily lead to higher accuracy. Indeed, an order of
approximation that is too high can lead to significant numerical pathologies.
A reliable method for evaluating accuracy consists of computing pointwise best response for
each individual bidder and comparing them to the NE strategies. Given bidder i’s signal, his best
response depends on the distribution functions and (inverse) bid functions of his competitors. His
best response function does not depend on his own distribution function. This is seen clearly in
equation (3). Thus, given his competitors equilibrium strategies and distribution functions, we can
use equation (3) to compute pointwise the best response of bidder i. His best response function
can then be matched against the equilibrium function computed by the algorithm and difference
between these two functions provides a measure of the accuracy of the algorithm. A reasonable
metric, and the one we use in this paper is the root of the mean squared deviation (RMSE) between
the equilibrium bid function and the best response function.
An important illustration of the usefulness of such comparisons is provided by example 3.
Figure 5 reveals a curious “blip” in the bid function of the coalition. The bid function dips down
between private values of 2.0 and 2.5. This gives rise to the question of whether this is the result
of a numerical error, or if the blip is a rational response by the collusion to the strategies of the
outsiders. This question can be answered by the method of verification we just described. Fig-
ure 6 reproduces the equilibrium bid function of the coalition and also plots the best response of
the coalition computed as described in section 5. The reaction function (bold dotted line) coin-
cides exactly with the computed bid function (solid line). This confirms that the blip is indeed an
equilibrium reaction by the coalition to the strategies of its competitors.
Higher accuracy of the numerical approximations to the equilibrium bid functions comes at
the cost of increased computational time. For a small number of types of bidders, one can be
liberal with the size of the grid and the order of the Taylor Series expansions. However, for models
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with a large number of types of bidders, the computational time increases potentially significantly.
Though this is not a significant obstacle in our current applications, computational time can quickly
become a problem in others. An important example is that of empirical applications where the
algorithm would be instrumental in the estimation of the underlying private values distributions. In
this case, the model would have to be solved for each trial value of the vector of parameters of the
private values distributions. and one might have to be conservative with the size of the chosen grid.
In this section we present a small study of the trade off between accuracy and speed as controlled
by these two variables.
Table 25 reports the computational time and the RMSE between the equilibrium bids and reac-
tion functions of two bidders. The first panel fixes the order of Taylor series expansions to 5, and
evaluates these statistics for the number of grid points being 500, 1000, 1500, and 2000. The table
reveals that the computational time increases linearly with the number of grids. The computational
time increases by 0.11 seconds with a one point increase in the number of grid points. The RMSE
for each bidder is decreasing and concave in the number of grid points. However, the decrease in
the RMSE is very small for large increases in the number of grid points. This suggests that there
is not a lot to gain in terms of accuracy by increasing the number of grid points. A relative small
number of grid points like 500 provides almost the same numerical accuracy as a larger number of
grid points like 2000.
The second panel of Table 25 fixes the number of grid points to 500 and increases order of
Taylor series expansions incrementally from 2 to 5. The computational time increases linearly
by approximately 7 seconds with each increase in the order of the Taylor series expansions. In-
terestingly, the numerical accuracy of the bid functions are invariant to the order of Taylor series
expansion. The third panel of Table 25 bolsters this conclusion.
The conclusion of this exercise is that the investigator looses very little in terms of numerical
accuracy by using a relatively small number of grid points and order of Taylor series expansions.
The time saving is however significant.
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4.7 PROCUREMENTS
The proposed algorithm is modified to the procurement problem under the same environment as
that of the auctions problem. We provide all the options that are provided in the auctions problem,
including asymmetry, collusion, the calculation of optimal reserve price, expected revenue to the
auctioneer, expected surplus to the bidders, probabilities of winning, and the reaction functions.
The necessary modifications are minor and are described briefly in this section. For the procure-
ments problem bidder i with signal v ∈ [v,R] submits a bid t which is solution of the optimization
problem
t = arg max
u∈(v,R)
(u− v) · [Hi(λi(u))]ki−1Π j 6=i [H j(λ j(u))]k j, (54)
where Hi(x) = 1−Fi(x). The Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs) associated by the First Order
Conditions (FOCs) are given by
−1 = [H−1i (ℓi(t))− t] ·
[
n
∑
j=1
k∗i, j
ℓ′j(t)
ℓ j(t)
]
, i = 1→ n (55)
where ℓi(t) = Hi(λi(t)). The boundary conditions for λi and ℓi are given by
λi(R) = R, λi(t∗) = v, i : 1→ n (56)
ℓi(R) = Hi(R), ℓi(t∗) = 1, i : 1→ n (57)
respectively. Under this setup, the algorithm to compute equilibrium bids here mimics exactly the
one derived in section 2 to compute equilibrium bids in the auctions environment, except for two
changes. The first is that the RHS of equation (21) is now in instead of −in. The second is that the
recursion on the grid of t is a forward iteration instead of a backward iteration. The probabilities of
winning and expected revenues in the first price procurements environment are given as follows:
Pi(R) =−ki
∫ R
t∗
ℓ′i(t)
ℓi(t)
·Πnj=1 [ℓ j(t)]k jdt, (58)
P0(R) = Πnj=1
[
H j(R)
]k j (59)
Vi(R) =−ki
∫ R
t∗
[
H−1i (ℓi(t))− t
]
· ℓ
′
i(t)
ℓi(t)
·Πnj=1
[
ℓ j(t)
]k j , (60)
Va(R) = t∗−RΠnj=1
[
H j(R)
]k j +∫ R
t∗
Πnj=1
[
ℓ j(t)
]k j dt. (61)
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The corresponding probabilities of winning and expected revenues in the second price procure-
ments environment are given as follows:
Pi(R) =−ki
∫ R
t∗
ℓ′i(t)
ℓi(t)
·Πnj=1 [ℓ j(t)]k jdt, (62)
P0(R) = Πnj=1
[
H j(R)
]k j (63)
Va(R) = v−RP0(R)+
∫ R
v
Πnj=1
[
H j(v)
]k j dv
+
n
∑
i=1
ki
∫ R
v
[1−Hi(v)]Πnj=1
[
H j(v)
]k∗i, j dv (64)
Vi(R) = ki
∫ R
v
[1−Hi(v)]Πnj=1[H j(v)]k
∗
i, jdv (65)
4.8 DISCUSSION OF THE ALGORITHM
With all the described ingredients put together, we have a program that is fully automated and very
flexible. The program includes several candidate private values distributions, namely the two pa-
rameter Weibull, the Beta, the Normal and the Lognormal distributions. These distributions can be
combined to produce hybrid distributions, and other distributions can be trivially added. The nec-
essary Taylor series expansions of the inverse distributions are also fully automated. Furthermore,
the program allows for the analysis of a wide variety of collusive arrangements. As an illustration
of how user friendly the program is, we present verbatim below the input sequence from example
3 where the two high types and one low type collude to compete against the remaining three low
types.
Enter 1 if you want auctions, 2 if you want procurements: 1
Enter number of types: 2
Enter order of Taylor series expansion (5 recommended): 5
Enter the number of subintervals of (t0,t*) to consider: 2000
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Enter number of coalitions of each type, separating by
space For example, if you entered 2 for number of types and you
want 3 coalitions in the first and 2 in the second, then enter 3 2: 1 3
Enter lower bound of the support of the distribution of private values: 1.5
Enter upper bound of the support of the distribution of private values: 6.0
Enter reserve price: 1.5
Here is a menu of cdfs to choose from
1 - two parameter Weibull
2 - Beta
3 - Normal
4 - Lognormal
Please enter the number of cdfs to be used: 2
Enter the index of the cdfs you choose to use: 4 4
Enter scale and shape parameter of Lognormal distribution: 1.35 0.35
Enter scale and shape parameter of Lognormal distribution: 0.75 0.35
For type 1 Enter sequence of zeros and ones corresponding to the use of the cdfs: 2 1
For type 2 Enter sequence of zeros and ones corresponding to the use of the cdfs: 0 1
TYPE MEAN STD.DEV
1 4.3793 0.8563
2 2.4353 0.7241
Enter 1 if you wish to compute the optimal reserve
Enter 2 if you wish to keep your reserve price: 1
Enter output file name: illustration.txt
Time taken: 290.000s
Writing grid points and bids to file: illustration.txt
Enter 1 for expected revenue and bidder surplus
Enter 2 if not: 1
Enter output file: rillustration.txt
Enter 1 to compute the best response function
Enter 2 if not: 1
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Enter best response file name: brillustration.txt
The input sequence is quite self-explanatory, except possibly for the input sequences 5 (number
of coalitions), 11 and 12 (sequences of zeros and ones). At the fifth input point the program asks the
user to provide the number coalitions for each type. This corresponds to the parameters ki, i = 1,2
in section 2. In this example, we specify that there is 1 coalition making up type one group, and
there are 3 coalitions making up the type two group. Input points 11 and 12 are where the user
provides the structure of the coalitions. The numbers entered at these points correspond to ui in
section 2.4.5 of this paper. Input sequence 11 specifies that the first coalition consists of the two
high types, and one low type player. Input sequence 12 specifies that the other three coalitions
are simply the rest of the low type bidders competing individually. The format of the program
therefore allows for the construction of a wide variety of hypothetical collusive environments. The
program used in this paper, “bidfunc.exe” is available upon request from the first author.
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Table 21: 3 bidders (median, low, high).
Type Auctioneer
1 2 3
ki 1 1 1
ui 1 1 1
ai 2.0 1.0 3.39
bi 1.0 1.0 2.20
mean 1.55 0.966 2.71
std. dev. 1.25 0.911 1.15
First price, no reserve
E(revenue) 0.344 0.111 0.912 1.65
Prob ‘win’ 0.29 0.13 0.58 —-
First price, optimal reserve=2.016
E(revenue) 0.225 0.061 0.622 1.851
Prob ‘win’ 0.22 0.08 0.51 0.18
Second price, no reserve
E(revenue) 0.246 0.069 1.16 1.57
Prob ‘win’ 0.22 0.08 0.70 —-
Second price, optimal reserve=2.016
E(revenue) 0.181 0.045 0.692 1.858
Prob ‘win’ 0.18 0.06 0.58 0.18
Fi(v) = 1− e−(
v
ai
)bi
, truncated on [0,5].
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Table 22: 2 bidders.
Type Auctioneer
1 2
hazard increasing decreasing
ki 1 1
ui 1 1
ai 1.11 1.50
bi 1.50 0.50
mean 1.00 0.84
std. dev. 0.67 1.01
First price, no reserve
E(revenue) 0.481 0.463 0.440
Prob ‘win’ 0.58 0.42 —-
First price, optimal reserve=0.98
E(revenue) 0.211 0.297 0.656
Prob ‘win’ 0.33 0.28 0.39
Second price, no reserve
E(revenue) 0.55 0.40 0.44
Prob ‘win’ 0.64 0.36 —-
Second price, optimal reserve=0.93
E(revenue) 0.230 0.303 0.660
Prob ‘win’ 0.37 0.27 0.36
Fi(v) = 1− e−(
v
ai
)bi
, truncated on [0,4].
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Table 23: No collusion, 2 high types (H) and 4 Low types (L).
First Price Second Price
Mean Std. dev. Prob. Rev. Res. Prob. Rev. Res.
H 3.756 1.030 0.393 0.385 0.415 0.413
L 2.435 0.724 0.053 0.031 0.042 0.025
Auc. 0.000 3.557 0.000 3.536
H 3.756 1.030 0.394 0.386 0.415 0.411
L 2.435 0.724 0.053 0.031 0.042 0.024
Auc. 0.000 3.558 2.170 0.001 3.537 2.395
vHi ∼ LN(1.35,0.35),vLi ∼ LN(0.75,0.35) truncated on [1.5,6].
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Table 24: Collusion exercise between 2 high types (H) and 4 Low types (L).
First Price Second Price
Mean Std. dev. Prob. Rev. Res. Prob. Rev. Res.
HH 4.346 0.880 0.668 0.906 0.832 1.227
L 2.435 0.724 0.083 0.050 0.042 0.025
Auc. 0.000 3.287 0.000 3.135
HH 4.346 0.880 0.675 0.857 0.801 0.998
L 2.435 0.724 0.073 0.044 0.038 0.021
Auc. 0.026 3.297 2.972 0.048 3.237 3.134
HHL 4.379 0.856 0.706 1.019 0.874 1.398
L 2.435 0.724 0.098 0.060 0.042 0.025
Auc. 0.000 3.181 0.000 2.989
HHL 4.379 0.856 0.709 0.902 0.815 0.977
L 2.435 0.724 0.077 0.045 0.035 0.020
Auc. 0.048 3.225 3.134 0.079 3.185 3.300
vHi ∼ LN(1.35,0.35),vLi ∼ LN(0.75,0.35) truncated on [1.5,6].
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Table 25: Study of the trade off between numerical accuracy and computational.
Order of Expansion, J=5
Grid Time (sec.) RMSE 1 RMSE 2
500 37.1880 0.4000 0.0882
1000 95.3590 0.3988 0.0868
1500 146.1250 0.3984 0.0864
2000 202.2500 0.3982 0.0862
Number of grid points = 500
J Time (sec.) RMSE 1 RMSE 2
2 18.1880 0.4000 0.0882
3 32.2810 0.4000 0.0882
4 38.7030 0.4000 0.0882
5 46.4690 0.4000 0.0882
Number of grid points = 2000
J Time (sec.) RMSE 1 RMSE 2
2 93.4530 0.3982 0.0862
3 139.4530 0.3982 0.0862
4 173.8120 0.3982 0.0862
5 202.2500 0.3982 0.0862
F1(v) = 1− e−v,F2(v) = 1− e−( v3.39 )2.2, truncated on [0,5].
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A.1 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
A.1.1 Data and Sample Construction
The data is taken from the 1979 youth cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Market
Experience (NLSY79), a comprehensive panel data set that follows individuals over the period
1979 to 2000, who were 14 to 21 years of age as of January 1, 1979. The data set initially consisted
of 12,686 individuals: a representative sample of 6,111 individuals, a supplemental sample of 5,295
Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks, and economically disadvantaged, non-black, non-Hispanics, and
a supplemental sample of 1,280 military youth. Interviews were conducted on an annual basis
though 1994, after which they adopted a biennial interview schedule. This study makes use of the
first 16 years of interviews, from 1979 to 1994. By 1990, the NLSY79 experienced attrition of
2,250 sample members, of which 1,097 were from the supplemental sample of military youth. I
discuss briefly the construction of some of the key variables used in estimation
Employment
The NLSY79 collects detailed work history data for individuals in the sample. The work history
data includes beginning and ending dates for all of 5 possible jobs, a maximum of 5 possible gaps
in employment with each of the 5 possible jobs, the usual hours worked per day or per week on
each job, and the hourly rate of pay on each job. The biggest complication in calculating hours
worked is the fact that it must be calculated for the relevant year, which is the school year in
this case. Since the actual weeks that comprise the school year vary from state to state, the dates
chosen for the school year are somewhat arbitrary. Following Eckstein and Wolpin [1999], the year
for those not attending school starts at October 1st in year t and ends September 30st of year t+1.
For those attending school the school year instead ends at June 30 of year t+1. Weeks employed is
then calculated based on these calendar dates. Hours worked per week or per day and hourly rate
of pay is reported retrospectively back to the previous interview date. These variables were also
adjusted to the above specified calendar dates. From these, we then construct hours worked for the
relevant years, as well as average hourly rate of pay and an employment rate variable, which is the
fraction of the relevant year in which the respondent was actively employed.
Education
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The NLSY79 also collects information on the respondents’ education. In particular, the NLSY79
collects , among others, enrollment status, highest grade level completed, current grade level, and
degree held. The primary variables used in the paper are highest grade completed and enrollment
status. In 1981, the NLSY collected information on the patterns of school activities of the respon-
dents that are enrolled in school. In particular, the NLSY asked these respondent about the amount
of hours they spent in school during the week before the interview date. They asked whether or
not the time the reported is typical or not, and if no, to report the typical hours spent in school.
The NLSY also asked the respondents to report the number of hours they spent studying outside
of school during the week before the interview date. The response to these questions are used in
the paper to estimate the study pattern of individuals enrolled in school.
There are a number of missing observations on highest grade completed. Many of these miss-
ing observations could be recovered from the information provided by enrollment status and high-
est grade completed in other years by the respondent. Since the model relies very much on the data
on highest grade completed, we decide not to impute those years that are not recoverable with very
high confidence.
The model construction and estimation requires data on the cost of schooling for an individ-
ual who decides to enroll in school. The yearly in-state tuition and required fees for four-year
institutions and two-year institutions are taken from the NCES web site. Also, to identify the the
aggregate shocks in wages and consumption, all nominal variables have to normalized to the same
base year. To do this, the CPI is taken from the BLS web site, and converted to have a base year of
1981.
Asset holdings
Beginning in 1985, the NLSY79 began collecting comprehensive information on the asset holdings
of the respondents. This information was collected annually up to and including 1994, except for
the year 1991 where asset data is missing. The best way to deal with these missing observations
on asset holdings depends on exactly how the data will be used in estimation. In the case of
Keane and Wolpin [2001] and Imai [2000], asset holding itself plays a central role in their model.
Their method of imputation was therefore to model and asset holdings as normally distributed,
and the estimate the mean and variance, from which they impute the missing years. In my case
however, I require savings balance to impute total family consumption. For years in which the
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data is available, this is simply the difference between the Asset holding from one year to the
next. For the years in which the data is missing, I take savings balance to be zero. For the early
years of the cohort, net savings is relatively small and centered around zero. This suggests that the
bias induced by this imputation is small. Furthermore, in estimating the consumption equation,
savings is one the right hand side of the equation. The consistency of parameter estimates in the
case where the left hand side variable is measured with a mean zero error is well documented in
classical econometric textbooks. Finally, if there were large biases introduced by this imputation,
they would show up in the estimated aggregate prices, These is no unusual visible discrete change
in estimated aggregate prices for these periods. All these reasons lead me to believe that such
imputations results in minimal biases in the parameters of interest.
Consumption
The NLSY79 does not collect data on individual consumption. However, the unique advantage
of this data set that it collects detailed information on individual asset holding. To estimate the
parameters in the above equation, family consumption is imputed from family income, family
savings, four year schooling costs, and two year schooling costs. The way this is done is a follows.
Subtracting family savings is taken from family income gives an estimate of the total resources
available to the family in that year, net of savings. If the individual goes to high school, then his
cost of schooling is assumed to be 0. If he goes to a two-year college, his cost of schooling is the
two-year tuition cost, and if he goes to a four-year college, his cost of schooling is the four-year
tuition cost. The individual’s cost of schooling is subtracted from his individual resources. The
yearly averages of the imputed consumption is given in Table 2.
Demographics
Demographic and family background variables collected by the NLSY79 and used in this study
include age, race, mother’s education, Father’s education, family income, and year of experience
working. Experience is calculated from the employment history section of the data set, which gives
complete employment status for each year. Missing observations in family income are imputed by
first using a three year moving average smoothing technique, followed by regressing family income
on other covariates, some of which not listed here, and using the predicted income for the cases in
which family income is missing. The resulting distribution of imputed family income match the
distribution of actual (observed) family remarkably well.
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Sample Restriction
As stated above, the data employed in this paper span the years of 1979 though 1994. The model
specified in section (3.2) does not include the decision to enter the military, and thus as the first
restriction on the data we drop all males who enter the military in 1979. This restriction reduces the
sample size to 11406. As stated above, we drop respondents for cases where missing observations
in highest grade completed cannot be recovered with very high confidence. This reduces the sample
to 7814 respondents. This is clearly are somewhat severe restriction on the data, and it may pay
to invest is less restrictive imputation rules. This however is not pursued here. In the literature,
female members are treated differently from male sample members. The choice set of a female
is generally considered larger than that of a male. The additional decisions usually included in
the choice set for women are marriage decisions and fertility decisions. To avoid these additional
complications, the data is restricted to include males only. This results in a sample size of 3916
male respondents. The summary statistics and all estimations make use of this sample.
A.1.2 Standard Errors for the Probability of Grade Promotion
Let ynt be in indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual advances a grade level, and 0 otherwise.
Define:
g(x4,B4,B3) ≡ x4
(
y− e
x′4B4
1+ ex′4B4
)
(A.1.1)
h(x3,B3) ≡ x3(ln(s)− x′3B3) (A.1.2)
f (x,θ) ≡ [g(x4,B3,B4)′,h(x3,B3)′]′ (A.1.3)
where θ ≡ (B′4,B′3)′. Equation (A.1.1) is the score contribution of a single individual from the
likelihood function constructed from equation (2.8.2). Equation (A.1.2) is the moment condition
derived from the study time equation (2.8.1). I assume that these two moments are uncorrelated,
and we have by construction that 1N ∑n f (x, ˆθ) = 0. The proof that ˆθ
p→ θ0 is straightforward and
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therefore omitted. Let
G4 ≡ E[∆B4g(x4,B4,B3)] =−E
[
x4x
′
4
ex
′
4B4
1+ ex′4B4
1
1+ ex′4B4
]
(A.1.4)
G3 ≡ E[∆B3g(x4,B4,B3)] =−E
[
x4x
′
3(sB4,1 +2s2B4,2)
ex
′
4B4
1+ ex′4B4
1
1+ ex′4B4
]
(A.1.5)
H3 ≡ E[∆B3h(x3,B3)] =−E[x3x′3]. (A.1.6)
Since f (x,θ) satisfies conditions (i)− (v) of Theorem 3.4 of Newey and McFadden [1994], ˆB4 is
asymptotically normal and
√
n( ˆB4−B4) d→ N(0,V ), where
V = G−14 E[g(x4)g(x4)
′]G−1′4 +G
−1
4 G3H
−1
3 E[h(x3)h(x3)
′]H−1′3 G
′
3G−1′4 (A.1.7)
Thus the variance can be consistently estimated by replacing the jacobian terms in the equation
(A.1.7) with their sample averages.
A.1.3 The estimation method for the CCP’s and the conditional state probabilities
Let K[δ−1N (ΨNmr −ΨNnt)] be a kernel, where δN is an appropriately chosen bandwidth. Then the
nonparametric estimate of pnt j is computed using the kernel estimator
pNnt j ≡
∑Nm=1 ∑Tr=1 dmr jK[δ−1N (ΨNmr−ΨNnt)]
∑Nm=1 ∑Tr=1 K[δ−1N (ΨNmr−ΨNnt)]
. (A.1.8)
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To define the conditional state probabilities we first define the set of possible histories that will
become relevant in the model. Accordingly, the (2ρ+K +1)-dimensional vectors
x
(i)
nt0 ≡ (hnt−ρ+i, · · · ,hnt−1,0, · · · ,0,snt−ρ+i, · · · ,snt−1,0, · · · ,0,
Snt−ρ+i+1, · · · ,Snt ,Snt , · · · ,Snt ,Ent−ρ+i,znt+i),
x
(i)
nt1 ≡ (hnt−ρ+i, · · · ,hnt−1,h∗nt , · · · ,0,snt−ρ+i, · · · ,snt−1,0, · · · ,0,
Snt−ρ+i+1, · · · ,Snt ,Snt , · · · ,Snt ,Ent−ρ+i,znt+i),
x
(i)
nt2 ≡ (hnt−ρ+i, · · · ,hnt−1,0, · · · ,0,snt−ρ+i, · · · ,snt−1,s∗nt , · · · ,0,
Snt−ρ+s+1, · · · ,Snt ,Snt +1, · · · ,Snt +1,Ent−ρ+i,znt+s),
x
(i)
nt3 ≡ (hnt−ρ+i, · · · ,hnt−1,0, · · · ,0,snt−ρ+i, · · · ,snt−1,s∗nt , · · · ,0,
Snt−ρ+i+1, · · · ,Snt ,Snt , · · · ,Snt ,Ent−ρ+i,znt+i),
x
(i)
nt4 ≡ (hnt−ρ+i, · · · ,hnt−1,h∗nt , · · · ,0,snt−ρ+i, · · · ,snt−1,s∗nt , · · · ,0,
Snt−ρ+i+1, · · · ,Snt ,Snt +1, · · · ,Snt +1,Ent−ρ+i,znt+i),
x
(i)
nt5 ≡ (hnt−ρ+i, · · · ,hnt−1,h∗nt , · · · ,0,snt−ρ+i, · · · ,snt−1,s∗nt , · · · ,0,
Snt−ρ+s+1, · · · ,Snt ,Snt , · · · ,Snt ,Ent−ρ+i,znt+s),
(A.1.9)
for i = 1, · · · ,ρ, where h∗nt and s∗nt is the fraction of time individual n devotes to working and school-
ing conditional on participating and enrolling. Define the state vectors Ψ(i)ntk ≡ (x
(i)
ntk,µnηnωnt+iλt+i),
k = 0, · · · ,5, where ωnt ≡ ωent1t1 ωent2t2 . For example, Ψ(i)nt1 is the state of a young man who has accu-
mulated the history
(hnt−ρ, · · · ,hnt−1,snt−ρ, · · · ,snt−1,Snt−ρ+1, · · · ,Snt ,Ent−ρ+1)
up to period t, chooses not to enroll in school and to work h∗nt hours in period t, and not to enroll nor
work for i−1 periods following t. Similarly, Ψ(i)nt3 is the state of a young man who has accumulated
the same history up to period t, chooses not to work, to and study s∗nt hours in period t, gets
promoted a grad at the end of year t, and chooses not to enroll nor work for i−1 periods following
t.
Define p j(Ψ(i)ntk), j = 0, · · · ,3, k = 0, · · · ,5, as the the probability that individual n chooses
alternative j in period t + i conditioned on realizing the state vector Ψintk in period t + i. The
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intuition for estimating these future state probabilities is to condition on observationally equivalent
men in the current period. To do this, define the indicator variables:
d(i)nt j ≡

dnt−i, j ∏i−1r=1 dnt−r,0, for j = 0,1,
ynt−idnt−i, j ∏i−1r=1 dnt−r,0, for j = 2,4,
(1− ynt−i)dnt−i, j ∏i−1r=1 dnt−r,0, for j = 3,5,
(A.1.10)
where ynt is equal to one if the individual is promoted a grade level at the end of period t, and
zero otherwise. Therefore, d(i)nt j allows us to condition of the appropriate history for computing the
estimators of the state probabilities pk(Ψ
(i)
nt j), which are computed as
pNk (Ψ
(i)
nt j)≡
∑Nm=1 ∑Tr=1 dmrkd(i)mr jK[δ−1N (ΨNmr−ΨNnt)]
∑Nm=1 ∑Tr=1 d(i)mr jK[δ−1N (ΨNmr−ΨNnt)]
. (A.1.11)
Estimation of the parameters characterizing preference also require that the derivatives of the prob-
abilities with respect to h be estimated. The methodology employed to estimate these quantities is
found in Altug and Miller [1998].
A.1.4 Derivation of the moment conditions for the final stage estimation
Hotz and Miller [1993] prove the existence of a mapping q : [0,1]→ℜ such that
q(pk(Ψnt)) = Vj(Ψnt)−Vk(Ψnt), (A.1.12)
Equations (A.1.12) and (2.3.14) are used to derive the alternative representation of the conditional
valuation function Vntk for the finite dependence case. To do so, define
u j(Ψnt)≡

u1(Snt ,0)+u2(xnt ,0)+u3(xnt ,1)+α−1ηnλtcnt f or j = 0,
u1(Snt ,0)+u2(xnt ,1)+u3(xnt ,1−h∗nt)+α−1ηnλtcnt f or j = 1,
u1(Snt ,1)+u2(xnt ,0)+u3(xnt ,1− snt)+α−1ηnλtcnt f or j = 2,
u1(Snt ,1)+u2(xnt ,1)+u3(xnt ,1−h∗nt − snt)+α−1ηnλtcnt f or j = 3.
(A.1.13)
Recall that Fj(Ψ(i)nt |Ψnt) is the probability that the state vector of individual n in period t + i is
Ψ(i)nt , given that his state vector in period t is Ψnt and he chooses alternative j in period t. Then by
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recursive application of the law of iterated expectations, the conditional valuation function can be
expressed as
Vj(Ψnt) = u j(Ψnt)+Et
{
∑ρi=1
[
βi ∑
A
(i)
nt j
[
u0(Ψ(i)nt )+ϕ0(p0(Ψ
(i)
nt ))
+∑3k=1 pk(Ψ(i)nt )(q(pk(Ψ(i)nt ))+ϕk(pk(Ψ(i)nt ))
−ϕ0(p0(Ψ(i)nt )))
]
Fj(Ψ(i)nt |Ψnt)
+βρ+1 ∑
A
(ρ+1)
nt j
[
V0(Ψ(ρ+1)nt )+ϕ0(p0(Ψ
(ρ+1)
nt ))
+∑3k=1 pk(Ψ(ρ+1)nt )(q(pk(Ψ(ρ+1)nt ))+ϕk(pk(Ψ(ρ+1)nt ))
−ϕ0(p0(Ψ(ρ+1)nt )))
]
Fj(Ψ(ρ+1)nt |Ψnt)
]}
,
(A.1.14)
Notice that the recursive substitution employed to obtain the alternative representation is only valid
up to where p0(Ψint j) > 0. In the context of this paper, this condition is true at i = 2 for j = 0,1,
and i = 1 for j = 2, · · · ,5. Equation (A.1.14) gives the following alternative representation of the
Euler equations for labor supply and schooling
0 = ∂u j(Ψnt)∂gnt +Et
{
∑ρi=1
[
∑
A
(i)
nt j
[
∂[u0(Ψ(i)nt )+ϕ0(p0(Ψ
(i)
nt ))]
∂gnt
+∑3k=1 pk(Ψ(i)nt )∂[(q(pk(Ψ
(i)
nt ))+ϕk(pk(Ψ
(i)
nt ))−ϕ0(p0(Ψ(i)nt )))]
∂gnt
+∑3k=1[(q(pk(Ψ(i)nt ))+ϕk(pk(Ψ(i)nt ))
−ϕ0(p0(Ψ(i)nt )))] pk(Ψ
(i)
nt )
∂gnt
]
Fj(Ψ
(i)
nt |Ψnt)
]
+∑
A
(ρ+1)
nt j
[
u0(Ψ
(i)
nt )+ϕ0(p0(Ψ
(i)
nt ))
+∑3k=1[pk(Ψ(i)nt )(q(pk(Ψ(i)nt ))+ϕk(pk(Ψ(i)nt ))
−ϕ0(p0(Ψ(i)nt )))]Fj(Ψ
(i)
nt |Ψnt)
∂gnt
]}
,
(A.1.15)
where gnt = {hnt ,snt}. Assume that εont , · · · ,εnt3 are identically and independently distributed
over (n, t) as Type 1 extreme value random variables. This assumption leads to convenient rep-
resentations for the differences in the conditional valuation functions, and the expected values
of the alternative specific unobservables when their corresponding alternative have been cho-
sen. Specifically we have that q(pk(Ψnt)) = ln
[
pk(Ψnt )
p0(Ψnt)
]
, ϕk(pk(Ψnt)) = γ− ln(pk(Ψnt)), and
ϕk(pk(Ψnt))−ϕ0(p0(Ψnt)) =− ln
[
pk(Ψnt )
p0(Ψnt)
]
.
Note that the transition matrix is degenerate conditional on the individual choosing not to
enroll in school. If he chooses to enroll in school, the probability of advancing a grade level is
F(xnt). This implies that the transition probabilities for i = 1, · · · ,ρ are given by F(Ψ(i)nt, j|Ψnt) = 1,
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for j = 0,1, F(Ψ(i)nt, j|Ψnt) = F(xnt) for j = 2,4, and F(Ψ(i)nt, j|Ψnt) = (1− F(xnt)) for j = 2,4.
Define ξnt ≡ (1−α)−1 ln(ηnλt). Then we marginal utility of consumption can be expressed as
ηnλt ≡ exp((1−α)ξnt).
The parametric assumptions on the utility functions and the idiosyncratic taste shifters, and
the Euler conditions for work and schooling from equation (A.1.16) are used to form population
moment conditions. We can then define
mnt1(Θ)≡ dnt1
[
α−1ηnλtwnt − z′ntB5−2δ0l(1)nt −∑ρi=1 δi(lnt−i +βi)
−∑ρi=1 βi p0(Ψ(i)nt1)−1 ∂p0(Ψ
(i)
nt1)
∂hnt
]
+dnt3
[
α−1ηnλtwnt − z′ntB5−2δ0l(3)nt −∑ρi=1 δi(lnt−i +βi)
−∑ρi=1 βi
[
p0(Ψ(i)nt4)−1
∂p0(Ψ(i)nt4)
∂hnt F(xnt)+ p0(Ψ
(i)
nt5)
−1 ∂p0(Ψ(i)nt5)
∂hnt (1−F(xnt))
+ ln
(
p0(Ψ
(i)
nt5)
p0(Ψ
(i)
nt4)
)
∂F(xnt)
∂hnt
]]
.
mnt2(Θ)≡ dnt2
[
−z′ntB5−2δ0l(2)nt −∑ρi=1 δi(lnt−i +βi)
−∑ρi=1 βi
[
p0(Ψ
(i)
nt2)
−1 ∂p0(Ψ(i)nt2)
∂snt F(xnt)+ p0(Ψ
(i)
nt3)
−1 ∂p0(Ψ(i)nt3)
∂snt (1−F(xnt))
+ ln
(
p0(Ψ
(i)
nt3)
p0(Ψ
(i)
nt2)
)
∂F(xnt)
∂snt
]]
+dnt3
[
−z′ntB5−2δ0l(3)nt −∑ρi=1 δi(lnt−i +βi)
−∑ρi=1 βi
[
p0(Ψ
(i)
nt4)
−1 ∂p0(Ψ(i)nt4)
∂snt F(xnt)+ p0(Ψ
(i)
nt5)
−1 ∂p0(Ψ(i)nt5)
∂snt (1−F(xnt))
+ ln
(
p0(Ψ
(i)
nt5)
p0(Ψ
(i)
nt4)
)
∂F(xnt)
∂snt
]]
.
The parametric assumptions on the utility functions, the distribution of the idiosyncratic taste
shifters, equation (A.1.12) and equation (A.1.14) are used to obtain the following additional mo-
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ment conditions1
mnt3(Θ)≡ dnt1
[
ln
(
pnt1
pnt0
)
− x′ntB6 + x′ntB7(l(0)nt − l(1)nt )+δ0(l(0)2nt − l(1)2nt )
+∑ρi=1 δi(l(0)nt − l(1)nt )(lnt−i +βi)− ηnλtα (wnthnt)−∑ρi=1 βi ln
(
p0(Ψ
(s)
nt0)
p0(Ψ
(s)
nt1)
)]
,
mnt4(Θ)≡ dnt2
[
ln
(
pnt2
pnt0
)
− x′ntB5 + x′ntB7(l(0)nt − l(2)nt )
+δ0(l(0)2nt − l(2)2nt )+∑ρi=1 δi(l(0)nt − l(2)nt )(lnt−i +βi)+ ηnλtα pint
−∑ρi=1 βi
[
ln p0(Ψ
(i)
nt0)− ln p0(Ψ(i)nt2)F(xnt)− ln p0(Ψ(i)nt3)(1−F(xnt))
]]
,
mnt5(Θ)≡ dnt3
[
ln
(
pnt3
pnt0
)
− x′ntB5− x′ntB6 + x′ntB7(l(0)nt − l(3)nt )
+δ0(l(0)2nt − l(3)2nt )+∑ρi=1 δi(l(0)nt − l(3)nt )(lnt−i +βi)− ηnλtα (wnthnt −pint)
−∑ρi=1 βi
[
ln p0(Ψ(i)nt0)− ln p0(Ψ(i)nt4)F(xnt)− ln p0(Ψ(i)nt5)(1−F(xnt))
]]
.
A.1.5 Consistent Asymptotic Variance Estimation
Some preliminary results are in needed. The first is concerned with the estimation of the CCP’s
themselves. In estimation, a the data was trimmed to ensure that the density is bounded away from
zero. This fixed trimming condition defines a compact subset of the support of the density over
which the density affects the estimator. Assumptions 8.1 - 8.3, and the assumptions in Lemma 8.10
of Newey and McFadden [1994] ensures the resulting kernel density estimators of the CCP’s and
their derivatives converge uniformly:
√
N‖pN(Ψ)− p0(Ψ)‖2 p→ 0, (A.1.16)
where the norm is the Sobolev norm. Assume that , θN is the unique solution to:
1
N
N
∑
n=1
m(xn,θ,ξn(BN1 ),sn(BN3 )Fn(sn(BN3 ),BN4 ), pNn ). (A.1.17)
Assume also that θ0 ∈ Θ, a compact set. Inspection of the equations in (??) shows that m(x,θ) is
continuous in each θ. Further inspection along with the fixed trimming condition on the data in
1The construction of the moment conditions show that the choice of the normalizing alternative (alternative 0) is
not completely arbitrary. This alternative has to sufficiently saturate the state space so that pnt0 > 0 and p0(Ψint j) > 0.
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estimation implies that m(z,θ) is uniformly bounded over θ. These conditions ensures that θN p→ θ0
as shown in Theorem 2.6 of Newey and McFadden [1994].
Define the following influence functions from equations (??) and from the definitions in section
A.1.2
ϕ1(x1n) ≡ −E[∆x′1nA−1n ∆x1n]−1∆x′1nA−1n ∆v1n, ϕ3(x3n)≡−H−13 h(x3n),
ϕ4(x4n) ≡ −H−14 h(x4n). (A.1.18)
Define the following matrices
M1nt ≡

(dnt1 +dnt3)(1−αα )exp((1−α)ξnt))wnt
0
−dnt1(1−αα )exp((1−α)ξnt))wnthnt
dnt2(1−αα )exp((1−α)ξnt))pint
dnt3(1−αα )exp((1−α)ξnt))(wnthnt −pint)

[
− 1
N ∑n x
′
1nt
]
,
M1n(xn)≡ (M′1n1, · · · ,M′1nT )′, and, α1(xn)≡ E[M1n]ϕ1(x1n). (A.1.19)
M2nt ≡

dnt1 ∑i dsnt−iδi+
dnt3
[
2δ0 + ∑i
(
dsnt−iδi−βi
((
1
pi0nt4
∂pi0nt4
∂hnt −
1
pi0nt5
∂pi0nt5
∂hnt
)
∂F(xnt )
∂snt + ln(
pi0nt5
pi0nt4
)∂
2F(xnt )
∂hnt∂snt
))]
dnt2
[
2δ0 + ∑i
(
dsnt−iδi−βi
((
1
pi0nt2
∂pi0nt2
∂snt − 1pi0nt3
∂pi0nt3
∂snt
)
∂F(xnt)
∂snt + ln(
pi0nt3
pi0nt2
)∂
2F(xnt)
∂s2nt
))]
+
dnt3
[
2δ0 + ∑i
(
dsnt−iδi−βi
((
1
pi0nt4
∂pi0nt54
∂snt −
1
pi0nt5
∂pi0nt5
∂snt
)
∂F(xnt)
∂snt + ln(
pi0nt5
pi0nt4
)∂
2F(xnt)
∂s2nt
))]
−dnt1 ∑i δi(l0nt − l1nt)dsnt−i
dnt2
[
x′6ntB6 + 2δ0l2nt + ∑i δilnt−i ∑i βi
[
ln( p
i
0nt2
pi0nt3
)∂F(xnt)∂snt
]]
dnt3
[
x′6ntB6 + 2δ0l3nt + ∑i δilnt−i ∑i βi
[
ln( p
i
0nt4
pi0nt5
)∂F(xnt)∂snt
]]

[
sntx
′
3nt
]
,
M2n(xn)≡ (M′2n1, · · · ,M′2nT )′, and, α2(xn)≡ E[M2n]ϕ2(x3n). (A.1.20)
M4nt ≡

−dnt3 ∑i βi
[
1
pi0nt4
∂pi0nt4
∂hnt −
1
pi0nt5
∂pi0nt5
∂hnt + ln(
pi0nt5
pi0nt4
)∂
2F(xnt)
∂h2nt
]
−dnt2 ∑i βi
[
1
pi0nt2
∂pi0nt2
∂snt −
1
pi0nt3
∂pi0nt3
∂snt + ln(
pi0nt3
pi0nt2
)∂
2F(xnt )
∂hnt ∂F
]
−
dnt3 ∑i βi
[
1
pi0nt4
∂pi0nt4
∂snt −
1
pi0nt5
∂pi0nt5
∂snt + ln(
pi0nt5
pi0nt4
)∂
2F(xnt)
∂hnt∂F
]
0
dnt2 ∑i βi
[
ln( p
i
0nt2
pi0nt3
)
]
dnt3 ∑i βi
[
ln( p
i
0nt4
pi0nt5
)
]

[
F(xnt)(1−F(xnt))x′4nt
]
,
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M4n(xn)≡ (M′4n1, · · · ,M′4nT )′, and, α4(xn)≡ E[M4n]ϕ4(x4n). (A.1.21)
Dnt0 ≡ E
[ ∂mnt
∂pnt0
|Ψnt
]
=−p−1nt0(0,0, pnt1, pnt2, pnt3)′
Dn0(xn)≡ (D′n10, · · · ,D′nT0)′, and, α5(xn)≡ Dn0[dn0− pn0]. (A.1.22)
Dnt1 ≡ E
[ ∂mnt
∂pnt1
|Ψnt
]
= (0,0,1,0,0)′
Dn1(xn)≡ (D′n11, · · · ,D′nT1)′, and, α6(xn)≡ Dn1[dn1− pn1]. (A.1.23)
Dnt2 ≡ E
[ ∂mnt
∂pnt2
|Ψnt
]
= (0,0,0,1,0)′
Dn2(xn)≡ (D′n12, · · · ,D′nT2)′, and, α7(xn)≡ Dn2[dn2− pn2]. (A.1.24)
Dnt3 ≡ E
[ ∂mnt
∂pnt3
|Ψnt
]
= (0,0,0,0,1)′
Dn3(xn)≡ (D′n13, · · · ,D′nT3)′, and, α8(xn)≡ Dn3[dn3− pn3]. (A.1.25)
For i = 1, · · · ,ρ define.
Dnt0i ≡ E
[
∂mnt
∂p(i)0nt0
|Ψ(i)nt0
]
= βi
(
0,0,
p(i)1nt0
p(i)0nt0
,
p(i)2nt0
p(i)0nt0
,
p(i)3nt0
p(i)0nt0
)′
Dn0i(xn)≡ (D′n10i, · · · ,D′nT 0i)′, and, α9i(xn)≡ Dn0i[dn0− p(i)n0 ]. (A.1.26)
Dnt1i ≡ E
[
∂mnt
∂p(i)0nt1
|Ψ(i)nt1
]
= βi
(
p(i)1nt1
(p(i)0nt1)2
∇h p(i)0nt1,0,
p(i)1nt1
p(i)0nt1
,0,0
)′
Dn1i(xn)≡ (D′n11i, · · · ,D′nT 1i)′, and, α10i(xn)≡ Dn1i[dn1− p(i)n1 ]. (A.1.27)
Dnt2i ≡ E
[
∂mnt
∂p(i)0nt2
|Ψ(i)nt2
]
= βi
(
0,
p(i)2nt2
(p(i)0nt2)2
∇s p(i)0nt2F(xnt)−
p(i)2nt2
p(i)0nt2
∇sF(xnt),0,
p(i)2nt2
p(i)0nt2
F(xnt),0
)′
Dn2i(xn)≡ (D′n12i, · · · ,D′nT 2i)′, and, α11i(xn)≡ Dn2i[dn0− p(i)0n2]. (A.1.28)
Dnt3i ≡ E
[
∂mnt
∂p(i)0nt3
|Ψ(i)nt3
]
= βi
(
0,
p(i)2nt3
(p(i)0nt3)2
∇s p(i)0nt3(1−F(xnt))+
p(i)2nt3
p(i)0nt3
∇sF(xnt),0,
p(i)2nt3
p(i)0nt3
(1−F(xnt)),0
)′
Dn3i(xn)≡ (D′n13i, · · · ,D′nT 3i)′, and, α12i(xn)≡ Dn3i[dn0− p(i)0n3]. (A.1.29)
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Dnt4i ≡ E
[
∂mnt
∂p(i)0nt4
|Ψ(i)nt4
]
= βi

p(i)3nt4
(p(i)0nt4)2
∇h p(i)0nt4F(xnt)− p
(i)
3nt4
p(i)0nt4
∇hF(xnt)
p(i)3nt4
(p(i)0nt4)2
∇s p(i)0nt4F(xnt)− p
(i)
3nt4
p(i)0nt4
∇sF(xnt)
0
0
p(i)3nt4
p(i)0nt4
∇sF(xnt

Dn4i(xn)≡ (D′n14i, · · · ,D′nT 4i)′, and, α13i(xn)≡ Dn4i[dn0− p(i)0n4]. (A.1.30)
Dnt5i ≡ E
[
∂mnt
∂p(i)0nt5
|Ψ(i)nt5
]
= βi

p(i)3nt5
(p(i)0nt5)2
∇h p(i)0nt5(1−F(xnt))+
p(i)3nt5
p(i)0nt5
∇hF(xnt)
p(i)3nt5
(p(i)0nt5)2
∇s p(i)0nt5F(xnt)+
p(i)3nt5
p(i)0nt5
∇sF(xnt)
0
0
p(i)3nt5
p(i)0nt5
∇sF(xnt

Dn5i(xn)≡ (D′n15i, · · · ,D′nT 5i)′, and, α14i(xn)≡ Dn5i[dn0− p(i)0n5]. (A.1.31)
Let f int j ≡ f (Ψint j) be the density of Ψint j j = 1, · · · ,5, i = 1, · · · ,ρ. Define also ϑint j ≡ ( f (Ψint j))−1
∂ f (Ψint j)
∂hn .
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For i = 1, · · · ,ρ let
hMnt1i ≡ E
[
∂mnt
∂∇h p(i)0nt1
|Ψ(i)nt1
]
= βi
(
p(i)1nt1
p(i)0nt1
,0,0,0,0
)′
hhMnt1i ≡ E
[
∂mnt
∂∇h p(i)0nt1∂hnt
|Ψ(i)nt1
]
= βi
(
p(i)1nt1
(p(i)0nt1)2
∇h p(i)0nt1,0,0,0,0
)′
hDnt1i ≡−
[
hhMnt1i + 2 hMnt1iϑint1
] (A.1.32)
hDn1i(xn)≡ ( hD′n11i, · · · , hD′nT 1i)′, and, α15i(xn)≡ hDn1i[dn0− p(i)0n1]. (A.1.33)
sMnt2i ≡ E
[
∂mnt
∂∇s p(i)0nt2
|Ψ(i)nt2
]
= βi
(
0,
p(i)2nt2
p(i)0nt2
F(xnt),0,0,0
)′
ssMnt2i ≡ E
[
∂mnt
∂∇s p(i)0nt2∂snt
|Ψ(i)nt2
]
= βi
(
0,
p(i)2nt2
(p(i)0nt2)2
∇s p(i)0nt1F(xnt)−
p(i)2nt2
p(i)0nt2
∇sF(xnt),0,0,0
)′
sDnt2i ≡−
[
ssMnt2i + 2 sMnt2iϑint2
] (A.1.34)
sDn2i(xn)≡ ( sD′n12i, · · · , sD′nT 2i)′, and, α16i(xn)≡ sDn2i[dn0− p(i)0n2]. (A.1.35)
sMnt3i ≡ E
[
∂mnt
∂∇s p(i)0nt3
|Ψ(i)nt3
]
= βi
(
0,
p(i)3nt3
p(i)0nt3
(1−F(xnt)),0,0,0
)′
ssMnt3i ≡ E
[
∂mnt
∂∇s p(i)0nt3∂snt
|Ψ(i)nt3
]
= βi
(
0,
p(i)3nt3
(p(i)0nt3)2
∇s p(i)0nt1(1−F(xnt))+
p(i)3nt3
p(i)0nt3
∇sF(xnt),0,0,0
)′
sDnt3i ≡−
[
ssMnt3i + 2 sMnt3iϑint3
] (A.1.36)
sDn3i(xn)≡ ( sD′n13i, · · · , sD′nT 3i)′, and, α17i(xn)≡ sDn3i[dn0− p(i)0n3]. (A.1.37)
The construction of hDnt4i and sDnt4i are the same as sDnt2i with the correct indexes. Likewise, the
construction of hDnt5i and sDnt45i are the same as sDnt3i with the correct indexes. This gives additional
influence functions α18i, · · · ,α21i. Define also α(xn)≡∑8j=1 αn j(xn)+∑21j=9 ∑ρi=1 α ji(xn). The fixed trimming
condition, the smoothness properties of m(x, ·), and condition A.1.16 ensures linearization is possible in
the necessary arguments, that the above matrices are well defined (in particular, all expectations are well
defined), and that assumptions 5.1-5.6 of Newey [1994] are satisfied. Define
Mθ ≡ E
[∂m(xn,θ0)
∂θ
]
(A.1.38)
W ≡ E[{m(xn,θ0)+ α(xn)}{m(xn,θ0)+ α(xn)}′] (A.1.39)
Therefore, by lemma 5.3 of Newey [1994], we have that
√
N(θN −θ0) p→ N(0,V ),
where
V ≡ (M′θΩ−1Mθ)−1M′θΩ−1WΩ−1Mθ(M′θΩ−1Mθ)−1 (A.1.40)
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A consistent estimator of jacobians with respect to the finite dimensional parameters are obtained by replac-
ing the parameters (both finite and infinite dimensional) with their respective estimates and taking averages
over N. A consistent estimator jacobians with respect to the ccp’s and their derivatives are obtained by
replacing the parameters with their estimated counterparts and then performing nonparametric regression of
these quantities on their appropriate conditioning vectors Ψin j. The residuals needed to complete the for-
mation of αˆ(xn) are readily obtained from all the parametric and nonparametric pre-estimates. By similar
substitutions and averaging consistent estimates of Mθ m(xnt ,θ), and Ω are formed, denoted by Mnθ, mN(xn),
and ΩN , A consistent estimate of W is then obtained by
W N = N−1
N
∑
n=1
[
mN(xn)+ α
N(xn)
][
mN(xn)+ α
N(xn)
]′
. (A.1.41)
Putting all these estimated quantities together, a consistent estimator for the asymptotic variance is given by
V N ≡ (MN′θ (ΩN)−1MNθ )−1 MN′θ (ΩN)−1W N (ΩN)−1 MNθ (MN′θ (ΩN)−1 MNθ )−1 . (A.1.42)
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A.2 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3.2
Proof. Inverting the index functions ϕ0 and ϕ1 in equations (3.2.3) and (3.3.1) respectively gives:
ϕ−10 (x′itβ0 + f0(zi)) = ϕ−11 (x′it β1 + f1(zi))⇔
x′itβ0 + f0(zi) = ϕ0(ϕ−11 (x′itβ1 + f1(zi))), (A.2.1)
since both sides of the first equality are equal to Pit0. Also, since the index function is strictly increasing, it is
differentiable almost everywhere. Differentiating equation (A.2.1) with respect to the continuous regressor
xitk gives:
a :=
β0k
β1k =
ϕ′0(ϕ−11 (x′itβ1 + f1(zi)))
ϕ′1(ϕ−11 (x′itβ1 + f1(zi)))
> 0, (A.2.2)
where the positive sign follows trivially from the assumption that the index function is strictly increasing.
We have from equation (A.2.2) that ϕ′0(Pit0) = aϕ′1(Pit0) which implies that:
ϕ0(Pit0) = aϕ1(Pit0)+ c. (A.2.3)
Taking first difference of equations (3.2.3), (3.3.1) and (A.2.3) we have that:
∆[ϕ0(Pit0)] = ∆x′itβ0
∆[ϕ1(Pit0)] = ∆x′itβ1
∆[ϕ0(Pit0)] = a∆[ϕ1(Pit0)] (A.2.4)
which implies that
a∆[ϕ1(Pit0)] = ∆x′itβ0
a∆[ϕ1(Pit0)] = a∆x′it β1. (A.2.5)
Equating the RHS of the equations in (A.2.5), pre-multiplying by ∆x′it and taking expectations gives:
E[∆xit∆x′it ]β0 = aE[∆xit∆x′it ]β1. (A.2.6)
Then by the invertibility of E[∆xit∆x′it ] we have
β0 = aβ1. (A.2.7)
The assumption that ||β0||= ||β1||= 1 implies from equation (A.2.7)that |a|= 1. But a > 0, which implies
that a = 1. Thus equations (A.2.7) and (A.2.3) imply that:
β0 = β1 (A.2.8)
ϕ0(Pit) = ϕ1(Pit)+ c. (A.2.9)
From equations (A.2.8) and (A.2.9), (3.2.3) becomes:
ϕ1(Pit0)+ c = ∆x′itβ1 + f0(zi)
⇒ ∆x′itβ1 + f1(zi)+ c = ∆x′itβ1 + f0(zi)
⇒ f1(zi)+ c = f0(zi). (A.2.10)
This completes the first part of the proof. The fact that c = 0, follows from assumption (3.3.1.1) and equation
(A.2.10) by taking the expectations of both sides of equation (A.2.10).
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A.2.2 Finite Entropy Lemma
For any given R > 0, let
G := {S(x,β,ϕ,P0) | ‖β‖K ≤ 1,ϕ ∈ SK }.
Then we have the following result:
Lemma A.2.1. If assumption (3.6.2) holds, then
1. The class G is uniformly bounded.
2. For any δ > 0,
H∞(δ,G)≤C1 ln
(
4C2 + δ
δ
)
+
C3
δ ,
for some C1 > 0, C2 > 0 and C3 > 0, where H∞(δ,G) is the δ-entropy of G for the supremum norm (See
Definition 2.3 of van de Geer [2000]).
Proof. Since η is continuous, it is bounded over K , say with lower and upper bounds R1 and R2 respectively.
Thus the set SK is uniformly bounded. Thus, S(x,β,ϕ,P0)≤ (‖∆Xi‖T2 .‖β‖2 +2(T −1)‖ϕ‖)2 ≤ (R0 +2(T −
1)R)2 for some R > 0.
Note that the entropy of the class G is at most that of the cartesian product BK(0,1)×G . The ball BK(0,1)
can be covered by
(
8+δ
δ
)K
balls with radius δ2 (van de Geer, 2000). Since a ball of radius δ can be covered
by a K-dimensional cube of length 2δ, the ball BK(0,1) can be covered by
(
8+δ
δ
)K
cubes of diameter δ. This
in turn implies that H∞ (δ,BK(0,1)) ≤ K ln
(
8+δ
δ
)
. Furthermore, there is a constant C such that the entropy
H∞(δ,C := {g : K → [R1,R2] |
∫
K |g′(x)|dx ≤ M}) has the upper bound Cδ for some C > 0, (van de Geer
[2000]). G(R) is included in C . The entropy bound now results from the fact that the entropy of a cartesian
product is the sum of the entropies of the sets in the product.
Corollary A.2.2. If assumptions (3.6.2) holds, then the following uniform convergence holds:
sup
(β,ϕ)∈G
|SN(x,β,ϕ,P0)−S0(x,β,ϕ,P0)| → 0, Q-almost surely.
Proof. Lemma A.2.1 establishes that G has finite entropy in the sup-norm. Lemma 2.1 of van de Geer
[2000] shows that the entropy in the sup-norm bounds above the entropy with bracketing for the L1(Q)-
metric, implying finite entropy with bracketing in the L1(Q)-metric. Then apply Lemma 3.1 of van de Geer
[2000] to see that G satisfies the ULLN.
A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 3.6.3
Proof. Define
m(xi,β,ϕ,Pi) := ∆ϕ(Pi)−∆xiβ
S(xi,β,ϕ,Pi) := m(xi,β,ϕ,Pi)′m(xi,β,ϕ,Pi)
SN(β,ϕ,P) := 1N
N
∑
i=1
S(xi,β,ϕ,Pi)
S0(β,ϕ,P) := E[S(x,β,ϕ,P)].
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Clearly, the pair ( ˆβ, ϕˆ) is defined to be minimizing SN(β,ϕ, ˆP), and (β0,ϕ0) minimizes S0(β,ϕ,P0). In fact
S0(β0,ϕ0,P0) = SN(β0,ϕ0,P0) = 0. Thus
SN( ˆβ, ϕˆ, ˆP) ≤ SN(β0,ϕ0, ˆP) p−→ 0, (A.2.11)
by the continuous mapping theorem. Thus from equation (A.2.11) we have:
0≤ S0( ˆβ, ϕˆ,P0) = SN( ˆβ, ϕˆ, ˆP)+ S0( ˆβ, ϕˆ,P0)−SN( ˆβ, ϕˆ, ˆP)
≤ |S0( ˆβ, ϕˆ,P0)−SN( ˆβ, ϕˆ,P0)|
+|SN( ˆβ, ϕˆ,P0)−SN( ˆβ, ϕˆ, ˆP)|+ op(1) (A.2.12)
The first term of the RHS of the last inequality is an op(1) by corollary (A.2.2). To see that the last term is
also an op(1), we add and subtract m(xi, ˆβ, ϕˆ, ˆPi)′m(xi, ˆβ, ϕˆ,Pi0) to get the following:
|SN( ˆβ, ϕˆ,P0)−SN( ˆβ, ϕˆ, ˆP)|
≤ 1
N
N
∑
i=1
{[
‖m(xi, ˆβ, ϕˆ, ˆPi)‖T2 +‖m(xi, ˆβ, ϕˆ,Pi0)‖T2
]
‖m(xi, ˆβ, ϕˆ, ˆPi)−m(xi, ˆβ, ϕˆ,Pi0)‖T2
}
≤ C 1
N
N
∑
i=1
{
‖m(xi, ˆβ, ϕˆ, ˆPi)−m(xi, ˆβ, ϕˆ,Pi0)‖T2
}
≤ C 1
N
N
∑
i=1
sup
ϕ∈SK
‖ϕ( ˆPi)−ϕ(Pi0)‖T2 . (A.2.13)
As discussed in the proof of Lemma A.2.1, the set SK has finite entropy in the sup-norm, and is thus totally
bounded in the sup-norm. Its closure SK is therefore a compact set of continuous functions defined on K .
Since ˆPi → Pi0 in probability, by the continuous mapping theorem, the sequence (ϕ( ˆPi)−ϕ(Pi0)) converges
pointwise (i.e., for each ϕ) to 0 over SK . Note also that SK is equicontinuous by the Arzela-Ascoli theorem.
Since SK is compact, the sequence also converges uniformly in SK , implying,
sup
ϕ∈SK
‖ϕ( ˆPi)−ϕ(Pi0)‖T2
p−→ 0
as n→∞. This in turn implies that the last term on the RHS of equation (A.2.13) goes to zero in probability.
Then from equation (A.2.12) we have that
0≤ S0( ˆβ, ϕˆ,P0)≤ op(1). (A.2.14)
Since the model is identified, for all δ > 0 there exists ε > 0 such that
d[(β,ϕ),(β0,ϕ0)] > δ⇒ S0(β,ϕ,P0) > ε.
So we have that
Pr{d[( ˆβ, ϕˆ),(β0,ϕ0)] > δ} ≤ Pr{(S0( ˆβ, ϕˆ,P0) > ε} −→ 0,
where the convergence comes from equation (A.2.14). This proves that ˆβ p−→ β and supP∈K |ϕˆ(P)−
ϕ0(P)| p−→ 0.
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A.2.4 Proof of Theorem 3.6.4
Proof. The proof of asymptotic normality of ˆβ relies heavily on the results in Newey and McFadden [1994].
By consistency results, we have ϕˆ = ϕ0 + oP(1). The consistency of ˆβ also implies ˆβ = β0 + oP(1). Hence,
we have
∆xi ˆβ = ∆[ϕˆ( ˆPi)]
= ∆[ϕ0( ˆPi)]+ (∆[ϕˆ( ˆPi)]−∆[ϕ0( ˆPi)])
= ∆[ϕ0( ˆPi)]+oP(1). (A.2.15)
Identification of the model and the above implies the following equality
∆xi( ˆβ−β0) = ∆[ϕ0( ˆPi)]−∆[ϕ0(Pi0)]+oP(1)
∆xi( ˆβ−β0) = Ri( ˆPi−Pi0)+ oP(1),
∆x′i∆xi( ˆβ−β0) = ∆x′iRi( ˆPi−Pi0)+ oP(1),
∆x′i∆xi( ˆβ−β0) = ∆x′iRi( ˆPi−Pi0)+ oP(1),
√
N
(∑Ni=1 ∆x′i∆xi
N
)
( ˆβ−β0) = 1√N
N
∑
i=1
∆x′iRi( ˆPi−Pi0)+ oP(1/
√
N) (A.2.16)
The second equality is due to the mean value theorem, where Ri is as in the statement of the theorem, except
that the components ¯Pit , are between ˆPit and Pit0. Linearizing ˆPit around Pit0 and stacking in t gives:
√
N
(∑Ni=1 ∆x′i∆xi
N
)
( ˆβ−β0) = 1√N
N
∑
i=1
∆x′iRi f−1(wi)Gi[γˆ(wi)− γ0(wi)]
+C
√
N‖γˆ(wi)− γ0(wi)‖2 + oP( 1√N ) (A.2.17)
where
f−1(wi) =

f−1(wi1) 0 · · · 0
0 f−1(wi2) · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 · · · f−1(wiT )

Gi =

−Pi10 1 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 −Pi20 1 · · · 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 0 0 · · · −PiT0 1

[γˆ(wi)− γ0(wi)] =

γˆ1(wi1)− γ10(wi1)
γˆ2(wi1)− γ20(wi1)
.
.
.
γˆ1(wiT )− γ10(wiT )
γˆ2(wi1)− γ20(wi1)

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For notational convenience, define the T × 2T matrix Mi := ∆X ′i Ri f−1(wi)Gi. As discussed in equation
(3.6.1), the second to term on the RHS of equation (A.2.17) converges to zero in probability. Then from
equation (A.2.17) we have:
√
N
(∑Ni=1 ∆x′i∆xi
N
)
( ˆβ−β0) =
√
N
∫
M(w)[γˆ(w)− γ0(w)] f (w)dw
+
[
1√
N
N
∑
i=1
M(wi)[γˆ(wi)− γ0(wi)]
−
√
N
∫
M(w)[γˆ(w)− γ0(w)] f (w)dw
]
+oP(
1√
N
) (A.2.18)
Equation (3.6.1) along with the triangle inequality results in the term in brackets on the RHS of equation
being an oP(1/
√
N). As for the first term on the RHS:
∫
M(w)[γˆ(w)− γ0(w)] f (w)dw = N−1
N
∑
i=1
∫
M(w)qiJσ(w−wi) f (w)dw (A.2.19)
−
∫
M(w)γ0 f (w)dw
= N−1
N
∑
i=1
∫
[ f (w)M(w)qi−E[ f (w)M(w)q]]Jσ(w−wi)dw.
As discussed in Newey and McFadden [1994], the conditions in assumption 3.6 ensures that this integral is
close to the empirical measure. This with equation (A.2.18) implies that
√
N
(∑Ni=1 ∆x′i∆xi
N
)
( ˆβ−β0) = 1√N
N
∑
i=1
[ f (w)M(w)qi−E[ f (w)M(w)q]]
+oP(
1√
N
) (A.2.20)
Substituting for M(w) and observing that by the law of iterated expectations, the term on the RHS in expec-
tations is zero, we have the following:
√
N
(∑Ni=1 ∆x′i∆xi
N
)
( ˆβ−β0) = 1√N
N
∑
i=1
∆x′iRi(yi−Pi0)+ op(
1√
N
)
=
1√
N
N
∑
i=1
∆x′iRiεi + oP(
1√
N
) (A.2.21)
The result then follows immediately from the Slutsky theorem combined with the WLLN and a multivariate
version of the Linberg-Levy CLT.
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A.2.5 Proof of Theorem 3.6.5
Proof. The proof of efficiency uses the results developed in Newey [1994]. To proceed, we first set up the
environment so that the results are directly applicable.
Notice that the model construction in section 3.2 implies the following equivalent moment condition
EQ[∆x′i(∆[ϕ0(Pi0)]−∆xiβ0)] = EQ[m˜(xi,β,ϕ,Pi0)] = 0.
This moment condition can be seen as the first order condition of S(xi,β,ϕ,Pi) with respect to beta. Further-
more, the limit of our estimate ϕˆ maximizes EQ[S(xi,β,ϕ,Pi)]. Thus by proposition 2 of Newey [1994], the
estimation of ϕ can be ignored in calculating the asymptotic variance. So we work only with ϕ = ϕ0.
Let the distribution Q belong to a general family of distributions Q . Define the parametric sub-
model Q (θ) := {Qθ : Qθ ∈ Q , Qθ = Q0 at θ = 0}. We assume fθ to be a probability density relative to
a fixed measure µ, the map θ 7→
√ fθ(w) is continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of 0, and θ 7→∫ [
(∂ fθ/∂θ)2/ fθ
]
dµ is finite and continuous in this neighborhood. Then by Lemma 1.9 of van der Vaart
[1998], θ 7→ Qθ is a differentiable path. We use this differentiable path to induce parametric submodels for
the parameters that ˆβ and ˆPi are estimating. That is, we define µ(θ) = µ(Qθ) := plim ˆβ and Pi(θ) = Pi(Qθ) :=
plim ˆPi, where µ(Qθ) satisfies:
Eθ[m˜(x,µ,P(θ))] = 0 (A.2.22)
The rest of the proof involves finding the pathwise derivative d(w) satisfying ∂µ(θ)∂θ = E[d(w)g(w)], where
g(w) := ∂∂θ|θ=0 ln fθ(w) is the corresponding score. Then the variance bound for the estimation of µ(θ) is
Var(d(w)). Differentiating equation (A.2.22) with respect to θ and solving for ∂µ(θ)∂θ gives
∂µ(θ)
∂θ = −M
−1
{
E
[ ∂
∂Pm˜(x,β0,P(θ))
∂P(w,θ)
∂θ
]
+
∂
∂θEθ [m˜(x,β0,P0)]
}
, (A.2.23)
where M := ∂∂βE[m˜(x,β0P0)] = E[∆x′∆x], which is invertible by assumption (3.3.1.3). From equation
(A.2.22), the last term on the RHS of equation (A.2.23) is zero. Defining δ(x) := ∂∂Pm˜(x,β0,P(θ)) and
applying the law of iterated expectations to P(w,θ) = E[y|w] gives
∂µ(θ)
∂θ = −M
−1
{ ∂
∂θEθ[δ(w)(y−P0(w))]
}
= [−(M−1δ(w)(y−P0))S(w)] (A.2.24)
Thus giving d(w) =−M−1δ(w)(y−P0). Noting that δ(wi) = ∆x′iRi, we have that
Var(d(w)) = E[∆x′∆x]−1E[∆x′R]ΩE[R′∆x]E[∆x′∆x]−1 (A.2.25)
which is the asymptotic variance of ˆβ derived in theorem 3.6.4.
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A.2.6 Contraction Mapping
Proof. Here we show that equation (3.5.4) indeed defines a contraction mapping. For simplicity we drop
the s subscript. Recall that the usual kernel smoother is indeed a projection (see Mammen et al., 2001). We
therefore write equation (3.5.4) as:
ϕ j+1(P) = PrPt ∆x ˆβ+ PrPt ϕ j( ˆPt−1). (A.2.26)
Taking differences gives
ϕ j+1(P)−ϕ j(P) = PrPt ϕ j( ˆPt−1)−PrPt ϕ j−1( ˆPt−1). (A.2.27)
= PrPt
(
ϕ j( ˆPt−1)−ϕ j−1( ˆPt−1)
)
. (A.2.28)
Computing these projections at ˆPt−1 and norming both sides of this equation gives the inequality
‖ϕ j+1( ˆPt−1)−ϕ j( ˆPt−1)‖ < ‖ϕ j( ˆPt−1)−ϕ j−1( ˆPt−1)‖, (A.2.29)
since the projection is a contraction mapping.
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A.3 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
We prove here two lemmas which are used in the paper to evaluate Taylor Series expansions for composite
and inverse functions. Lemma 1 is taken from MMRS but is included here for the ease of reference.
Lemma A.3.1. Let
f (u) =
∞
∑
j=0
f j(u−u0) j, g(t) =
∞
∑
j=0
g j(t− t0) j, (A1)
together with u0 = g(t0). Then
( f ◦g)(t) =
∞
∑
j=0
a j(t− t0) j (A2)
where a0 = f0 and for j ≥ 1
a j =
j
∑
k=1
fkθk, j (A3)
and where the θs are evaluated recursively as follows
θk, j =
j−k+1
∑
s=1
gsθk−1, j−s, 1≤ k ≤ j (A4)
with θ0,0 = 1.
Proof: We have
( f ◦g)(t) =
∞
∑
k=0
fk
[
∞
∑
s=1
gs(t− t0)s
]k
(A5)
Whence a j is given by formula (A3) where θk, j denotes the coefficient of (t− t0) j in the k-th power of the
factor in brackets. Formula (A4) follows from the identity
∞
∑
j=k
θk, j(t− t0) j =
[
∞
∑
r=k−1
θk−1,r(t− t0)r
]
·
[
∞
∑
s=1
gs(t− t0)s
]
(A6)
Lemma A.3.2. Let f−1 denote the inverse of f
f−1(x) =
∞
∑
j=0
h j(x− x0) j (A7)
with x0 = f (t0). Then
h0 = x0, h1 = f−11 (A8)
h j =− f− j1 ·
[ j−1
∑
k=1
hkθk, j
]
(A9)
Proof: We apply Lemma 1 together with g = f−1, whence
(g−1 ◦g)(t) = t = t0 +(t− t0)
This implies that a0 = a1 = 1 and a j = 0 for j > 1 in Formula (A3). The proof follows from formulae (A3)
and (A4), with the latter implying that θ j, j = f g1 .
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